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Abstract: PhD thesis, University of Durham 2005 
The British Government, the newspapers and the German problem 1937-39 
Michael Meznar 
British newspaper attitudes towards Neville Chamberlain's `appeasement' of Nazi 
Germany have long attracted historical criticism; and in the now-orthodox interpretation 
of Richard Cockett's Twilight of Truth (1989), the government is said to have exerted 
such influence, even `control', over newspapers that criticism of its foreign policy was 
effectively suppressed, and freedom of the press subverted. 
This thesis reassesses government-newspaper relations from 1937 to the end of 
appeasement in 1939. It argues that while government did seek to influence newspaper 
comment, this was hardly a new development; and if new in intensity, this was a 
reaction to the greater interwar political independence of newspapers. While making 
full use of government records and private papers, in contrast to Cockett's work the 
thesis also pays close attention to actual newspaper content. Newspapers with different 
political stances and forms of ownership are examined, from the `establishment' Times, 
the Conservative Daily Telegraph, the main Beaverbrook newspapers, The Yorkshire 
Post and Manchester Guardian as examples of provincial papers, the Liberal News 
Chronicle, to the main Labour opposition paper, The Daily Herald. 
It is argued that newspaper independence remained strong, and `press freedom' 
continued to be jealously guarded. Papers which supported government policy did so 
for their own long-established reasons; others were constrained by their inconsistent 
foreign-policy stances, or at dangerous periods (especially the Czechoslovakian crisis) 
temporarily moderated their criticism from a sense of national responsibility, not 
because of government pressure; and other newspapers remained persistently critical. 
Government efforts to influence the press had very limited and sporadic success. 
Moreover, not only did all major newspapers continue to report the views of anti- 
appeasers; tellingly, these anti-appeasers made no substantial complaints of government 
suppression of alternative views. Government-newspaper relations in the late 1930s 
were more complex and subtle than recent accounts have suggested. 
I declare that no portion of this thesis has previously been submitted for a 
degree in this or any other university. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been a common assumption that Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy 
received overwhelming support from the British public. Most leading politicians in the late 
1930s believed this was so, and historians long accepted the claims of former policy makers 
that until 1939 public opinion was a constraint on any firmer stance towards Nazi 
Germany. ' However, more recent studies have shown that Chamberlain had less support 
than he claimed, especially at the time of the 1938 Czechoslovakian crisis. 2 This leads to 
doubt about what had always been one of the main justifications of Chamberlain's policies 
- that he was doing what most British people wanted. 
A central question is: why was `appeasement' apparently so strongly supported, 
given the manifestly evil and aggressive nature of Nazi Germany? After 1940 the policy 
was very widely repudiated and condemned, so much so that for a long period it seemed 
difficult to understand why and how it had obtained any significant support. One 
assumption was that the political public was deluded or misled about the character of the 
Nazi regime, its threat to Britain and the prospects of appeasement. But how was this 
achieved, if such was the case? 
A possible argument is the strength of government propaganda, upheld - perhaps 
encouraged - by newspapers. The press's attitude towards appeasement was important 
because in the 1930s, newspapers were for most of the British public the major source of 
' E. g. Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), pp. 327-8,375, and David Dutton, 
Neville Chamberlain (London, 2001), p. 2. 
2 See Anthony Adamthwaite, `The British Government and the media', 1937-38', JCH 18 (1983), 281, and 
Dutton, Neville Chamberlain, p. 53. See also N. J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the 
European Dictators 1935-1940 (London, 1997), for growing criticism within local Conservative 
constituencies. 
information about foreign affairs. 3 Though valuable as a source, newspapers are difficult to 
assess as an indicator of public opinion, because of the problems in detecting the reactions 
of the readers. The fact that a newspaper was bought reveals nothing much about whether 
the readers read the leaders, or agreed or were influenced by them. 4 As Dutton has stated, 
`there seems no entirely satisfactory answer to the question of whether the press sets out to 
shape political opinion or merely to reflect it. In all probability there is truth in both 
propositions'. 5 No attempt has been made in the present study to determine what impact the 
newspapers had on the political consciousness of Britain as a whole, although occasional 
and instructive observations on this issue from journalists themselves are noted. Not even 
people closely involved were confident about the impact: `I sometimes think that we have a 
tremendous influence', Lord Beaverbrook said in 1948, but `then I get quite despondent 
about it'. 6 
One authoritative verdict on the impact of media on its audience has concluded that 
it is `more likely to reinforce opinions than convert them', therefore limiting its power to 
change political ideas. 7 Nevertheless, it is important that in the 1930s newspaper owners, 
journalists and readers not only believed that newspapers had considerable influence on 
public opinion, but that it was assumed that they could change the way politicians acted. 
This assumption, in turn, had an effect on politicians. Hence, obviously, the great concern 
3 See Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge, Britain by Mass Observation (London, 1939), p. 30. 
4 See Paul Addison, The Road to 1945. British politics and the Second World liar (London 1982), p. 15 
5 Dutton, Neville Chamberlain, p. 3. 
6 Beaverbrook in Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence, (London, 1949), q. 8662 (18 March 
1948). 
' Colin Seymour-Ure, The Political Impact of Mass Media (London, 1974), pp. 41-63,74. 
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of politicians about the state of the press. 8 `Mistaken or not, this conviction created its own 
reality. '9 
*** 
During the last fifteen years, British newspapers have been strongly criticised for 
their stances on foreign policy in the 1930s, especially during the premiership of Neville 
Chamberlain. The main charge has been that most newspapers too readily supported his 
policy of appeasement towards Hitler and Mussolini. A stronger and more specific charge 
has been that they did so because the government was able to `manipulate' or even 
`control' news and comment, to the point - it has been argued - of suppressing true press 
freedom. 
Such charges were not entirely new. Criticism of the role of the press, or of 
particular newspapers, began during the reactions against appeasement during the Second 
World War and played some part in the post-war Labour government's decision to appoint 
the Royal Commission on the Press (1947-49). However, that enquiry was unable to 
confirm the alleged government pressure, 10 a verdict apparently confirmed by an important 
contemporary and authoritative study of the newspapers by a leading proprietor. ' 
8 Colin Seymour-Ure, The Press, Politics and the Public. An Essay on the Role of the National Press in the 
British Political System (London, 1968), p. 14. 
9 Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, vol. ii, The Twentieth Century (London, 
1984), p. 7. 
10 See Royal Commission on the Press, 1947-49, Report (Cmnd 7700; London, 1949), para. 18, p. 4. 
" See Viscount Camrose, British Newspapers and Their Controllers (London, 1947), and Tom Harris, `The 
Popular Press', Horizon (1940), 158-74. Cf. Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Weekend .4 
Social 
HistorY of Great Britain 1918-1939 (London, 1940; 1950 edn. ), p. 432. 
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Since the 1940s, a considerable amount has been written about British newspapers 
in the early twentieth century. 12 Much of this literature has been in the form of histories of 
particular newspapers, or biographies of their proprietors or editors. Though valuable as 
sources of information, by their nature they can give only limited assessments on the 
central issue for the appeasement years, the relationship between the government and the 
press in general, or at least the major national newspapers, 13 
In one important instance, however, such studies did generate a debate about 
government influence: that of Britain's most respected newspaper, The Times. After 1940 
The Times had joined the general criticism of appeasement, and in the early 1950s its own 
official history denounced its earlier support for Chamberlain's policies. It did so partly in 
terms of the newspaper's journalistic structure at the time - notably its lack of a foreign 
editor14 - but it also condemned the editor, Geoffrey Dawson, not just for his commitment 
to appeasement but even for trying to do the government's job: `to assist a government of 
whatever complexion to find a national policy had become one of the important functions 
12 Most notably Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. The Gathering Storm (London, 1948); Cato, 
Guilty Men (London, 1940); and Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946). 
13 Significant studies have been: David Ayerst, Garvin of the Observer (London, 1985); ibid., Guardian. 
Biography of a Newspaper (London, 1971); Anne Chisholm and Michael Davie, Lord Beaverbrook.. 4 Life 
(New York, 1993); Richard Cockett, David Astor and the Observer (London, 1991); Duff Hart-Davis, The 
House the Berry Built. Inside the Telegraph, 1928-1986 (London, 1990); Lord Hartwell, William Camrose. 
Giant of Fleet Street (London, 1992); David Hubback, No Ordinary Press Baron. .4 Life of Sir [falter 
Layton (London, 1985); Markus Huttner, Britische Presse und nationalsozialistischer Kirchenkampf. Eine 
Untersuchung der 'Times' und des 'Manchester Guardian' von 1930 bis 1939 (Paderborn, 1995); R. J. 
Minney, Viscount Southwood (London, 1954); A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972; Colin Seymour- 
Ure and Jim Schoff, David Low (London, 1985); Huw Richards, The Bloody Circus. The Daily Herald and 
the Left (London, 1997), p. 7; Adrian Smith, `The Fall and Fall of the Third Daily Herald, 1930-64, in Peter 
Catterall, Colin Seymour-Ure and Adrian Smith (eds. ), Northcliffe's Legacy. Aspects of the British Popular 
Press, 1896-1996 (London, 2000), 169-200; John Stubbs, `Appearance and reality: a case study of the 
Observer and J. L. Garvin, 1914-1942', in George Boyce, James Curran and Pauline Wingate (eds. ), 
Newspaper History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day (London, 1978), pp. 320-338; James 
Thomas, `A Bad Press?: Popular Newspapers, the Labour Party and British Politics from Northcliffe to 
Blair' (PhD thesis, University College Swansea, 1999). 
4 History of The Times, vol. iv (London, 1952), p. 815. 
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of The Times'. 15 In a more specific allegation, the History of The Times accused Dawson of 
doctoring articles by the paper's Berlin Correspondent Norman Ebbutt, to suit the cause of 
British appeasement. 16 Wrench, in his biography of Dawson, was quick to defend his 
actions. " Similar, McLachlan in his later study of the deputy editor, Robert Barrington- 
Ward, claimed that what both did was common journalistic practice: though articles were 
cut, they were not censored or distorted to support appeasement. 18 An early German 
commentator, Abshagen, went still further, denying any influence of the British 
government on the editorial policy. 19 Though he saw the danger of Dawson's involvement 
with the government through his personal friendships with ministers, he argued that this 
was not a one-way-channel of influence; it was difficult to say who influenced whom, and 
in some cases the leading hand came from The Times office. 20 
Nevertheless, in the 1960s, the accusation that Dawson's intervention in the news 
columns was politically motivated became dominant. Both A. J. P. Taylor and Martin 
Gilbert accused Dawson of applying improper means like `suppression' to achieve 
influence, 21 while Francis Williams criticised Dawson of being `a committed man', too 
closely involved with the government and lacking a vital journalistic prerequisite: 
15 Ibid., p. 1008. 
16 See ibid., p. 908. 
17 Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times (London, 1955), p. 373. '$ Donald McLachlan, In the Chair, Barrington-Ward of The Times 1927-1948 (London, 1971), pp. 131-8; 
more recently see Oliver Woods and James Bishop, The Story of The Times. Bicentenary Edition 1785-1985 
(London, rev. ed. 1985), pp. 294-5. 
19 Karl Heinz Abshagen, `Geschichte einer Zeitung als Weltgeschichte. Die Times" 
in der ersten 
Jahrhunderthälfte',. -lussenpolitik 3 (1952), pp. 721-32, here p. 721. 20 See ibid., p. 729. 
21 A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-46 (Oxford, 1965), p. 418, and Martin Gilbert, The Roots of 
Appeasement (London 1966), p. 143; see also Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London, 
1963), pp. 77-81; and see Keith Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and Germany, 
1937-39 (London, 1972), pp. 102,288. 
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detachment. 22 But both explanations originated from a belief that Dawson's personal 
ambitions were his guiding principle, rather than from an argument about governmental 
pressure. On the press in general, Williams did not deny government or political influence 
but claimed that this was just one of many different kinds of influences. 23 
For the most part, the burgeoning literature on appeasement during the 1960s and 
1970s used newspapers as source material, rather than investigating whether they 
themselves played a part in the policies. A notable exception was Appeasement on Trial, by 
the American historian William R. Rock. Analysing the position of the British press in 
1938-9, he stated that press coverage `generally followed partisan political lines'. 24 Yet 
even here the role of the government in influencing each paper's position remained mainly 
in the dark. It is indicative that where he referred to an active government press policy, as 
with an initiative by Hoare in speaking with press controllers in September 1938, Rock 
concluded that the British newspapers' position `might well have been the case even 
without Hoare's efforts'. 25 His assumption of an independent press was further supported 
by his discussion of episodes like the May crisis of 1938, or the calls for an alliance with 
Russia or for the inclusion of Churchill in the government, where the change of newspaper 
attitudes was because they were `considerably ahead of the government in its recognition of 
the failure of appeasement'. 26 
It was primarily German historians who gave extended consideration to British 
newspaper attitudes towards Germany. Early German historical studies concentrated upon 
22 Francis Williams, Dangerous Estate: the Anatomy of Newspapers (London, 1957), pp. 272-5; see also 
History of The Times, p. 1008. 
23 Williams, Dangerous Estate, p. 271. 
24 William R. Rock, Appeasement on Trial: British Foreign Policy and its Critics, 1938-1939 (Hampden, 
Conn., 1966), p. 43. See also his British Appeasement in the 1930s (London, 1984), p. 82. 
25 Rock, Appeasement on Trial, p. 124. 
26 Rock, British Appeasement, p. 82, and Rock, Appeasement on Trial, pp. 98,158. 
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discussions of the rise of Hitler and the NSDAP in the coverage of foreign observers as one 
means of considering how this could have happened, as well as from interest in how Britain 
dealt with the problem. 27 Central to this early research was the question of how British 
newspapers reported the personality of Hitler and the character of his party. 28 Later studies 
saw newspaper images of Germany as being determined mostly by foreign-policy 
responses to German expansionism; in other words, the initial analysis of German domestic 
politics was overshadowed by the supposedly more weighty events of foreign policy. 29 
Holzweißig, for example, concentrated on 1935, a date to which he attached great 
importance for the development of a British answer to Hitler's foreign policy. With the help 
of files from the German Foreign Office, Holzweißig argued that German government 
propaganda had significant influence on published opinion in Britain. 30 
British historians of newspapers took no obvious account of this German literature. 
Their interest mainly focused on British press commentaries on Germany, rather than on 
the press's relationship with the government. Although Gannon could have had access to 
27 Brigitte Granzow, A Mirror of Nazism. British Opinion and the Emergence of Hitler 1929-1933 (London, 
1964); Eva Pfeifer, `Das Hitlerbild im Spiegel einiger konservativer Zeitungen in den Jahren 1929-1933' 
(PhD thesis, University of Heidelberg, 1965); Helmut Illert, `Die deutsche Rechte der Weimarer Republik im 
Urteil der englischen Presse 1928-1932' (PhD thesis, University of Cologne, 1987); Herbert Behrendt, 
`British Opinion and the Rise of Hitler in the 1920s. The Assessment of the Foreign Office, the Press and 
Intellectuals' (D. Phil, University of Oxford, 1982). 
28 On this aspect see the research report of Gerhard Schreiber, Hitler. Interpretationen 1923-1983. 
Ergebnisse, Methoden und Probleme der Forschung (Darmstadt, 1984), pp. 73-87, which is focused on the 
foreign perception of Hitler. See also William F. Sheldon, `Das Hitler-Bild in der Time" 
1923-1933', in 
Joachim Hütter, Reinhard Meyers and Dietrich Papenfuss (eds. ), Tradition und Neubeginn (Cologne, 1975), 
p. 74. 
29 Rolf Kieser, Englands Appeasementpolitik und der Aufstieg des Dritten Reiches im Spiegel der britischen 
Presse (1933-1939). Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Winterthur, 1964); and Markus 
Huttner, Britische Presse und nationalsozialistischer Kirchenkampf. Eine Untersuchung der 'Times' und des 
'Manchester Guardian' von 1930 bis 1939 (Paderborn, 1995), p. 19. 
30 Günther Holzweißig, Das Deutschlandbild der britischen Presse im Jahre 1935. Ein Beitrag -ur 
Grundlegung der englischen Appeasementpolitik (Hamburg, 1967), pp. 86-107. See also Dietrich Aigner, 
Das Ringen um England. Das deutsch-britische 1 erhältnis. Die öffentliche Meinung. Tragödie zweier 
Völker (Munich-Esslingen, 1969); Manfred Lessle, Englands Weg zum Appeasement, 1932-1936. Ein 
Beitrag zur l orkriegsgeschichte Englands, dargestellt unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Presse 
(Heidelberg, 1969). 
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unpublished government papers, he did not consult them and the role of the government is 
largely excluded from his study. Gannon set out very concisely what the papers said about 
Germany during the 1930s, but he could make only hesitant comments about exactly why 
they said it. 31 Gannon did, though, reject on general grounds the claim of deliberate 
censorship of news and commentary critical of the dictators. For a quality paper like The 
Times, despite the close relationship between Dawson and Chamberlain, such influence 
seemed to be unthinkable: 
To think that Dawson would intervene to censor news he found disagreeable from 
his own or the paper's point of view is to understand neither the paper nor the man. 
It also neglects to take into account the journalistic integrity of the people whose 
work would thus be censored for policy, and, especially in domestic affairs, a well- 
informed readership which would be immediately aware of any such 
32 tendentiousness. 
In the case of popular newspapers, supposedly chiefly interested in maximising profits, any 
manipulation was again disregarded, because `both financially and intellectually it was 
unwise or impossible for the British Press to adopt a strongly critical line towards Nazi 
Germany: the readers did not want to read it, and the intellectuals did not want to write it'. 33 
Open conflict between the idea of making profits and a vigorous news policy was avoided 
`by a tacit mutual restraint'. 34 
Those historians of newspapers who were interested in British politics were mostly 
inclined to minimise the role of government influence. Seymour-Ure in his assessment of 
The Times concluded that the paper's support for appeasement arose out of Dawson's own 
31 See Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and Germany 1936-1939 (Oxford, 1971); a similar U. S 
example is Barbara Benge Kehoe, `The British Press and Nazi Germany' (PhD thesis, University of Chicago 
1980). 
32 Gannon, British Press, p. 70; also Iverach McDonald, A Man of The Times. Talks and Travels in a 
Disrupted World (London, 1976), pp. 52-3. 
33 Gannon, British Press, p. 2. 
34 Ibid., p. 4. 
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conceptions about foreign policy: `it was certainly not a tool of the Government'. " 
Similarly, Koss rejected any successful government influence on the whole press, due to 
the independent attitude of newspaper men: `Whatever tutelage they may have received 
from whatever minatory power would have been superfluous, for they were resolved to 
commit their own mistakes. ' 36 Though he did not deny that attempts were made to 
influence editorial policy, the outcome was unsure, and it could even back-fire: `There was 
no harm in trying, but also no guarantee that the effort would not serve to stiffen a paper's 
resistance. ' He further claimed that `[i]nstructions were indeed issued, but whether they 
were accepted was more or less a matter of editorial discretion', leaving the initiative with 
the newspaper owners and editors. 37 
In his studies of British government propaganda, Philip Taylor reached similar 
conclusions. What was published was due to the views of owner or editor, not the 
government or any politician. 38 Therefore, if the public was not fully aware of the dangers 
it was blamed on `the existence of a free and independent press in a democratic society 
which cherished the traditions of free speech and freedom to publish what it liked'. 39 
Pronay too, acknowledged the proprietorial independence of the press in the inter-war 
years. 40 Though he emphasised that the government tended to approach newspapers at the 
top (to their proprietors) and not the editors or journalists, support for the government was 
35 Seymour-Ure, Political Impact, p. 91. 
36 Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 576. 
37 Ibid., pp. 575,579, also p. 542. 
38 Philip M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain. British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939 
(Cambridge, 1981), pp. 38-9; see also idem., `Publicity and Diplomacy: The Impact of the First World War 
upon Foreign Office Attitudes towards the Press', in David Dilks (ed. ), Retreat from Power (London, 1981), 
pp. 42-63, and more recently idem., `Propaganda', in Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds. ), The Origins 
of World liar Two. The Debate Continues (Houndsmill, 2003), p. 352. 
39 Taylor, Projection, pp. 38-9. 
40 Nicholas Pronay, `Rearmament and the British public', in James Curran, Anthony Smith and Pauline 
Wingate (eds. ), Impacts and Influences. Essays on Media Power in the Twentieth Century (London, 1987), pp. 
53-96, here pp. 66-7. 
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only secure if both the owner and editor were convinced. 4' Newspaper men have to believe 
what they write if they want to be consistently persuasive, therefore influence can only be 
successful if it confirms the editors' and proprietors' view. 
However, from the late 1970s the critical verdict re-emerged. James Margach was 
the first to make a new case for government manipulation. Having been a political 
journalist in the 1930s, he ostensibly offered an insider's account of the press-government 
relationship - though, writing 40 years after the events, his study could not help but be 
affected by hindsight and the post-war denunciation of appeasement. He was extremely 
critical of Chamberlain, calling him `the first Prime Minister to employ news management 
on a grand scale. ... From the moment 
he entered No. 10 in 1937 he sought to manipulate 
the Press into supporting his policy of appeasing the dictators'. 42 Further, Margach argued 
that Dawson's enthusiasm for appeasement was a result of his becoming `an active 
participant in the affairs of government and Whitehall', and accused him of distorting 
reports from his own correspondents. 43 Similarly, Adamthwaite's historical study of 
government-media relations attributed the lack of criticism and restriction of alternative 
views partly to `the exercise of extensive official influence on the press, broadcasting and 
the newsreels'. 44 
The allegation of government manipulation of the press in general was made still 
more strongly in Richard Cockett's book, significantly entitled Twilight of Truth. 45 This has 
become highly influential, indeed it established an orthodoxy which has now been adopted 
41 Ibid., p. 76. 
42 James Margach, The Abuse of Power: The War Between Downing Street and the Media from Lloyd George 
to Callaghan (London, 1978), pp. 50,60. 
43 Ibid., p. 54. 
44 Adamthwaite, `British Government and the Media', pp. 281-2. 
45 Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth. Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press 
(London, 1989). 
into more general studies of appeasement. This is at first sight surprising, because his 
attitude towards Chamberlain appears almost to be an updated version of the Guilty Ak'n 
charges of 1940, which most modern scholars have largely discounted. His central themes 
are that the Chamberlain government shamefully - sometimes almost treacherously - 
manipulated the British press in order to pursue a misconceived and dangerous strategy of 
conciliating Hitler and Mussolini; and that many newspaper proprietors and editors, equally 
shamefully and treacherously, yielded to manipulation to the point of losing touch entirely 
with public opinion and becoming `not so much the watchdogs of democracy as the harlots 
of democracy'. 46 According to Cockett there was no `free' and `independent' press in 
Britain during this period. It was `at best merely a partisan political weapon controlled by 
politicians for their own purposes, and at worst a mere arena at the disposal of Whitehall to 
play out a game of interdepartmental warfare'. 47 
The book is clearly written from a radical direction - radical in the senses (a) of an 
effort to contribute to present debates about unlimited `freedom of information'; 
48 and (b) 
an assumption that appeasement was not simply wrong but discreditable, perhaps even 
immoral. Because Chamberlain and his ministerial allies tried to influence the press - 
which the author considers improper - in favour of a particular policy which the author 
considers mistaken and bad, the implication is that Chamberlain and other ministers were 
themselves bad and acted from bad motives. This colours the overall argument. 
There are a number of difficulties about this approach. Firstly, Cockett does not 
sufficiently engage with the historiography of appeasement. Politics is a more complex 
process than Cockett, with his tendency to judge everyone by their ability to see through 
46 Ibid., p. 187. 
47 Ibid., p. 1. 
48 The comments on pp. 2,142 and elsewhere are indicative. 
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appeasement, allows. In the late 1930s people were still genuinely unsure as to whether %%ar 
could be avoided, and if it could not be, on what terms it should be fought. Ev en 
Churchill's own record was not as clear-cut as he later claimed, 49 and memories of the 
Great War were still fresh. Studies on Chamberlain and appeasement have shown that 
Chamberlain recognised that Britain's ability to control events on the continent was limited; 
that he distrusted U. S. foreign policy and doubted the prospects of U. S. assistance; that, like 
many other Europeans, Chamberlain feared the Soviet Union; and that his efforts to 
appease Germany were part of an intelligible effort to maintain a balance of power on the 
Continent. 
Secondly, Cockett takes the undoubted fact that the government tried to influence 
newspapers and concludes not just that these efforts were successful, but that they provide 
an adequate or even complete explanation for `press' support for appeasement. The 
implication is always that the explanatory weight lies less with the press itself than with 
Chamberlain and his ministerial and official allies. So an `incestuous relationship between 
Whitehall and the press' is said to have meant that `the press ... could 
do nothing but help 
Chamberlain pursue appeasement'. 50 There is repeated slippage from such phrases as 
`informal contacts'5' between ministers and newspapermen, to assertions of government 
`control'. Yet such `control' would appear to be problematic or difficult to establish. 
because it appears to require free actions by the press - with the effect that Cockett's 
argument contains an internal tension. `Although one might despair at the level of control 
government was able to exert ... 
it is nonetheless true that it could do so only with the 
a`' David Reynolds, `Churchill's writing of history: appeasement, autobiography and The Gathering Storin', 
Transaction of the Royal Historical Society, 6s (2001), pp. 221-47; John Ramsden, Han of the Century. 
Winston Churchill and his Legend since 1945 (London, 2002), ch. 4. 
50 Cockett, Twilight, p. 1: italics inserted. 
51 Ibid., p. 2. 
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willing connivance of journalists, editors and newspaper proprietors'. 52 The grounds for 
such `willing connivance' are insufficiently explained: alternative explanations for 
newspaper support remain possible. 
Thirdly, Cockett implies that the press was under such tight government control that 
alternative attitudes towards Germany and Italy were marginalized or even suppressed - 
that there was no `independent' or `free' press. Yet it is striking that his book contains no 
sustained analysis of the actual content of the newspapers. His evidence is overwhelmingly 
from private exchanges, rather than the published news reports, commentaries, articles and 
leaders. References to and quotations from newspapers seem to be presented to support 
instances of press self-censorship; there is no systematic indication of the rest of the 
content. For example, newspaper coverage of parliamentary debates, public speeches and 
party meetings - by members of all parties - was wider and fuller than it is today, so that 
varied opinions, including criticisms of the government, appeared in all newspapers almost 
as a matter of course. 
Fourthly, Cockett frequently writes of a monolithic `press': `the press supported 
Chamberlain and appeasement'; `the press ... could 
do nothing but help Chamberlain'. 53 
Yet it is notable that in his early pages there are no references to Labour and Liberal 
newspapers. There is also a telling phrase that `the Daily Telegraph was the only national 
paper with Conservative loyalties to treat Chamberlain and appeasement with a modicum of 
caution'. 54 Should we be surprised that papers with Conservative loyalties tended to support 
a Conservative prime minister, and the causes of peace and avoidance of total ývar? But 
what about newspapers without Conservative loyalties? Why the careful limitation? There 
52 For example ibid., p. 2. 
53 Ibid., p. 1. 
54 Ibid., p. 13. 
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is another curious sentence in Cockett's conclusion. Asserting that Chamberlain exerted 
`tight control of the press', it is stated that `no alternative policy to appeasement as pursued 
by Chamberlain could ever be consistently articulated in the British press'. 55 Absolute 
statements ('no', `ever)' are followed by a conditional qualification, `consistently' - which 
implies that sometimes alternatives were articulated. In fact, earlier in the book it had 
emerged that `the press' was not monolithic. It seems that newspapers which usually 
supported Chamberlain did, for some periods, became critical, and even that some 
newspapers were persistently critical. 56 These are rather large qualifications. 
Despite these tensions in Cockett's book, subsequent studies have often accepted his 
argument. Stewart, for example, writes of `the government's successful attempts to 
manipulate the press' . 
57 Robert Rhodes James wrote in the same vein, about 
`Chamberlain's deliberate, and largely successful manipulation of the newspapers'. 58 Foster, 
in his discussion of press coverage of the British guarantee to Poland in March 1939 claims 
that through `Chamberlain's careful cultivation and manipulation of Fleet Street', the 
importance of the guarantee was minimised. 59 Nevertheless Foster restricted the success to 
only three sources, suggesting that `it had obviously been highly selective'. 
60 McDonough 
also adopted the claim of media manipulation. 61 Yet he too had to qualify the verdict: the 
ss Ibid., p. 188. 
56 E. g. the Daily Mirror: see ibid. p. 102. 
5' Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar. Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party (London, 
1999), p. 340; see the most recent works: Robert J. Caputi, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement (London, 
2000), p. 169: `example of the detailed sophistication of very recent scholarship', and Dutton, Neville 
Chamberlain, p. 183. 
58 Robert Rhodes James, A Spirit Undaunted. The Political Role of George 17 (London, 1998), p. 150. 
'9 See Alan J. Foster, `An unequivocal guarantee? Fleet Street and the British guarantee to Poland, 31 March 
1939', JCH 26 (1991), pp. 33-47, here pp. 42-3. 
60 Ibid., p. 36. 
61 See Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War (Manchester, 
1998), pp. 114,159. In an earlier article he tried to re-establish the accusation that The Times's cutting of 
Ebbutt's despatches were politically motivated: see Frank McDonough, `The Times, Norman Ebbutt and the 
Nazis, 1927-37', JCH27 (1992), 407-424. See also Crowson, Facing, p. 85. 
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freedom enjoyed by the press ensured that total government control was never feasible and 
critical comment continued to appear'. 62 
*** 
Cockett's argument has not received universal acceptance. This thesis proceeds 
from the doubt also expressed by D. C. Watt: the relationship between the press and 
politicians is `far from settled'. 63 The first chapter sets out the framework of press- 
government relationship in the 1930s, and puts it in a larger historical context. It is notable 
that influential studies (notably these of Gannon and Cockett) give little consideration to 
any period before 1936. This assists the argument of a special degree and success of 
government `manipulation' under Chamberlain, because it ignores evidence which would 
weaken the interpretation. A contrast needs to be established between the short period of 
appeasement (January 1938-March 1939), and earlier periods of substantial newspaper 
criticism towards or at least uncertainty about the Conservative leadership, even from 
Conservative newspapers. Moreover, Cockett begins his account with the 1936 Abdication 
crisis, which he assumes provides an early demonstration of the sort of press control which 
was intensified in 1938.64 Yet a quite different interpretation of the press silence on the 
King's love affair can be offered. 
A problem with most studies is that they place considerable emphasis on the power 
of the British government and its desire to influence the press. Yet ministers and officials 
62 McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, p. 124. 
63 Donald Cameron Watt, `Churchill and appeasement', in Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ), 
Churchill (Oxford, 1993), pp. 199-214, here p. 213. 64 See Cockett, Twilight, pp. 2,13-15. 
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had no legal instruments to control newspapers, at least until the outbreak of zwar in 
September 1939. And attempts to obtain a `positive press' were far from being an invention 
of the late 1930s. Ever since newspapers began in Britain, it had been in the interest of 
ministers and political leaders to seek support from as many newspapers as possible, or at 
least to try and minimise press criticism. Indeed, until the early part of the twentieth century 
some newspapers were more or less party organs, subsidised from party funds and used by 
parties to advance party interests. Conversely, some of the more independent newspaper 
owners and editors had always sought access to and influence with (or over) ministers, or 
with opposition `ministers-in-waiting'. Government efforts to influence the press, and 
`incestuous relationships' with newspaper controllers were far from novel in the late 1930s, 
and any claim that this period was marked by a new departure or new intensity needs to be 
compared to earlier developments. 
The desire of governments to influence newspapers intensified during periods of 
international crisis - especially when there was a risk of war - for obvious reasons. What 
was unusual in the late 1930s was the interest of a foreign power in British newspaper 
comment, to the point where it became a diplomatic issue. After German leaders had told 
Halifax, during his visit to Germany in November 1937, that they regarded some British 
newspapers as poisoning Anglo-German relations, it is intelligible that ministers should 
take a still closer interest in the press. And given the enormous stakes - the prospect of 
avoiding what was likely to be a hugely costly and horrible European war -a ministerial 
appeal for press restraint in the `national interest' was also intelligible; nor was it 
necessarily `discreditable'. Since it was widely believed in Britain that Hitler and other 
Nazi leaders were psychologically unstable, there was real fear that excessively critical 
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British newspaper comment on German events might dangerously exacerbate AnýgIo- 
German relations, even trigger Nazi hostility to the point of war. It is arguable that in such 
circumstances, any British prime minister - not just Chamberlain - would for foreign 
policy reasons have taken greater interest in the British press. But this concern to ease 
diplomatic negotiations is hard to distinguish from a concern to shape British public 
opinion. Asking the press for restraint for whatever reason has the same effect. Concern 
with Anglo-German relations could mean that criticism of Nazis was not published for 
British readers; concern for national interest could seem like partisan political efforts to 
muzzle the press in the government interest. 
Furthermore, close examination is needed of the relationship between the 
newspapers and different parts of the government, and different politicians. As Cockett 
shows, there were actually two `government views' on foreign policy: those of the press 
office of 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office News Department. Their views and 
statements to the press frequently differed and were sometimes contradictory. Yet how far 
can `the government' be said to `manipulate' or `control' the press, when there was no 
single, clear, government effort to do so? Still more important, the position of politicians 
critical of appeasement must be considered. Cockett's focus is very much on government 
ministers; Churchill does appear (usually indirectly), but the Labour and Liberal opposition 
leaders are barely mentioned at all. Were the anti-appeasers denied access to newspapers? 
Were they effectively silenced? Did they believe that alternative views towards Germany 
and appeasement were being `suppressed', and that the government was successfully 
manipulating or controlling the press? Did they complain of government intervention? 
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And what about the newspapermen themselves? Did they feel that they were being 
`manipulated' or `controlled'? Did all `the press' support appeasement? Some newspapers 
did: but did they do so because of government pressure, or an `incestuous relationship' with 
the government? An unusual feature of the late 1930s press was the emergence of a number 
of newsletters, established by journalists themselves. It has been argued that this as a 
result of government pressure on newspapers, forcing journalists critical of appeasement to 
find alternative outlets for their news. As will be argued in later chapters, however, there 
are other explanations for the creation of these newsletters. 65 
The main chapters of this thesis examine particular newspapers or newspaper 
groups. Where Cockett focuses on the government and its contacts with newspaper 
controllers and argues that newspaper treatments of Germany and policy towards Germany 
were the result of government pressure, here the emphasis will be more upon newspapers 
themselves. How far had they developed their own editorial policies towards Nazi Germany 
by 1938? If they supported appeasement, perhaps they had independent and well- 
considered reasons for doing so? 
Where Cockett focuses upon Conservative newspapers, this thesis will also examine 
the main Liberal and Labour newspapers. Where Cockett concentrates upon the evidence of 
private contacts between ministers and newspaper controllers, this thesis will give 
considerable attention to newspaper content. Focus on private contacts may give a 
misleading perspective on newspaper attitudes. For example, Cockett implies that 
Beaverbrook and his newspapers supported appeasement substantially because he was 
friendly with, and wished to retain influence with, the Cabinet minister Hoare; 
66 but 
65 See further down, pp. 105-6,195-6. 
66 Ibid., pp. 57-9. 
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Beaverbrook and his newspapers had their own long-established and firm views on British 
policy towards continental Europe. A systematic analysis of the different political stances 
and policy preferences of particular newspapers, including those opposed to appeasement. 
will provide a fuller understanding of government-newspaper relations, and a more 
accurate assessment of the extent of government influence. 
This thesis is based upon a wider range of private and published sources than 
previous studies of the newspapers in the late 1930s. These include official government 
records, and the private papers of ministers and other leading politicians. Unpublished 
German sources, from the German Foreign Office and the Bundesarchiv, were examined 
for evidence of possible German government pressure, and contacts with British 
newspapermen. Numerous private papers and memoirs of newspaper owners, editors and 
journalists have been used, including records not available for earlier studies. Much of the 
evidence is derived, however, from the newspapers themselves - news columns, speech 
reports, articles, commentaries by foreign correspondents, cartoons, and editorials. 
In order to obtain a balanced assessment of newspaper opinions and government- 
newspaper relations, a representative sample of a variety of major newspapers is examined 
- different in audience, circulation, political stance, and `proximity' to government. These 
include the `quality' daily newspapers, The Times (independent Conservative) and Daily 
Telegraph (Conservative), and the popular mass circulation national newspapers, the News 
Chronicle (Liberal), the Daily Herald (Labour). Then there were Beaverbrook's main 
newspapers, both `independent Conservative': the Daily Express (national daily) and the 
Evening Standard (London and South-East evening). The Observer (independent 
Conservative) is chosen as a Sunday newspaper, because its editor, J. L. Garvin, «-as a 
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particularly influential commentator. Two provincial newspapers are also considered, both 
because they had national reputations and because they have figured prominently in 
criticisms of government influence: the Manchester Guardian (Liberal), and the Yorkshire 
Post (Conservative). 
Government `pressure' or `manipulation' was not the only reason for the attitudes 
adopted by newspaper owners and editors towards Germany, British foreign policy and the 
prospect of war. They had their own views and purposes: so the crucial question is - how 
important were these, in comparison with attempted government pressure? Perhaps 
readiness to respond to ministerial calls for restraint was conditioned by their own, prior, 
concerns? The earlier history of each newspaper and opinions of their controllers - their 
stances before Chamberlain became prime minister in 1937 - are the essential context for 
understanding their attitudes towards appeasement in 1938-39, and their willingness to 
listen to the government's views. 
20 
particularly influential commentator. Two provincial newspapers are also considered, both 
because they had national reputations and because they have figured prominently in 
criticisms of government influence: the Manchester Guardian (Liberal), and the Yorkshire 
Post (Conservative). 
Government `pressure' or `manipulation' was not the only reason for the attitudes 
adopted by newspaper owners and editors towards Germany, British foreign policy and the 
prospect of war. They had their own views and purposes: so the crucial question is - how 
important were these, in comparison with attempted government pressure? Perhaps 
readiness to respond to ministerial calls for restraint was conditioned by their own, prior, 
concerns? The earlier history of each newspaper and opinions of their controllers - their 
stances before Chamberlain became prime minister in 1937 - are the essential context for 
understanding their attitudes towards appeasement in 1938-39, and their willingness to 
listen to the government's views. 
21 
CHAPTER I 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS 
Previous studies of the relationship between the newspapers and the government 
during Chamberlain's premiership have not always engaged sufficiently with the 
subject's pre-history. Cockett's Twilight of Truth, in particular, was compromised by 
beginning sharply in 1936-7, without considering earlier conditions. The effect is that 
his argument about a substantial change in government-press relations and a new degree 
of government `manipulation' is carried very largely by assertion. This chapter will 
begin by briefly reviewing the development of the relationship before 1937. It then 
considers German government complaints about British newspapers during the 1930s, 
and examines the two British government organisations which dealt with newspaper 
reports on foreign affairs - the No. 10 Downing Street Press Office and the Foreign 
Office News Department. The last section will describe and begin to assess ministerial 
efforts from 1937 to influence newspapers' comment on 'appeasement'. 
*** 
During the past 200 years there has usually been a close, if varying, relationship 
between newspapers and political parties - and governments. 
1 Politicians and 
government were a staple of newspaper report and comment; political parties and 
governments have regarded newspapers as vital for influencing - shaping, creating or 
limiting - opinion. Three main historical phases can be discerned. The first, until the 
1850s, was characterised by state restriction on newspapers by means of taxation (the 
' Koss's monumental work Rise and Fall of the Political Press is indispensable for the study of this 
subject; for a shorter assessment see R. Negrine, Politics and the Mass Media in Britain (London, 1989), 
ch. 3. 
ýý 
so-called `taxes on knowledge') and by forms of censorship. Ever since their creation in 
the early eighteenth century, a plurality of political views were expressed through a 
variety of newspapers: these were Tory papers and Whig and radical papers. A 'free 
press' - like free speech - was increasingly a feature of British political culture; 
nevertheless, governments on occasion tried to repress `popular' radical newspapers and 
to weaken (or buy out) the papers of their party rivals - while the newspaper taxes, by 
raising their prices, suppressed their potential readership. 
The second phase covered the 1850s and 1860s, with the reduction and abolition 
of the newspaper taxes and relaxed state intervention. This helped stimulate a greater 
amount of political comment, and more open debate in the newspapers. Yet many of 
these newspapers remained - or became - attached to particular parties or groups within 
parties, which could mean - when that party was in office - attachment to the 
government. Some received party subsidies, or had politicians as major shareholders or 
directors. Most of the others willingly identified themselves with particular parties and 
governments. Their owners and editors had ready access to party leaders or ministers: 
editorial comment was tailored to what they considered to be party or government 
interest; their well-known party allegiances were part of their appeal to readers. ' 
Nevertheless, `freedom of the press' was preserved. Because different 
newspapers expressed the views of different parties, there was open debate. No party or 
government could control all the newspapers, and governments always faced some 
critical, opposition elements in the press. Moreover, whatever the party bias of editorial 
comment and feature articles, newspapers were expected to report the news truthfully, 
and to note the views of all important politicians, of all parties. This was especially true 
of The Times, which came to be regarded - and to regard itself - as the `newspaper of 
2 Stephen Koss, Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, vol. i: The Nineteenth Century (London, 
1981), pp. 3-4; see Ivon Asquith, `1780-1855', in Boyce, Curran and Wingate (eds. ), Newspaper History, 
pp. 98-116, on the press during the pre-Victorian time. 
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record', but these attitudes and expectations also influenced the content of most other 
newspapers. It is in this sense that some contemporary commentators came to regard 
newspapers as a `fourth estate', operating in an arena of free speech and open debate. 3 
Party or government influence - even control - over particular newspapers was 
compatible with a `free press'. 
The third phase, reaching up to the present, began around the turn of the 
twentieth century when commercialism became the key factor in shaping the finance, 
strategies and content of newspapers. 4 New newspapers were established which sought 
to maximise their sales and their income from advertisers, a trend which in time affected 
some of the older quality newspapers. On the one hand, this tended to reduce the 
amount of newspaper content devoted to politics: the concern of these papers was to 
attract and preserve readership by entertainment as well as topical comment on serious 
issues. On the other, increased financial independence began to make some newspapers 
more independent of political parties and government. It is important not to overstate 
the change: a few newspapers remained close to particular parties; Lloyd George in 
1918 acquired control of the Daily Chronicle, and in the 1920s leading trade unions 
obtained overall political control of the Daily Herald, in order to give the Labour party 
its own national press organ. But other popular newspapers became such successful 
commercial properties that their owners were able to buy further local, regional and 
national newspapers and create chains, giving them large and geographically wide and 
deep readership. 5 
3 Cf. G. Boyce, `The Fourth estate: the reappraisal of a concept', in Boyce, Curran and Wingate, 
Newspaper History, pp. 19-40, here p. 26. See also Koss, Rise and Fall, i, p. 10. 
4 Alan Lee, `1855-1914', in Boyce, Curran and Wingate, Newspaper History, p. 117. 
5 Colin Seymour-Ure, `The press and the party system between the Wars', in Gillian Peele and Chris 
Cook (eds. ), The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918-1939 (London, 1975), pp. 232-57, here 232. The history of 
the chains is succinctly described in the Royal Commission on the Press, Report (London, H. M. S. O., 
1949), ch. 7 and appendix IV; and see also in Political and Economic Planning, Report on the British 
Press (London, 1938) pp. 95-105, a useful source on the interwar press generall`. 
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The existence of truly independent newspapers - independent of party or 
government control, or willingly subordinating themselves to political influence - was 
not, therefore, long-established. It was a recent creation, dating only from the 
Edwardian period. It was the product of technological and commercial changes that 
enabled some newspapers to become highly profitable - what Curran calls the 
`industrialisation' of the press6 - thereby reducing the need for political subsidies and, 
consequently, the scope for party and government influence. 7 
This was particularly true of certain of the `popular', mass circulation 
newspapers, under the control of the `press lords' or `press barons'. The concept is 
associated above all with Lords Northcliffe and Rothermere of the Daily Mail group 
(Associated Newspapers) and Lord Beaverbrook of the Daily Express group. 8 Yet there 
were other newspaper owners with peerages ('lords' and `barons') who were not 
labelled `press lords', for example the Astors (Times, Observer) and the Berry brothers, 
Camrose and Kemsley (Daily Telegraph and Sunday Times). The term `press lord' or 
`press baron' had a particular meaning. It referred not simply to an ennobled newspaper 
proprietor, but to a specific type of behaviour - to their political independence. 
9 Indeed, 
they went further: they were not just detached from party or government, but were more 
than ready to be critical of them, to take an active political stance in opposition to them, 
and even to run their own political campaigns and organise their own political pressure 
groups, whether `leagues', `crusades' or `parties'. In a sense, they treated politics as a 
form of entertainment and a means to maximise their sales, exploiting the grievances or 
ambitions of those who felt neglected or alienated by the parties on particular issues. 
6 James Curran and Jean Seaton (eds. ), Power Without Responsibility. The Press and Broadcasting in 
Britain (London, 1981), p. 43-62. 
See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 11-2. 
8 On the Daily Mail, see Paul Addison, `Patriotism under pressure: Lord Rothermere and British foreign 
policy', in G. Peele and C. Cook (eds. ), The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939 (London, 1975). On 
Northcliffe see J. Lee Thompson, Northcliffe. Press Baron in Politics, 1865-1922 (London, 2000). 
9 Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 49. See D. G. Boyce, `Crusaders without chains: 
power and the press barons 1896-1951', in Curran, Smith and Wingate (eds. ). Impacts and Iiuences, pp. 
99-100. 
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The existence of such capacity for independence from party or government - 
which the `press lords' chose to exercise, but which, nearly as significantly, other 
ennobled newspaper owners did not - is vital to the main arguments of this thesis. If 
popular newspapers supported a government or party, it was more likely to be because 
their owners chose to do so for their own reasons than because they felt obliged to 
submit themselves to government influence or control. 
These new conditions had large consequences for the relations between political 
parties or governments and the newspapers. Previously party leaders or ministers (say 
Conservative) had expected criticism from the newspapers of rival parties (say Liberal 
and Labour). There was in practice nothing they could do to restrain these rival 
newspapers, and provided the criticisms appeared to be `fair comment', any public 
complaints about it might be interpreted as weakness, and even invite ridicule. What the 
party leaders or ministers could do was, of course, to counteract the opposition 
newspapers by encouraging friendly newspaper owners and editors to respond. Now, 
however, the party leaders and ministers might find that the new independent newspaper 
controllers were less willing to come to their aid. Worse, still, newspapers read by many 
of their own party supporters (such as, in the Conservative case, the Daily Mail and 
Daily Express groups) might themselves become critical. If the criticism attracted 
support from their own party members, this could become a major problem. Broadly 
`Conservative' newspapers could become disruptive forces within the Conservative 
party. 
In such circumstances, it is not surprising that party leaders and government 
ministers should have stepped up their efforts to influence newspaper owners and 
editors. Paradoxically, increased efforts to `control' or manipulate newspapers occurred 
because newspapers had become more independent: greater political concern about 
newspaper content is evidence of greater press freedom. The most obvious indications 
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of government attempts to obtain the good opinion of these now independent owners 
and editors were the proliferation of honours conferred upon them - knighthoods and 
peerages, notably the Northcliffe barony in 1905.10 Nor is it surprising that government 
attempts to influence newspapers should intensify at periods of national danger. 
especially during the First World War, with its accompanying severe political strains. 
As prime minister from December 1916 Lloyd George established particularly close 
relationships with newspaper owners and editors, and became profuse in his efforts to 
reward or win their support. Not only did he confer more honours on newspaper owners 
than ever before (including the Rothermere and Beaverbrook peerages). He also 
appointed some to posts in the government - Northcliffe was entrusted with Britain's 
Enemy Propaganda at Crewe House, while Rothermere became Secretary of State for 
Air and Beaverbrook Minister of Information in 1918.11 
All this, however, created a new difficulty - that these `press lords' now 
expected their political status to be maintained, indeed they felt encouraged to think that 
they could become more powerful by being more independent. From 1919 Northcliffe, 
Rothermere and Beaverbrook turned against Lloyd George and the Coalition 
government; and the pattern was repeated with Rothermere's and Beaverbrook's 
campaigns later against the Conservative leader, Baldwin. The appropriate context for 
understanding government-newspaper relations in the 1930s is not just the 1936 
abdication crisis, which (as we shall see) Cockett presents as the beginning of a new 
phase. It is also the long period of tension between the `press lords' and the 
Conservative leadership, which peaked in 1929-1931. 
10 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 52. 
" See Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the 20th Century. Selling Democracy (Edinburgh, 1999), 




From the mid 1920s `managing' the broadly Conservative press was treated as a 
leading issue by Conservative party organisers and leaders. 12 J. C. C. Davidson, the party 
chairman from 1926 to 1930, put considerable effort into trying both to conciliate 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere, and to assist the Berry brothers in developing their 
newspaper empire as a counterweight to the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press. 13 There 
was a larger concern too -a recognition of how important friendly mass circulation 
newspapers were in reaching the much enlarged electorate of the 1920s, and in resisting 
the potential attraction of the Labour party and socialism to new, young and female 
voters. As a Conservative Central Office memorandum noted: The possibilities of 
using the Press are practically unlimited and conditioned only by the amount of money 
that Party organisations are prepared to spend on staff and writers. ' 
14 Davidson found 
the money and recruited the personnel for very active and innovative party publicity and 
press departments. Davidson's most important recruit was Joseph Ball, a former 
member of the intelligence service, who was appointed Director of Publicity in 1927. 
' 5 
Ball then became the first director of the new Conservative Research Department (CRD) 
in 1930, and remained active in the party's propaganda throughout the 1930s. 
'6 
12 Timothy Hollins, `The Presentation of Politics: The Place of Party Publicity, Broadcasting and Film 
in British Politics, 1918-1939' (PhD thesis University of Leeds, 1981), p. 29. 
13 See J. C. C. Davidson, Memoirs of a Conservative, ed. R. R. James (London, 1969), pp. 294-5; Thomas 
Jones, Whitehall Diary, ed. Keith Middlemas (3 vols., Oxford, 1969) II, p. 181 (14 April 1929); Hartwell, 
William Camrose, pp. 187-8; and Richard Cockett, `The party, publicity, and the media', in Anthony 
Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds. ), Conservative Century. The Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford, 1994), 
pp. 547-577, here pp. 545-55. 
14 Quoted in Cockett, `Party, publicity', p. 551. 
15 For Ball and the creation of the Conservative Research Department, see A. Beichmann, `Hugger 
Mugger in Old Queen Street', JCH 15 (1978), pp. 671-88. For Ball's contacts with the British 
Intelligence Service, see Christopher Andrew, Secret Service (London, 1985), p. 340, and also Richard 
Cockett, `Ball, Chamberlain and Truth', HJ 33 (1990), p. 132. 
16 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy. The Conservative Research Department 
since 1929 (London, 1980), p. 60; also Christina Bussfeld, `Democracy versus Dictatorship': Die 
Herausforderung des Faschismus und Kommunismus in Großbritannien 1932-193 7 (Paderborn, 2000), 
pp. 80-1. 
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In the winter of 1929-30, however, when the Conservative party was in 
opposition, its efforts to restrain the `press lords' broke down, as Beaverbrook first 
launched his `Empire Free Trade' campaign and Rothermere then began his `United 
Empire Party'. '7 Both aimed to force changes in the party's policy, and both sought to 
remove Baldwin from the party leadership. Davidson was a casualty of this campaign, 
and was forced to resign in May 1930. His replacement as party chairman, Neville 
Chamberlain, was as chairman of the CRD already establishing a close alliance with 
Ball, and he now became directly involved in negotiations with Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere, and in dealings with the Berrys and with various journalists. Chamberlain, 
in other words, had a long experience of relations with newspapers controllers before he 
became prime minister in 1937. 
This initial experience, in 1930-31, was very painful, as the hostile newspaper 
campaigns added to considerable party discontent over European and imperial policies, 
produced repeated crises within the party and nearly forced Baldwin's resignation. 
Baldwin famously fought back. His oratorical onslaught on the `press lords" attempt to 
exercise `power without responsibility' - defending himself on the high ground of 
political and constitutional principle, and the putative limits of legitimate newspaper 
political influence - punctured their campaign. Chamberlain was able in March 1931 to 
conclude an agreement with Beaverbrook and to neutralise Rothermere. But the 
struggles of 1929-31 had emphasised just how independent supposedly `Conservative' 
newspapers could be, and how dangerous their activities could be to the Conservative 
leadership and its capacity to develop and sustain its own policies. Even after the 
formation of the Conservative-dominated National coalition government and its huge 
general election victory in October 1931, Conservative party managers remained 
nervous about the extent of support from ostensibly Conservative newspapers. Ball and 
17 See e. g. John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (London, 1978), pp. 297-8,306- 
14. 
'19 
Chamberlain - though Chancellor of the Exchequer 1931-37, and no longer party 
chairman - continued to be much involved in managing relations with the press. During 
1934, in anticipation of the next general election, Ball proposed to Chamberlain 
measures for securing a more favourable press comment, by establishing close contact 
with those in control of broadly sympathetic newspapers. He was, however, realistic 
enough to conclude: `Some attempts will fail, but many might succeed, if properly 
planned. ' 18 In the following year the National Publicity Bureau (NPB. ) was formed. 19 
Although created to coordinate propaganda for all the partners in the National coalition 
government, this was clearly Conservative orientated. 20 Ball was its first director, and 
Kingsley Wood, Postmaster-General and a close Chamberlain ally, was chairman. 
Even though the National government retained a large majority at the November 
1935 election, Ball remained dissatisfied with the level of support for the government in 
the newspapers. As he put the case to Baldwin, the prime minister, in December: 
the Daily Mail and the Daily Express attack us more frequently than they 
support us, while, although The Times and the Daily Telegraph are admirable 
newspapers and give us their full support, their circulations are so small ... that 
their influence among the masses is almost negligible. 
To improve this fragile position Ball proposed to take over `a suitable weekly 
publication, and ... to 
build up a staff of really good writers capable of exposing 
effectively the fallacies upon which the public is being fed' . 
21 It is probable that the 
widespread and sharp newspaper and popular reaction to the Hoare-Laval pact during 
that month, when even The Times became critical, emphasised the point. The paper that 
Ball eventually acquired, without publicity, was Truth, which over the next two years he 
18 Ball notes about propaganda, 14 April 1934, NC 8/21/9. 
19 Ball to Chamberlain, 14 April 1934, NC 8/21/9. See Ralph D. Casey, `The National Publicity Bureau 
and British Party Propaganda' The Public Opinion Quarterly, October 1939, p. 624; also Taylor, British 
Propaganda, p. 93. 
20 See Hollins, 'Presentation', p. 83; also Cockett, `Ball, Chamberlain', pp. 131-42. 
21 Quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 551. For newspaper support at the election, see Tom Stannage, 
Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition. The British General Election of 1935 (London, 1980), pp. 190-210. 
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increasingly used as an instrument to support Chamberlain and his polic}, of 
appeasement. 22 Although Truth has recently acquired notoriety, it is important to note 
that this idea of reviving the pre-1914 arrangement of a politically-controlled newspaper 
was not new. Apart from the cases of Lloyd George's majority share-holding in the 
Daily Chronicle from 1918 to 1927 and the Labour movement's purchase of the Daily 
Herald in 1922, Baldwin and Davidson had entered into negotiations - later made 
unnecessary by Baldwin's victory - with the Berrys in early 1931 for the creation of a 
London-based evening paper to counteract the Rothermere and Beaverbrook press. 23 
In the mid 1930s, then, the press in general was regarded within government as 
vigorously independent, to such a degree that renewed efforts were being made in press 
`management'. Where does the notorious silence of the British newspapers over King 
Edward VIII's affair fit into these conditions? For Cockett, this `can be seen as a 
precursor for the ... 
damaging and long-term control of the press that was to occur 
between 1937 and 1940'. `The King and the government', he writes, `had effectively 
preserved a blanket censorship on the press'. 24 Examination of the evidence, however, 
produces a different interpretation, one which indicates another important feature 
common to the press during the 1930s and another leading theme in this thesis - its 
capacity, where important issues of national interests were at stake, to exercise 
voluntary restraint from a sense of public responsibility. 
The avoidance of British newspaper reports on the King's relationship with Mrs 
Simpson - especially the failure to comment on their summer 1936 holiday cruise on 
the Nahlin, extensively reported and photographed in European and North American 
newspapers - began well before any involvement by the King or the government. 
The 
22 For details see `Control of Newspaper "Truth"', Vansittart papers, VNST 112/3 1, and Cockett, `Ball, 
Chamberlain and Truth', p. 131-42. Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 23 July 1939, NC 18/1/1108, noted 
that the paper was `secretly controlled by Sir Joseph Ball'. 
23 See Jones diary, 11 March 1931; Davidson Memoirs, pp. 359-60; Hartwell, Camrose, p. 170. 
24 Cockett, Twilight, pp. 14,2. 
31 
press silence was the spontaneous decision of the various newspaper owners and editors 
themselves. Baldwin as prime minister only became aware of the foreign press coverage 
in mid October, and was evidently surprised at the continuing British newspaper 
silence. 25 There is no evidence of him speaking with any newspaper controller before 
Dawson asked to see him on 25 October. 26 The King only became involved on 27 
October, when he asked Beaverbrook whether it would be possible to `limit publicity' 
about Mrs Simpson's imminent divorce case. 27 Beaverbrook agreed to help, and with 
Esmond Harmsworth, Rothermere's son and chairman of the newspaper proprietors' 
association, met other London and provincial newspaper owners, 28 and convinced them 
to continue their silence about this matter. 29 Significantly, they did not feel a need to 
influence the London quality newspapers, like The Times, Morning Post and Daily 
Telegraph because these could be relied upon to exercise self-restraint for their own 
reasons: `their discretion was not in question'. 30 There was, indeed, nothing remarkable 
about this: newspaper discretion about the private (and sexual) affairs of public figures 
was still routine. 31 To take a specific example: many in the newspaper world knew that 
Lloyd George lived with his mistress, Frances Stevenson, but this was never mentioned 
in the press, not even by his most bitter political opponents. 
So the King and ministers only encouraged the maintenance of an existing 
newspaper restraint, one which had not been originated by government influence or 
control. At one point Cockett concedes this, contradicting his main assertions: `this 
25 See Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin. A Biography (London, 1969), p. 985. 
26 The same day Dawson received a letter from a British citizen living in the US, summarising public 
opinion, which he forwarded to Baldwin: printed in Wrench, Dawson, pp. 339-42, and see History of The 
Times, p. 1028. 
27 Lord Beaverbrook, The Abdication of King Edward VIII, ed. A. J. P. Taylor (London, 1966), p. 30. 
28 See History of The Times, p. 1027; Beaverbrook, Abdication, p. 31. 
29 In A King's Story (New York, 1947), p. 317, the Duke of Windsor states: `With the co-operation of 
Esmond Harmsworth and several others he [Beaverbrook] achieved the miracle I desired -a 
"gentlemen's agreement" among newspaper editors to report the case without sensation'. 
30 History of The Times, p. 1027. 
31 Jones, Dian,, p. 286 (13 November 1936), supports this assumption: `The silence of our press is 
extraordinary and is not enforced by the government but by a sense of shame. ' See Chisholm and Davie, 
Beaverbrook, p. 335 for Beaverbrook's handling of requests from women not to make their divorces 
public. 
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unity of silence was volunteered by the press to the government'. 32 Moreover, the end of 
the press silence and its aftermath - not considered by Cockett - provides further 
evidence of newspaper independence. Baldwin and the Cabinet feared newspaper 
revelations as likely to provoke public divisions and precipitate a constitutional and 
political crisis. But they did not feel able to achieve an indefinite press silence. The 
King himself urged Baldwin on 16 November to protect Mrs Simpson from newspaper 
criticism but Baldwin `told him that he couldn't control the British Press (who have 
behaved admirably in not mentioning the subject) & they are clamouring to air the 
subject but out of respect for the throne had refrained'. 33 Once it became apparent on 2 
December that the press silence was about to end, the King asked Baldwin to stop what 
he expected to be a critical Times editorial, but without success. As Dawson noted, in 
vain S. B. had explained that the press in England was free, and that he had no control 
over The Times or over any other newspaper'. 
34 
It was not only the King who could not ultimately `control' the press; the same 
was true of the Cabinet. Indeed, a newspaper controller caused much of the difficulties 
for ministers - when Harmsworth proposed the 
idea of a `morganatic' marriage, with 
Mrs Simpson not becoming queen. Once the issue was in the open, neither the King nor 
the ministers could command unified press support, as the newspapers 
divided 
according to proprietor's or editor's preferences between a `King's Party' 
(Daily Mail, 
Daily Express, News Chronicle), and the `Baldwin Press' (The Times, Morning Post, 
Daily Telegraph, and even the Daily Herald, as well as most of the provincial 
newspapers) . 
3s 
32 Cockett, Twilight, p. 2. (italics inserted) 
33 See Lucy Baldwin memo, 17 November 1936, in The Baldwin Papers. A Conservative Statesman 
1908-1947, ed. Philip Williamson and Edward Baldwin (Cambridge, 2004), p. 390. 
34 Dawson memo, 2 December 1936, quoted in Wrench, Dawson, p. 349. 
35 For discussion among the press see `Constitutional crisis, attitude of the British press', no 
date, PRE\1 
1/446; Beaverbrook, The Abdication, pp. 78-9; Channon diary, p. 87 (30 November 1936). 
33 
A comment by Simon, the Home Secretary and a member of the inner group of 
ministers consulted throughout the episode, is noteworthy: 
It was indeed a most extraordinary fact that in a country where there is no 
censorship of news, ... and where any attempt by Government to control topics 
of discussion would have been fiercely resisted and disregarded, the British 
Press by a voluntary ordinance ... 
had maintained complete silence for six 
months on a subject which would otherwise have been largely canvassed in 
every household in the land. 36 
*** 
The concern of some politicians and party managers over the excessive 
independence, or `unreliable' nature, of many newspapers increased as the European 
situation deteriorated. A new element developed: German complaints about British 
newspaper criticism of German government leaders. The Nazis had been quick to 
realise the importance of a good relationship with foreign observers for advancing their 
political and international aims, and made the cultivation of such relations part of the 
propaganda aims of the Third Reich. 37 This is exemplified by the numerous party and 
government offices dedicated to this end. As early as 1 April 1933 Hitler had 
established the Außenpolitisches Amt (APA), headed by Rosenberg, to persuade 
foreigners that his movement was peaceful in character. Attempts were made to 
improve the relationship with foreign newspaper reporters through receptions, 
38 
arranged interviews with leading Nazis, 39 or organised trips for English and American 
journalists, showing them the German countryside, the aim being to strengthening 
connections and influence through this social activity. 40 On the other hand, officials 
36 Simon diary, no date, MSS Simon 8: 1936. 
3' For an example of an organisation to improve Anglo-German relationship, see G. T. Waddington, 
"'An idyllic and unruffled atmosphere of complete Anglo-German misunderstanding": aspects of the 
operations of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop in Great Britain, 1934-1938', History 82 (1997), 44-72. 
38 E. g. guest list for a speech of Ernst Röhm, 7 December 1933, Bundesarchiv NS43/155. 
39 E. g [? ] to Wiedemann, 3 May 1937, Bundesarchiv NS43/158, B1.7+9. 
40 See Karl Falk to Bömer, 22 October 1936, Bundesarchiv NS43/158, B1.15. 
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criticised foreign reporters who did not report events in the way the Nazis wished to see 
them reported. The German press chief, Otto Dietrich, characterised the newspaper 
commentaries of the democracies as a `problem of high political consequences for 
world politics'. The weakness of the `governments of democracy' enables the press to 
operate as the `greatest and most dangerous war-monger', because it generated ill- 
feelings between Germany and other nations. 41 
German complaints about alleged British `Pressehetze' (smear campaigns in 
newspapers) were a regular topic in diplomatic circles. The German ambassador in 
London, Hoesch, told the Foreign Secretary as early as the end of March 1933 `how 
unfortunate the British coverage was in respect to the good relationship between 
Britain and Germany'. 42 Hitler himself had declared on 2 March 1933 that he regarded 
the `press-agitation in the world against the German government as very dangerous'. 43 
In the official press statements on this meeting, the German Cabinet discussion was 
presented as an unmistakable warning to `representatives of the foreign press' that the 
government had decided to take action against correspondents who in a malicious 
way agitate against the Reich government'. 44 Such warnings remained part of Nazi 
rhetoric throughout the 1930s. Hitler, in his speech of 20 February 1938, announced 
that he would no longer tolerate the abuse of Germany in other countries. He even 
declared that the behaviour of newspapers was more dangerous than bombs to the 
relationships between states. 45 Hitler's rhetoric, in which an alleged smear campaign 
in foreign newspapers was implicitly linked with the unstable state of international 
41 Quoted in Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 86. 
42 Bernstorff memo to German Foreign Office, 6 April 1933: PA, Presse, England 4, Bd. 1. 
43 German Cabinet minutes, 2 March 1933, printed in K. -H. Minuth (ed. ), Akten der Reichskanzlei. 
Regierung Hitler, 1933-1938,1/1 (Boppard, 1983), pp. 146-56, here p. 147-8. 
4' Völkischer Beobachter, 3 March 1933, p. 1, quoted in Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 100. 
15 Printed in Max Domarus (ed. ), Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945, vol. I: Triumph (1932- 
38) (Munich, 1962), pp. 792-804, here pp. 798-800. 
ý- ,ý 
relations, clearly emanated from a Nazi belief in the nearly unlimited effectiveness of 
media manipulation. 46 
These would seem to provide ground for a more detailed exploration of the 
connections between the German government and not just British ministers and officials 
- the standard subjects in studies of Anglo-German relations - but also newspaper 
owners, editors and journalists. That some contact did occur is certain. It is well known 
that Rothermere, owner of the Daily Mail group, met Hitler and other German leaders in 
mid-1930s, as did Kemsley, owner of the Sunday Times in July 1939. But there is very 
little evidence for any further contacts in the German archives. Nor does this appear to 
be an effect of the potential destruction of these records, since the private papers of 
British newspapermen and British government files similarly give few indications of 
direct German government attempts to influence the British press. 
Instead, it was British ministers, especially Chamberlain and Halifax, who did 
most to try and influence the attitude of British newspapers towards the Nazi regime. 
They did so because they were impressed by the obsessional force of the Nazi leaders' 
criticism of British press reports on their policies, and speculation about their ambitions 
and objectives. Chamberlain and Halifax feared that these Nazi criticisms aggravated 
Anglo-German tension, and that the German leaders might over-react - helping to 
trigger a diplomatic breach, and increasing the likelihood of war. After Halifax's visit to 
Germany in November 1937, when Nazi complaints were forcefully expressed, British 
government interest in newspaper commentaries on Anglo-German relations noticeably 
increased. 
46 A characterisation of National Socialism as a propaganda movement in Norbert Frei, 
`Nationalsozialistische Presse und Propaganda', in Martin Broszat and Horst Möller (eds. ), Das 
Drille 
Reich (Munich, 1986), pp. 152-75, here pp. 152-61. 
36 
*** 
The British government's efforts to influence British newspapers were based 
around the Press Office of 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office Nei , vs Department. 
The 10 Downing Street Press Office had been established in 1929 by the Labour prime 
minister Ramsay MacDonald, who feared that the predominantly Consenvative- 
orientated press might prove problematical for a Labour government. 47 The Press 
Office's establishment of a close relationship with the Lobby - the body of accredited 
parliamentary correspondents, from leading national and provincial newspapers - was 
an attempt to make sure that the government's point of view was frequently and reliably 
reported in the newspapers. 
Cockett criticises the Lobby system for the power it gave politicians and 
ministers to give non-attributable press briefings, to have a secret influence over 
newspaper reportage, and so to wield `power without responsibility'. As he himself 
wrote, the Lobby had existed since 1885 - yet he says nothing about how this had 
operated before 1937, so again claims about changes in 1937-40 are dependent upon 
silence about earlier history. 48 It is not surprising that ministers and party leaders should 
seek anonymity when briefing the press: this had always been the case, even predating 
the creation of the Lobby, and reaching back to the origin of newspapers in the 
eighteenth century. The reasons are obvious - to influence debate in ways and 
in 
directions which it might be embarrassing to acknowledge publicly. It is also 
understandable that newspapers accepted these unattributable sources, because it gave 
them an `inner' access to news and opinion which would otherwise be unthinkable. 
An 
a' See Jeremy Tunstall, The Westminster Lobby Correspondents: A Sociological Study of National 
Political Journalism (London, 1970), p. 94; see also Michael Cockerell, Peter Hennessy, and 
DaN id 
Walker, Sources Close to the Prime Minister. Inside the Hidden World of the News Manipulators 
(London, 1984), p. 37. 
48 Cf. Cockett, Twilight, p. 5. 
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even more remarkable instance of this relationship was the activity of the Conservative 
Central office in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when it was anonymously feeding 
reports and editorial comment to some 200 local and regional newspapers. 49 
The Lobby system was so well established by 1937 that it seems unlikely that 
there was much change in the essence of government-newspaper relations. Nevertheless 
there was some change, because in Neville Chamberlain there was a prime minister with 
greater interest, more experience and closer contacts with newspapers than his closest 
predecessors, MacDonald and Baldwin - though these were not, it should be 
emphasised, on a markedly different scale to Lloyd George's involvement with 
newspaper controllers from 1916 to 1922. Not only had he dealt directly with the 
troublesome `press lords' in 1930-3 1; as Chancellor of the Exchequer since then he had 
personally briefed editors and Lobby journalists on important issues. 50 He has been 
described as the `first prime minister to employ news management on a grand scale' - 
though Lloyd George has a very strong rival claim. 51 Chamberlain not only had the 
assistance of Ball, with his similarly long experience of newspaper manipulation and 
control of Truth, but also the loyal support of George Steward, director of the No. 10 
Press Office with some ten years familiarity with the Lobby. 52 
Chamberlain's habit of personal attention to the newspapers was given renewed 
impetus by his determination to reduce Anglo-German tension. There was not just the 
foreign policy concern of German government complaints about British newspaper 
commentaries on its policies. Some newspapers were ambivalent or critical about his 
own policy of appeasement, and gave space to Labour and Liberal opposition and to his 
49 See Cockett, `The Party, Publicity, and the Media', pp. 551-2. 
so Hollins, `Presentation', p. 83. Both Chamberlain's diaries and his letters to his sisters show a continual 
and early attention to press relations: see Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain. 18 October 1930,26 
September 1931,12 January 1932, NC 18/1/713,756,767. 
51 Margach, Abuse, p. 50. It should be noted that Margach's personal experience of prime ministers and 
the Lobby system did not extend back to the period of Lloyd George's government. 
52 See Cockett, Twilight, pp. 4-9. 
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critics among Conservative backbench MPs. He was also conscious of resistance among 
some Foreign Office officials, who were suspicious or hostile towards Germany and 
who had their own access to newspapers. In his view, the Foreign Office seemed to 
have `no imagination and no courage to pursue a settlement with Germany'. 53 His 
proposed policy of `double policy of rearmament and better relations with Germany and 
Italy which will carry us safely through', depended to a large degree on the Foreign 
Office, which he feared `would not play up'. 54 
Chamberlain's efforts to influence opinion were not just confined to the 
newspaper media. He also gave his support to efforts to counter the influence of the Left 
Book Club, which published not only a series of books but also a regular newsletter, 
The Left Book News. 55 So successful was this movement in disseminating radical Left, 
including Communist, ideas that it prompted the formation of other political book 
`clubs' - the Right Book Club, Liberal Book Club, and Labour Book Service. 
56 To these 
was added the National Book Association, with Baldwin as president and with hidden 
support from Chamberlain and Conservative Central Office, in an attempt to appeal on a 
wide basis to readers of many political persuasions, and so to consolidate (and create) 
opinion behind the National government. 57 
Another initiative is still more significant. After the 1938 Czechoslovakian crisis 
Chamberlain and Ball remained concerned about the extent of sympathy for 
appeasement in the media - which surely raises doubts about how far they 
had been 
successful in influencing and manipulating, still less `controlling' the newspapers. In 
December 1938 Chamberlain proposed the `immediate formation of an organisation 
53 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 12 September 1937, NC 18/1/1020- 
54 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 August 1937, NC 18/1/1014 
ss See Stuart Samuels, `The Left Book Club', JCH 1 (1966), pp. 65-86, Paul Laity (ed. ). The Left Book 
Anthology (London, 2001), p. ix, and Bussfeld, Democracy versus Dictatorship', pp. 124-32. 
56 See Samuels, `Left Book Club', p. 77; Laity, Left Book Anthology, p. xii. 
57 See E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism. Conservative Political Ideas in the 
Twentieth CentuFi 
(Oxford, 2002), p. 144. Also Clarisse Berthezene, `Creating Conservative Fabians: the 
Conservati\e 
party, political education and the founding of Ashridge College', Past and Present 18" 
(2004), 233-4 
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whose objectives would be to provide accurate and unbiased information about foreign 
affairs'. Baldwin was to become president of the British Association for International 
Understanding. 58 Ball, probably the mastermind behind the organisation, saw the 
Association `to be the best way of diverting the central body of British opinion frone the 
special pleading of Left-Wing propaganda with which the [League of Nations] Union, 
among other groups, has become infected'. 59 The creation of this body indicates a 
defensive, even beleaguered, attitude: they felt they were losing, not winning, the 
propaganda battle. 
*** 
The Foreign Office had a still longer-established system for dealing with the 
press. With the creation of its own News Department in August 1914, the relationship 
between the Foreign Office and the newspapers became institutionalised. 60 After the 
Great War it became the principal recipient of any foreign government's criticisms of 
British newspapers. If a complaint was received, Willert, the head of the News 
Department until 1934, would reply: 
We always explain to them (I) that HMG have no power of censorship over the 
press; (II) that if a foreign government wants to approach the British press, it 
must do so itself. The only concession which we ever make is to promise to try 
unofficially, as occasions offers, to prevail upon our press to use the right 
spectacles. 61 
The existence - and the briefings - of the Foreign Office News Department complicated 
the attempts of Steward, Ball and Chamberlain to control the dissemination of 
58 Chamberlain to Baldwin, 7 December 1938, Baldwin papers 174/19-21. 
59 Joseph Ball memo B, Baldwin papers 174/24-27. 
60 The origin of the News Department has been described by Taylor, Projection, ch. 1, and Taylor, 
`Publicity', p. 48. 
61 Willert minute, 11 June 1929, FO 395/436, P703/703/150. For a similar attitude from a prime minister, 
see transcript of Poincare-Baldwin conversation, 19 September 1923, in Baldwin Papers, p. 107. 
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government opinion and news. Sometimes it appeared that on important foreign issues. 
Whitehall was speaking with two different voices. 62 This was especially so because of 
the attitude of Rex Leeper, who had succeeded Willert as director of the News 
Department in January 1935.63 Leeper became closely associated with the views of 
Vansittart, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office. In contrast to 
Chamberlain's ambition of appeasing the German government, Vansittart supported a 
policy of reconciliation with Mussolini's Italy, to create a counterweight to what he and 
other Foreign Office officials considered to be an aggressive and impossibly hostile 
Nazi regime. 64 This was the policy which both Leeper and Vansittart wished to be 
`soundly interpreted' by the press. 65 But while Vansittart advocated military 
rearmament as the main means of strengthening Britain's bargaining position in the 
government's dealings with Hitler, Leeper urged greater official commitment to the use 
of propaganda abroad in order to increase British influence in areas vulnerable to 
German political and economic penetration. This he termed `psychological rearmament'. 
By this he meant preparing the public, both at home and abroad, for the issues which he 
believed lay ahead. He stressed that there were methods available to counter the 
campaign of the dictatorships, but `at present there is a great deal of news available on 
foreign affairs, but insufficient guidance; while visibility increases, vision lags 
behind', 66 
Leeper had a critical view of the British press, arguing that it was `showing itself 
quite incompetent to deal with foreign affairs', and was not exercising its proper 
degree 
of influence. The failure of newspapers to guide public opinion, was, in his view. 
because it `was owned by men whose main interest is not journalism, but business and 
62 Cf. Shepherd, Class Divided, p. 111, who claimed that both worked together. 
63 Taylor, Projection, p. 28. 
64 For his assessment of the dictators, see Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession 
(London, 1958). 
65 Eden described Leeper in his memoirs as `an early prophet of the Nazi menace': 
Anthony Eden, Facing 
The Dictators (London, 1962), p. 182. 
66 Leeper memo, 27 January 1936, FO 395/541, P332/332/150, quoted in Taylor, 
Projection, p. 187. 
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finance'. He obviously had in mind the `press lords', who had been involved in a fierce 
circulation war since the beginning of the 1930s. Leeper therefore saw it as his task to 
guide the press `so that an intelligent public opinion may be formed on foreign 
affairs. ' 67 For that reason he formed his own coterie of specialist reporters, the 
diplomatic correspondents. 68 
Establishing such a group was not an easy task, because journalists and the 
Foreign Office normally regarded each other with suspicion. 69 Leeper tried to promote 
his own approach within the diplomatic service, advising British missions abroad that it 
was `a highly important duty of His Majesty's missions to assist British 
correspondents'. 70 Apparently he did not succeed in fulfilling this aim, and he also 
became fearful of the effect of anti-British propaganda across continental Europe. His 
thoughts resulted in a lengthy memorandum dated 2 January 1938, where he claimed 
that Britain had lost its prestige `while we have done far too little to counteract the 
efforts of this hostile propaganda'. He saw a growing `deterioration' in the quality of 
British journalistic standards, due to the continuing commercial preoccupation of 'press 
dictators' with circulation and advertising income. Editors and proprietors `must be 
made to realise that this country cannot afford to let foreign affairs be treated with the 
same irresponsible freedom as home affairs. ' Leeper proposed a change in a way 
government relations with the press had worked so far. Instead of merely continuing the 
existing system, where ministers confined their contacts to journalists individually in 
the parliamentary Lobby, he wished to see increased ministerial contact with leading 
editors and with the Newspaper Proprietors' Association. 
67 Leeper memo, 12 October 1932, FO 395/458, P2143/2/150- 
68 Part of this group were F. A. Voigt of the Manchester Guardian, Victor Gordon-Lennox of the 
Daili 
Telegraph, Norman Ewer of the Daily Herald, Charles Tower of the Yorkshire Post, and 
Vernon 
Bartlett of the News Chronicle. See Detlev Clemens, Herr Hitler in German : Wahrnehmungen und 
Deutungen des Nationalsozialismus in Großbritannien 1920 bis 1939 (Göttingen, 1996), p. 402. 
69 E. g. Andrew Crozier, Appeasement and Germany's Last Bidfor Colonies (London, 
1988), p. 226. 
70 Quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 17. 
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We can only hope to induce the press to exercise restraint in foreign affairs b}, 
taking those irresponsible persons into our confidence. A free press is an 
enormous asset to the country provided that freedom does not degenerate into 
irresponsible licence. At present we are not tackling the heart of the problem. " 
Leeper's proposals found support from Vansittart and from Eden, who was 'in full 
agreement with this excellent paper'. 72 Nevertheless, for all his efforts to improve the 
quality of newspaper coverage - and, indeed, despite the largely independent efforts of 
Downing Street - Leeper remained disappointed. After Munich he commented that 'the 
amount of stupid or dishonest articles that I read in the English press is almost 
incredible'; and again `the press are so horribly cautious when they are not wilfully 
misleading'. 73 The Foreign Office news experts, at least, did not consider British 
newspapers to be `controlled'; rather they considered them to be too independent. 
*** 
The attempts by the prime minister's press office and the Foreign Office News 
Department to influence the newspapers are best assessed by examination of a series of 
incidents from 1937 to 1939. Shortly after Chamberlain's accession to the premiership, 
Ribbentrop, Hitler's principal representation in Britain, started a more positive approach 
to improving Anglo-German relations with the intention of neutralising British 
influence in Europe, and therefore increasing the Nazi freedom of manoeuvre. He 
wanted to invite to Germany such influential politicians as Halifax, Baldwin and even 
Churchill - `whose transition into a German-friend still seems 
to be possible'. 74 The 
71 Leeper memo, `Co-ordination of British publicity abroad', 2 January 1938, 
FO 395/596, P 
359/359/150. 
72 Vansittart note, 19 January 1938, and Eden note, 8 January 1938, both in FO 
395'596, P 359'359'150; 
see Taylor, Projection, pp. 33-4. 
73 Leeper to his sister, quoted in Taylor, Projection, p. 38, and Leeper to Lady 
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Lady Milner papers, C410/3. 
74 Ribbentrop to Auswärtige Amt, 18 May 1937, Auswärtige Amt Alls 
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initial invitation to Halifax appeared a good start, since Chamberlain gave his approval 
and strongly supported a new initiative. Foreign Office officials were more reserved 
about the plan, because Halifax was `not one of them: he was too close to the Prime 
Minister and could not be relied upon to put over a Foreign Office rather than a "No. 10 
line'. 75 This negative Foreign Office attitude made Chamberlain furious, because he saw 
`another opportunity to be thrown away'. 76 
To assist in the preparation for Halifax's visit, which was intended to be 
unpublicised, Chamberlain could rely on Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in 
Berlin. Henderson was usually the first to receive German complaints about British 
newspapers, and frequently had to point out that in Britain newspapers were 'not 
controlled'. 77 His views about what he considered to be newspaper irresponsibility were 
soon confirmed when news of Halifax's visit was leaked in the Evening Standard. 
Hitler was furious, and so too was Henderson, who described the paper's step as `the 
height of sensation mongering and of tendentious poisoning of the atmosphere'. For a 
time he even wanted the visit postponed until `the Press in Great Britain ... evinces that 
calm which is usually called decency and truthfulness in other countries'. 
78 
Chamberlain, however, was able to use his personal contacts with the 
newspapers to turn the situation to his advantage. The Times and the Dail' Telegraph 
published almost identical favourable stories about the visit, and commented upon the 
prospects for an improvement in Anglo-German relations. These obviously 
`authoritative' reports, particularly that in The Times, had a positive effect 
in Berlin. 79 
Henderson was able to say that `the attitude this morning of the 
British press. 
75 Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox. The Life of Lord Halifax (London, 1991), p. 66. 
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particularly The Times and the Daily Telegraph are regarded here as v erv satisfactory 
and the moderates hope that the Chancellor having ventilated his annoyance will take a 
calmer view'. 80 
When Halifax's visit finally went ahead, he found in his first talk with Hitler that 
it was British newspaper comments which annoyed him most in Anglo-German 
relations. Halifax described him as usually `quiet and restrained', but he did `get excited 
now and again over Russia and the Press'. For Hitler the degeneracy of democracy was 
manifested in the fact that it `paralysed the capacity to face the facts by its love of talk', 
and only existed on a `distorted view of facts presented to it by a licentious Press'. 8' He 
further claimed that `nine-tenths of all tension was produced simply and solely' by the 
newspapers. 82 Halifax's own sceptical view about `press freedom' had originated some 
years previously, when as Viceroy of India in April 1930 he stated how `few things 
have given me greater pleasure than shoving out the press ordinance ... and I look 
forward with sober optimism to real improvements in consequence of again bringing the 
press under control'. 83 Obviously he was writing about the Indian rather than the British 
press; nevertheless a critical attitude towards the more popular newspapers predisposed 
Halifax towards a sympathetic response to German complaints. He `alluded to the need 
for the Press to create the right atmosphere if any real advance were to be made towards 
a better understanding'. 84 
An underlying purpose of the German invitation became clear when Halifax met 
Goebbels the next day and press freedom was the only topic discussed. The Propaganda 
Minister claimed that 
80 Henderson to Foreign Office, 15 November 1937, Halifax Papers A4.410.3.3 (ii); see Cockett, Twilight. 
pp. 34-5. 
81 Halifax's diary, 19 November 1937, Halifax papers A4.410.3.3 (vi). 
82 Record of Hitler-Halifax conversation, 19 November 1937, enclosed in Neurath to Henderson, 
20 
November, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-45, Series D, vol. 1, p. 67. 
83 Quoted in Roberts, Holy Fox, p. 79. 
84 Henderson memo, 21 November 1937, FO 371/20736, C8094/270118. 
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the influence of the Press was under rather than over-rated. Its power to mould 
public opinion was greater even than was realised, and if public opinion was 
moulded wrongly, incalculable harm could be done since, in the end ... it was public opinion ... which directed policy. 
To improve the situation he asked whether `something could be done to put a stop in the 
British Press to personal criticism of Hitler. Nothing caused more bitter resentment than 
that'. In his reply, Halifax reminded Goebbels that because of the 'complete 
independence of the British Press', he could not promise a positive outcome. 
Nevertheless, he promised to `represent to the P. M. and his colleagues the views which 
Dr Goebbels had expressed'. 85 During his talks with leading German politicians Halifax, 
in contrast with earlier diplomatic statements, repeatedly denied that the government 
had no means at all for stopping criticism of foreign regimes. 86 After returning to 
England Halifax wrote hopefully to Henderson that the past developments had been 
`good'. But he ended with the condition, `if only we can get the press in both countries 
tame'. 87 
As a way to influence newspapers, and improve government-press relations, 
Halifax could build on the fact that he knew some of the major newspaper owners and 
editors personally. As well as speaking with them, he approached others he knew less 
well, if at all, including the controllers of the Daily Herald and News Chronicle and also 
the Evening Standard's cartoonist, David Low. These conversations, and their effects, 
will be considered in later chapters. But it should be noted that Henderson, knowing the 
sensitivity of British newspapers towards any official attempt to influence them, 
regarded it as dangerous to make any `formal arrangement" through the Foreign 
Office 
to deal with correspondents: this would easily look like `an attempt at censorship and 
85 Henderson memo of conversation between Halifax and Goebbels, 21 November 
1937, Halifax papers 
A4.410.3.3 and FO 371/20736, C8094/270/18. 
86 E. g. Woermann to German Foreign Office, 29 January 1937, R102772. Pol. I1 
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87 Halifax to Henderson, 24 November 1937, Halifax papers A4.410.3.2 (ii); also Cockett, 
Twilight, p 41. 
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control'. 88 One can therefore agree with Roberts that the last ý ord in this process of 
ministerial-newspaper contacts lay with the newspaper: `If they responded and engaged 
in a self-censorship helpful to British diplomacy, it can hardly be blamed on Halifax. '8 
*** 
When in early February 1938 the Daily Mail printed a story about a possible 
agreement with Italy, the Foreign Secretary, Eden was `very annoyed', because he 
thought this news might raise Italian government hopes of an easy settlement and 
weaken his own diplomatic efforts. 90 When Oliver Harvey, Eden's private secretary, 
tried to discover where these stories had come from, he was told by the Foreign Office 
News Department that they could `only have come from No. 10'. Although this vas 
denied by Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's chief industrial adviser, Leeper remained 
convinced that he had `very circumstantial evidence from journalists that they did come 
from No. 10'. 91 As it turned out, technically speaking Chamberlain had told the truth. 
Harvey found out a few days later that the `press campaign about Italy was given out by 
Sir Joseph Ball at Conservative Head Office, not from Number 10'. 92 
Nevertheless, through whatever channel, it was evident that Chamberlain was 
using his own means to brief the press, and this clearly weakened the Foreign 
Secretary's position. The final factors in Eden's resignation a few days later were not 
just Chamberlain's rejection of the Roosevelt offer; it was also the simultaneous launch 
88 Henderson to Halifax, 2 December 1937, Halifax papers A4.410.3.2 (ii). Halifax agreed to this and 
hoped for `a fuller realisation of the difficulties caused by the papers' by the Foreign Office: 
Halifax to 
Henderson, 3 December 1937, Halifax papers A4.410.3.2 (ii). 
89 Roberts, Holy Fox, p. 79. 
90 The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 193 7-1940, ed. John Harvey (London, 1970), p. 
87 (9 
February 1938) [hereafter: Harvey diaries]. 
91 Ibid., p. 88 (12 February 1938). 
92 Ibid., pp. 89-90 (13 February 1938). 
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of his campaign to influence the press. 93 Subsequently, Chamberlain, with the help of 
Ball, made sure that it was widely reported in the newspapers that the Foreign Secretary 
had resigned over minor differences, not major foreign policy issues. As Ball explained 
it, he had taken `certain steps privately' to destroy `the cases of Eden and Cranborne' in 
the Conservative press. 94 It is difficult to assess what these measures were, but they, 
were evidently successful: Harvey remarked on the morning after Eden's resignation 
that `the government took every possible step to secure the London papers'. 9' Eden's 
resignation and Vansittart's ostensible `promotion' to `Diplomatic Adviser' - in 
practice sidelining him - increased Chamberlain's influence over foreign policy. It also 
left Leeper, as a critic of Chamberlain's style of appeasement, in a vulnerable position. 96 
Despite Halifax's and Chamberlain's efforts in early 1938, elements of the press 
continued to write critical commentaries on the German government and British foreign 
policy. Consequently, Halifax, as the new Foreign Secretary, approached the leading 
newspapers again, to ask for moderate and fair coverage of German affairs. He 
discussed with Leeper `the steps which might be taken to moderate the tone of the BBC 
and the Press'. Leeper urged Halifax to meet with both newspaper representatives and 
Reith of the BBC, and to try and persuade them `to avoid provocation against Germany 
and Italy ... and to 
have a sense of national responsibility'. But he also urged that it 
should be made clear that `no attempt was being made ... to control the press. 
It was 
merely an appeal to help the national interest while a sincere effort «as being 
undertaken to search a settlement with these two countries'. 
97 Leeper was fully aware 
93 For the events and circumstances of Eden's resignation see N. Rose, `The resignation of 
Anthony 
Eden', HJ25 (1982), pp. 911-31; David Dutton, Anthony Eden. A Life and Reputation (London, 
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pp. 82-111' 
94 Ball to Neville Chamberlain, 21 February 1938, NC 7111/31/10. 
95 Harvey Diaries, p. 102 (27 February 1938). 
96 See Adamthwaite, `British Government', p. 289, and Cockett, Twilight, p. 52. 
97 Leeper minute, 28 February 1938, FO 371/21709, C1431/1261/18. 
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that British newspapers would react sharply if they suspected any kind of official 
exertion of influence. 
This growing government `interest' in newspaper reports was noted by the 
newspapers themselves. Already during January and February articles began to appear 
which commented on the freedom of the press and purpose of newspapers in a 
democracy: but these themes became more noticeable at the start of March 1938.98 
Halifax briefed the press on 8 March to remind them that `unguarded criticism of other 
countries, especially ... the Heads of States' would only make international relations 
`worse by needless provocation'. 99 Nevertheless, at a Press Gallery dinner Chamberlain 
dismissed rumours of government attempts to exert tighter control over newspapers. A 
remark he made in favour of press freedom was well received in the newspapers. 
According to the News Chronicle this response was a sign of the 'widespread hostility' 
with which the press regarded the government's recent attempts to influence newspaper 
opinion. 100 It is therefore no wonder that the `rumours' about government interference 
with the newspapers were raised in the House of Commons, where the prime minister 
was asked whether `any instruction, request or suggestion, direct or indirect, has been 
made since 21 February 1938, to British newspapers to suppress or modify news or 
comment on the Government's foreign policy'. He denied this categorically: 'no 
attempt has been made by instruction, request or suggestion to prevent newspapers from 
expressing their considered views. ' 101 
98 Henderson saw Hitler on 5 March 1938, and heavily criticised the British press: see 
Ian Colvin, The 
Chamberlain Cabinet (London, 1971), p. 101. 
99 Leeper draft in FO 371/21709.143 1, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 53. See also HarveI 
diaries. P. 11 I 
(8 March 1938): `A difficult business, as he appealed to them to refrain as far as possible 
from reporting 
"rumours" which might embitter relations with Germany and Italy. ' 
i00 E. g. News Chronicle, 22 March 1938, p. 10. 
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*** 
The Halifax visit to Germany in November 1937 had made it clear that British 
newspapers had an important role to play in the wider context of Anýglo-German 
relations. Consequently the British government did what it could to influence the nature 
of press coverage. It had only relative success - but this was in accordance with its own 
limited expectations. Two incidents in May 1938 are indicative. After the weekend 
`crisis' over rumoured German troop movements against Czechoslovakia. according to 
Chamberlain `the press had been told "not to overdo it"'. Then, after German 
complaints of a Times article criticising the German press, Halifax saw British 
newspaper representatives and `exhorted them to adopt a moderate tone'. 102 Yet the 
decision on how to respond to such an `appeal' lay ultimately with the person wvho ran 
the policy of a particular newspaper. All ministers hoped for was that newspapers would 
be more restrained, not to `overdo' or else to 'moderate' their comments - not that they 
would accept government instructions on what news and views they should publish. A 
few days later, Chamberlain again commented that we have done our best to damp 
down the enthusiasm of the press here and in France. ' 103 But this was all he could do. 
The visit of Wiedemann, another emissary from Hitler, during summer 1938 produced 
another example of the limited influence which could be brought to bear on the press. 
Wiedemann's discussions were supposed to be secret, but Cadogan - Vansittart's 
replacement as permanent secretary - could only give an assurance that `they would ... 
do their best to induce moderation in the Press. ' 104 In other words, the government was 
far from sure that it could control newspaper comment. Cadogan's fears about the 
unreliability of certain sections of the British press proved to be correct, for on the next 
102 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 22 May 1938, NC 18/1/1053; Halifax to Henderson, 24 May 
1938, DBFP, III, vol. 1, no. 305, pp. 369-71. 
103 Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 28 May 1938, NC 18/1/1054. 
104 Cadogan to Wiedemann, 18 July 1938, DBFP, III, vol. 1, no. 511, pp. 589-90. 
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day the Daily Herald leaked the news of the visit. As Chamberlain remarked: 'It %N-as 
annoying that the press discovered the Wiedemann visit... They are perfectly 
intolerable in their comments on delicate matters. ' 105 
Ball, who was already beginning to prepare for the next general election. was 
certainly very conscious of the continuing independence of the press. His pessimistic 
assessment of newspaper support for the National government in June 1938 reveals a 
more accurate assessment of the realities of government-newspaper relations than is 
found in some later historical studies. The Labour Daily Herald was `working the whole 
time against us', while the criticisms of the opposition Liberals were published in the 
News Chronicle, Star, and the Manchester Guardian. His account of the Conservative 
press was very accurate, reflecting its different shades: 
although a number of the national dailies (e. g. "The Times", "Telegraph", 
"Daily Mail", "Daily Express", "Evening News", "Evening Standard", 
"Yorkshire Post", etc. ) are nominally supporters of the Government, none of 
them can be relied upon for full, continuous, and deliberately planned 
support... Indeed, some of them deliberately adopt, from time to time, the role 
of "candid friend" (e. g. "The Daily Mail", "Evening News", "Daily Express" 
and "Evening Standard", and even "The Daily Telegraph"), while the 
"Yorkshire Post", since the Eden crisis, has adopted a distinctly hostile attitude. 
The situation was exacerbated by the attitude of the BBC, described by Ball as `one of 
our great handicaps'. '06 Chamberlain therefore, had good reason to worry about the 
level of support for appeasement in the press. 
His concern increased further over the relatively quiet few weeks in international 
affairs during the early summer, when Halifax began to develop his own doubts about 
German intentions, although this was a matter of tone and emphasis and not strictly a 
different policy. In Halifax's eyes there was the danger of Germany dominating Central 
and South-Eastern Europe. To avoid this an attempt should be made to check this 
105 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 24 July 1938, NC 18'1/106OA; on the visit see Cockett, 
Twilight, 
p. 66. 
106 Ball memo, enclosed in Ball to Chamberlain, I June 1938, NC 82 l/1-8. 
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process before it is too late'. 107 This was not Chamberlain's view of how to make 
progress with the German government, as he was more prepared to concede in the face 
of Hitler's demands. In these circumstances The Times at the beginning, of September 
1938 published an awkward leading article for Halifax, arguing the case for allowing 
`the Germans of Czechoslovakia - by plebiscite or otherwise - to decide their own 
future, even if this should mean secession to the Reich'. 108 Halifax feared that the article 
might be interpreted by the Czech and German governments as evidence of a change in 
British foreign policy, and issued an official denial that it represented the government's 
attitude. 109 Nevertheless, Hesse, the press attache at the German embassy, reported to 
Berlin that the article was the result of a meeting between Chamberlain and newspaper 
representatives, and that `no part of the article has been disavowed' by Chamberlain 
himself. 110 
With tension emerging between prime minister and foreign secretary, Henderson, 
from Berlin, came out strongly in favour of Chamberlain's line. He argued once again 
the importance of not upsetting Hitler by the issue of diplomatic warnings as was being 
proposed by the Foreign Office. " Rather, he advised, the British press should be asked 
`to write up Hitler as the apostle of Peace. We make a great mistake when our 
Press 
persists in abusing him'. 112 The comment was a reaction to a complaint about 
newspaper comment on the Runciman mission from Ribbentrop 
in late August 1938. 
Ribbentrop requested `a complete change in the attitude of the English press towards 
Germany', 113 but Foreign Office officials had little confidence that this could 
be 
achieved. Roberts minuted that `It would be difficult to get the 
British press to take the 
107 CAB 27/623 30th, 1 June 1938. See Roberts, Holy Fox, pp. 105-6. 
108 The Times, 7 September 1938, p. 13. 
109 Halifax to Newton (Prague), 4 June 1938, DBFP, III, vol. 1, no. 374, p. 
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793, p. 257. 
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127-29. 
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line suggested'. 1 14 Strang, supported by Leeper, suggested 'I doubt whether ý, e could ... 
influence the press in this sense. The best we can do is to instil the need for cautioned 
moderation, - so frequently [? ] disregarded by the "Times" this morning. 115 
Although Chamberlain's attitude towards the Czechoslovakian problem had 
been supported by The Times leader of 7 September, with its proposal for a secession of 
Sudeten areas, he thought that other `papers do their best to ruin all one's efforts'. 
Indeed Rothermere's Daily Mail, normally a firm supporter of Chamberlain's 
government, came out with the proposal on 10 September that if Hitler used force, the 
British government would declare war. 116 Nor could Chamberlain now rely on his 
Foreign Secretary. Halifax was appalled by German activities, and instructed the British 
minister in Prague to inform the Czech government that the French and British 
governments could not continue to advise it against military mobilisation. 17 Later on 
the same day he advised Chamberlain that public opinion was changing and that 
German aggression would be regarded as `an unpardonable crime against humanity '. 118 
On 26 September, the Foreign Office released a press communique pledging that 
Britain and the Soviet Union would `certainly stand by France' if there was a German 
attack on Czechoslovakia. ' 19 This can be regarded as an attempt by the Foreign Office - 
Halifax, now in cooperation with Leeper - to force Chamberlain's hand and establish a 
firm British stance, not least because neither the French nor Russian governments were 
14 Roberts minute, 7 September 1938, FO 371/21764. C9290/4470/18. 
115 Strang minute, 7 September and Leeper minute, 8 September 1938, ibid. - 
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ý; 
given advance information about this statement. 120 At this point, one of Chamberlain's 
Cabinet allies, Hoare, started to see newspaper representatives frequently. He recalled 
that `the incident warned us of the need for improving relations with the press, and it 
was for this purpose that I held daily meetings with the representatives of the leading 
papers'. 121 So as late as 26 September 1938, Chamberlainites were not confident about 
how newspapers would react to developments in the Czechoslovakian crisis. E\-cn 
during the critical Munich period, the government had contact - but not control - over 
the press. 
The immediate consequence was felt by Leeper, who (inaccurately) was 
regarded as responsible for the communique. Cadogan reported that 10 Downing Street 
was not happy with the way the Foreign Office News Department dealt with the press, 
indicating that there were two markedly different sources of government media 
management. In particular, `blame has been particularly attached to Leeper'. 122 Other 
Cabinet ministers also expressed doubts about the News Department, because its 
newspaper guidance in the past `had not always been in complete harmony with 
Government policy'. 
123 
Towards the end of the year `public opinion', as expressed in parliamentary by - 
elections from October to December 1938, reflected the critical attitude that many now 
took towards Chamberlain's foreign policy. 124 At the end of November a member of the 
Conservative Research Department sent its director, Ball, an urgent message: The 
120 In 1947 Halifax took full responsibility for sending the message: see Roberts, Holy Fox, p. 119; cf. 
Taylor, Projection, p. 36, who claims that it originated with Leeper. 
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outlook is far less promising than it was a few months ago. and there are a large number 
of seats held by only small majorities, so that only a small turnover of votes would 
defeat the Government'. 125 He advised that any idea of holding an early general election 
should be abandoned - which hardly indicates that the government was successfully 
manipulating opinion through the newspapers. Consequently, further efforts were made 
to obtain more favourable media coverage. The British Association for International 
Understanding was one of these initiatives. 
These renewed attempts to influence opinion again attracted comment. As in 
March 1938, the issue was raised in the House of Commons in late November. Geoffrey 
Mander, a Liberal MP, asked `to what extent recent advice has been officially tended by 
members of the Government towards owners of newspapers as to what attitude they 
should take up on the subject of foreign policy'. Chamberlain denied that such advice 
had been given. When Mander rephrased his question and asked if any advice had been 
given `unofficially', Chamberlain said `no such advice had been tendered ... neither 
officially or unofficially'. 126 Given the government efforts over the past few months, 
Cockett was certainly right to state that Chamberlain was now telling an outright 
lie'. 127 
Chamberlain's doubts about the extent of support for his foreign policy were 
evident at the end of 1938 when he again complained about newspaper criticism. He 
even commented on the `advantages' of dictatorships in dealing with public opinion: if 
only we could exclude from our own papers quotations from the foreign press except 
such as were agreeable - the world would go round a great 
deal faster. ' 128 From 
Chamberlain's private papers one never gets the impression that he was satisfied with 
British newspaper coverage of his policy. In February 1939 he `wish[ed] the 
Press could 
125 Quoted in ibid., p. 188. 
L6 HCDeb 341, col. 1528,22 November 1938. 
127 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 87. 
12` Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 11 December 1938, NC 18/1/1079. 
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be controlled a bit better'; now he was not happy with The Times and the Daily 
Telegraph, newspapers which were supposed to back him. 129 
At the beginning of March 1939, Chamberlain, under the influence of optimistic 
reports from Henderson 130 and encouraging intelligence reports, 131 used his private 
contacts with newspapers to brief them in a highly positive way, speaking of the coming 
of a `Golden Age' in Anglo-German relations. 132 Several newspapers of 10 March 1939 
displayed this optimism. The Foreign Office was startled: the 'ridiculous rainbow story' 
was `much too optimistic'. 133 Vansittart described its assessment of the international 
situation as an `entirely misleading estimate'. 134 Initially it was assumed that the story 
had come from a Foreign Office briefing, but it soon became evident that Chamberlain 
had `received all Lobby correspondents'. 135 Halifax questioned Chamberlain about the 
incident, 136 and Chamberlain defended himself by claiming that he was surprised that 
`my talk with the Press which was intended only as general background but was 
transcribed by them verbatim' -a remarkable and revealing statement in itself - and 
saying that he was contradicting the pessimistic general view, by which he certainly' 
meant to include the Foreign Office attitude. Chamberlain assured Halifax that the press 
briefing would not be repeated. 137 Halifax and his officials were sceptical: they were 
now well aware that Chamberlain was independently seeking to influence public 
discussion of foreign policy. 138 
129 Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 12 February 1939, NC 18/1/1085. 
130 See Vansittart minute, 17 February 1939, FO 800/315, commenting on Henderson to Halifax, 15 
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*** 
Close examination of British government relations with the newspapers in 1938- 
39 reveals that Chamberlain's increased involvement was partly - and significantly - an 
aspect of a disagreement between himself and leading figures in the Foreign Office. 
Chamberlain had been used to briefing newspapers himself on important issues, at the 
Treasury and also during the abdication crisis. Once he became prime minister, he had 
at his disposal the No. 10 Press Office as well as the assistance of Ball. But on forei,: n- 
policy issues there was already a well-established system of news `management' and 
newspaper briefings - and senior Foreign Office officials, and in time Halifax too, had 
attitudes towards Germany different from these which Chamberlain wanted to promote. 
In attempting to counteract Foreign Office views - as well as these of Labour, Liberal 
and Conservative anti-appeasement critics - Chamberlain, Steward and Ball revealed 
these differences in government views, and so drew increased attention to government 
news management. 
Consequently, it is arguable that the greater evidence of government attempts to 
manipulate the newspapers can be interpreted in other ways to these emphasised by 
Cockett. There is no doubt that Chamberlain did want greater government influence 
over the press; but it may be that the evidence reveals not an entirely new level of 
manipulation as a new degree of disagreement among government news managers -a 
disagreement which made the normally discreet process of press briefings more obvious. 
Indeed, the evidence may even be an indication of Chamberlain's failure to achieve 
greater press control. 
What can confidently be stated is that during the 1930s Conservative party 
managers and government officials shared considerable sensitivity towards the 
newspapers, and that Chamberlain took a leading part in efforts to influence newspaper 
5! 
comment. In this sense, Cockett's argument is justified. Nevertheless, his study does not 
take adequate account of the complexities of the relations between on the one hand the 
government and the rival political parties, and on the other newspapers of quite different 
political opinion. It was not just that on occasion `government' spoke with two voices. 
Further questions should be asked. If particular newspapers supported government 
policy, perhaps they did so for their own reasons? How did the newspapers react to 
attempted government influence? How far were critics of appeasement in all parties free 
to express their views? Did the Labour, Liberal and Conservative anti-appeasers feel 
that their opinions were being suppressed or ignored? Was a `free press' - or `truth' - 
really in `twilight'? 
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CHAPTER II 
THE TIMES: OFFICIAL MOUTHPIECE OR 
INDEPENDENT VOICE? 
The Times has often been regarded both abroad and at home as the 'semi- 
official' newspaper of the British government, ' and consequently historians have tended 
to regard it as the paper most susceptible to government influence. Cockett, for instance, 
argued that Chamberlain made use of The Times to promote a divergent point of view 
from that of the Foreign Office while maintaining his anonymity. 2 For him, accordingly, 
The Times was one of the newspapers which `became mere ciphers for Chamberlain's 
policies, whilst camouflaging their partisanship in the guise of a democratic "free 
press"'. 3 
The paper's high reputation was due to its long-established readership in official 
circles and among politicians and leaders in many professions, as well as the close 
connection that usually existed between the government and the paper's editor. Quite 
often editorials in The Times were regarded in Britain and Germany as an early 
indication of government thinking. Although it supported the National government 
throughout the 1930s and became one of the strongest supporters of Chamberlain's 
appeasement policy, it was actually an independent Conservative newspaper and its 
deputy editor was surprised in 1938 to learn that it was regarded as an organ of High 
Tory opinion'. 4 It has indeed too easily been assumed that the British government used 
1 See e. g. Cockett, Twilight, pp. 12-3, Seymour-Ure, Political Impact, p. 77. For a more critical judgment, 
see Koss, Rise and Fall, vol. ii, pp. 53 1-2. 
- See Cockett, Twilight, pp. 73,108. 
3 Ibid., p. 65. 
4 Barrington-Ward to G. V. Ferguson, 27 July 1938, quoted in Gannon, British Press, p. 60. 
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the paper, and that it promoted a strongly pro-German and pro-appeasement line 
throughout its pages. 
This chapter will concentrate on editorial policy, and argue that what has been 
seen as The Times' particularly Germanophile course during the late 1930s was, in fact, 
a long-established policy of the paper. The Times had its own understanding of British 
foreign policy and Britain's need to pursue better relations with Germany, which was to 
some extent due to outside influence - an aspect of its status as an `establishment' paper. 
in close touch with official and ministerial opinions - but which is more fully explained 
by other, internal, reasons. As the newspaper had by 1937 long been committed to 
Anglo-German understanding, it may well be wondered why it has been argued that 
from 1937 the government felt it needed to `inspire' or even `control' it. All that 
changed in 1937 was that Chamberlain's new positive attitudes on foreign policy were 
more in line with its editorial views than these of his predecessor, Baldwin, had been, 
and that accordingly the newspaper was encouraged to press more vigorously for 
Anglo-German reconciliation. 
What, then, was the political stance and conception of the editor, Geoffrey 
Dawson? He has been criticised on several grounds. One group of critics have claimed 
that although Dawson was not a politician, he used his position as if he were a politician. 
an eminence grise. 5 Williams in particular argued that he was socially too closely 
connected with responsible people in the government, and therefore 
lacked the 
necessary quality of detachment. 
6 Some have described the editor as an autocrat «ho 
accepted no advice on the paper's policy. This, it has been argued, was shown 
particularly by his failure to find a new foreign editor after 
1928. The History o> The 
Times is strongly critical of this arrangement, calling it `the most 
important decision of 
5 See Gannon, British Press, p. 57, and A. L. Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement (London, 
1961), p. 9. 
6 Williams, Dangerous, p. 275. 
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Dawson's second innings', 7 and implies that a foreign editor could have prevented 
Dawson from supporting the Munich policy. Others have judged Dawson to have been a 
man with limited intellectual background, especially on European issues. 8 It may be true 
that Dawson possessed no specialised European knowledge, but it is important to keep 
in mind that conducting a paper's foreign policy did not rely solely on detailed 
knowledge of European affairs. Equally important were `political facts at home, the 
views of the Government and Opposition leaders, the state of finances and armaments, 
the relative importance of European and imperial commitments'. 9 Who could claim to 
be an expert on them all? A further group have criticised the editor for using his power 
irresponsibly. Did Dawson cut or alter news from the paper's correspondents in order to 
tone down reports and opinions which were at odds with his own views? 
*** 
Support for `appeasement' was not a new policy adopted by The Times when 
faced with the threat of Hitler. It had in fact developed during Dawson's first period as 
editor (1912-1919), in the aftermath of the First World War. This stance derived from a 
sense that the Treaty of Versailles had not been `just' towards Germany, and also from a 
concern about the unprepared condition of Britain's defence should hostilities break out 
again. It argued that the Treaty had been concluded in defiance of the principle of self- 
determination, and improperly left a big minority of Sudeten Germans under control of 
the Czechoslovakian government. Revision of the Treaty and collective security through 
See History of The Times, p. 815, and Woods and Bishop, Story, p. 266. 
R See Gannon, British Press, p. 58, and Woods and Bishop, Stony, p. 208. 
9 McLachlan, Chair, p. 169. 
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the League of Nations became `the twin pillars of Times policy' during the inter-war 
period. 10 
Dawson's conduct as editor was also influenced by his post-war disagreement 
with its proprietor at that time, Northcliffe, which ultimately led to his resignation. Even 
though ownership of the paper changed after Northcliffe's death in 1922, Dawson learnt 
from the experience and when he returned as editor, he accepted the advice of Lord 
Milner (with whom he had been closely connected during his time in South Africa) and 
insisted upon firm and explicit conditions before taking the post. I' He was to have a 
`free hand' in directing the paper's policy, though this led to occasional disagreements 
with the paper's staff. 12 The strength of his position became clear in instances «-hen he 
would write leaders against the advice of the paper's specialists, notably during the 
Munich crisis, when he ignored the advice of his military correspondent. 13 
Dawson's political stance was founded upon belief in the British Empire. This 
was especially due to the influence of Milner, and for Dawson it meant two things: on 
the one hand the expression of values such as order and decency; on the other hand a 
defensive role for Britain. `The maintenance of the strength, the preservation of a unity 
of the Empire is not the only contribution, but is by far the greatest and most practical 
contribution, which British statesmanship can make to the welfare of mankind. ' 14 As 
Seymour-Ure argued this was `intellectually the key to his commitment to 
appeasement'. 15 Even so, Dawson's interest in continental European affairs should not 
be under-estimated. His diary is full of references to meetings with diplomats and 
10 Woods and Bishop, Story, p. 291 
11 Milner's Diary, 31 October 1922, quoted in History, p. 774; see Dawson memo, 18 November 1922. 
and for Astor's approval of terms: J. J. Astor to Dawson, 2 December 1922, The Times Archive [hereafter 
TTA] GGD/1. 
12 See Woods and Bishop, Story, pp. 248-50, for his return; also Jeremy Tunstall, Newspaper Power. 
The New National Press in Britain (Oxford, 1996), p. 101. 
13 See Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Memoires of Captain Liddell Hart, vol. ii (London, 1965), p. 149. 
" Times, 24 May 1934, p. 13. 
15 Seymour-Ure, Impact, p. 71; see also Gannon, British Press, pp. 29,58; Wrench, Dawson, pp. 374, 
376. 
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politicians from continental Europe. He was certainly worried about developments there, 
especially in Germany. But as Rose has convincingly shown, these only interfered with 
his policy `insofar as they touched upon the more vital interests of the Empire'. 16 
Through his frequent consultations with representatives from the Dominions. he «was 
well aware that they were not prepared to enter a war in Central Europe. Further, his 
contempt for Bolshevism, and linked with this, his view that Germany should stand as a 
bulwark against Russia, played a large part in shaping his outlook. 
Dawson's importance, which Williams described as `certainly far larger than 
that of any other newspaper editor, or proprietor of modern times', '7 arose out of the 
right of access he enjoyed to 10 Downing Street, frequently calling there to speak with 
the prime minister's secretaries, and when he wished normally being given an interview 
with the prime minister himself. Such a right of access was not allowed to editors of 
(say) the Beaverbrook and Rothermere papers, let alone the Liberal and Labour papers. 
Not even the Camrose and Kemsley editors had this right, despite the fact that they 
represented quality Conservative newspapers. Baldwin and Chamberlain frequently 
consulted Dawson, and valued his opinions. 18 Baldwin discussed major policy issues 
with him, and even Cabinet appointments. 19 He was trusted so much that he was even 
shown diplomatic correspondence. 20 He was also a life-long friend and neighbour of 
Halifax, with whom he often had long conversations. 
21 
The relationship with Baldwin is well indicated by Davidson's comment on the 
height of the abdication crisis: 'SB believed very strongly in the freedom of the press', 
16 Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set. Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity (London, 2000), p. 80. 
17 Williams, Dangerous, p. 271. 
18 See Wrench, Dawson, p. 373. 
19 Examples are in History of The Times, pp. 892-3, and The Times and Appeasement. 
The Journals of 
A. L. Kennedy, 1932-39, ed. Gordon Martel (Cambridge, 2000), p. 125 (27 March 1934): 
hereafter 
Kennedy Journal. 
20 See Gannon, British Press, p. 59. 
21 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 12. 
6ý 
and abstained from using any pressure, especially with the trusted editor of The Times. 
Baldwin only wished to be informed: `all he did was to telephone Dawson and ask him 
what line he proposed to take'. 22 Chamberlain, for his part, was -strengthened in his 
own views by the knowledge that Geoffrey agreed with his policy and would support it 
in The Times'. 23 Through his contacts Dawson was extremely well-informed about 
ministerial opinions on the details of leading issues. His range of contacts allowed him, 
on occasion, to stimulate or even originate the flow of ministerial ideas: he was not 
automatically just the receiver of the prime minister's ideas. 24 In October 1937 the 
editor wrote an influential leader on German policy which was manifestly compatible 
with the government's view. 25 Yet the circumstances, as recorded in Dawson's diary, 
hardly support a conclusion that he was `in Chamberlain's pocket': 
My leader produced a good deal of attention and approval. One sentence in it 
suggesting that public opinion was ahead of the Government in seeing the 
urgency and importance of a settlement with Berlin caused the P. M. to ask me to 
come and see him ... so that 
he might tell me what he at any rate had been trying 
to do. 26 
The Times shared the very widespread public reasons for supporting a conciliatory 
policy towards Germany. Dislike of conflict was strengthened by memories of the 
horror of the still recent First World War. This was particularly true for the paper's 
deputy editor, Barrington-Ward. 27 According to McLachlan, `the conviction in later 
years that the fighting had not been worthwhile because the peace had been bungled was 
burnt deep into him. It was at the root of his determination that war between the same 
22 Davidson's Memoirs, pp. 414-15; see Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 566. 
23 Wrench, Dawson, p. 373. 
`' See D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the 
Twentieth Century (London, 1965), p. 12, and Iverach McDonald, The History of The Times, vol. v, 
Struggles in War and Peace 1939-1966 (London, 1986), p. 11. 
25 See The Times, 28 October 1937, p. 17. 
26 Dawson diary, 28 October 1937, MS Dawson 41. 
27 See Seymour-Ure, Impact, p. 69. 
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contestants - the return match that some Germans dreamed of - must be avoided' . `b 
Accordingly, Barrington-Ward argued consistently for Anglo-German reconciliation. 29 
In a 1936 letter to Churchill, which can be read as a summary of The Times' 
appeasement policy, Barrington-Ward argued for understanding with the European 
dictators: 
We should, ... certainly be against premature abandonment of the hope, 
supported by many authoritative pronouncements on the German side, that Germany is prepared to reach a general understanding and settlement with the British Empire. The Times has consistently endeavoured to argue - and I well 
remember your stating the same case in several speeches some years ago - that there is no other ultimate basis for stability in Europe but an understanding 
between France, Germany and Britain on lines designed eventually to embrace 
Europe generally. 30 
Barrington-Ward's influence on the conduct of the paper grew considerably when he 
became more and more responsible for editing The Times in the later 1930S, 31 acting as 
`the virtual "Foreign Editor"', 32 and often supervising the last stages of the papers' 
preparation, late in the evening. In contrast to Dawson, Barrington-Ward was strongly 
interested in the European situation. The main pillar of his approach to continental 
affairs was revision of the Treaty of Versailles. He came to this conclusion quite early 
after the war, and Hitler's appearance did not change it. Gannon summarised his view as 
being that `justice did not become injustice because a dictator demanded it'. 33 
It was from this perspective that The Times accepted the German occupation of 
the Rhineland in 1936: `It is no condonation of the method by which the first of these 
moves was effected to say that they were inevitable sooner or later. ' 34 As Gannon 
argues `to understand everything was to forgive a good deal', and 'what British opinion 
28 McLachlan, Chair, p. 50. 
29 See ibid., p. 99. 
30 Barrington-Ward to Churchill, 22 September 1936, quoted in McLachlan, Chair, p. 107. 
31 See McLachlan, Chair, p. 99. 
32 Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 506. 
33 Gannon, British Press, p. 64. 
3' Times, 3 April 1936, p. 17. 
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seized upon was the opportunity of wresting good out of evil, of proceeding to a 
comprehensive liquidation of all reasonable German claims'. 35 
It is important to note a distinction between the editor's private opinions and the 
newspaper's published statements. Privately Dawson had doubts about the nature of 
Hitler's government; but for the purpose of encouraging the preservation of peace, he 
thought it important to put the best emphasis on any conciliatory statements coming out 
of Berlin. As Dawson wrote to Kennedy, his diplomatic correspondent, on 16 March: 
I should be very sorry myself to place any confidence in the present regime in 
Germany. Their occupation of the demilitarised zone was a characteristically 
stupid blunder, as a great many Germans seem to have realised. At the same 
time I think it sheer folly to refuse to get the utmost out of the professions which 
accompanied it, whether they are sincere or not. 36 
What Dawson had in mind -a search for reconciliation, yet an underlying suspicion and 
caution - becomes clearer when The Times's attitude towards armaments 
is considered. 
The paper held that a demonstration of British strength and resolve, in the form of 
continued rearmament, was vital in order to bring the German government to serious 
negotiations. In mid-1936 it stated that the best way of keeping the peace 'is the 
speediest possible completion of our defence arrangements, ... 
in present circumstances, 
an adequate level of British armament is paradoxically indispensable if the advance to 
agreement and disarmament is to be resumed'. 
37 A month later The Times again pointed 
out in these days that `British foreign policy must have the backing of 
far greater 
strength to enforce it'. 38 During the late 1930s rearmament 
became the newspaper's 
second pillar, next to treaty revision. 
35 Gannon, British Press, p. 98; Times, 21 April 1936, p. 13 
36 Dawson to Kennedy, 16 March 1936, TTA, GGD/l. 
37 Times, 4 June 1936, p. 13. 
38 Ibid., 6 July 1936, p. 15. 
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*** 
Most studies of The Times' stance on the appeasement issue draw attention to 
claims of a systematic censorship of articles written by the paper's own correspondents, 
most notably Norman Ebbutt, based in Berlin, 39 and a well-known correspondence 
between Dawson and H. G. Daniels, The Times' special correspondent. 4U The claim of 
improper manipulation was dismissed by Gannon on the grounds of the editor's 
integrity. Moreover, he argues, a highly-educated readership would have detected such 
censorship, with serious effects upon the paper's reputation that Dawson could not have 
wished. 4' Nevertheless, Margach, one of the strongest critics of Dawson, made a still 
stronger accusation: 
Not only did Dawson excise vital pieces from foreign correspondents' 
despatches, ... 
he even slipped in comments of his own, completely distorting 
the balance of the reports in the hope of comforting and currying favour with the 
Nazi leaders. 42 
Koss merely stated that The Times was doing what its competitors also did, but that this 
attracted more attention on account of its high reputation. 
43 The accusations were denied 
in the biographies of Dawson and Barrington-Ward, and in the memoirs of 
former 
journalists who pointed out that while articles were cut, this was not 
for the purpose of 
suiting a certain policy. 44 More recently, McDonough, in his examination of 
Ebbutt, 
casts doubt on these studies and renews the claim that they were 
indeed politically 
motivated. 45 
39 Norman Ebbutt (1894-1968). Joined foreign department of The Times in 1919, and 
became the paper's 
chief correspondent in Berlin, 1926-1937. 
40 See McDonough, `The Times', p. 407. 
41 Gannon, British Press, p. 70. 
42 Margach, Abuse, p. 54. See also Colin Coote, Editorial (London, 
1964), p. 169, who also claimed that 
Dawson made his own insertions. 
" Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 544. 
44 Gannon, British Press, pp. 118-24; McLachlan, Chair, pp. 131-8. 
45 See McDonough, `The Times', p. 407. 
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The allegation of manipulation and suppression of news relates most strongly to 
the correspondence between Dawson and Daniels in May 1937. On 11 May Da\v-son 
declared that `I am and always have been, most anxious that we shall `'explore evcrv 
avenue" in the search for a reasonable understanding with Germany'. 46 Da« son felt that 
Britain had never truly sought friendship with Germany, particularly in assuaging the 
German sense that they had been unfairly treated at Versailles. So he himself tried to do 
his best: `for my own part, I lose no opportunity, when I see it, of trying to mitigate this 
sort of grievance, which is mainly psychological'. 47 Only two weeks later Dawson 
reacted in a surprised manner to German criticisms of reports in The Times: 
But it really interests me to know precisely what it is in The Times that has 
produced this antagonism in Germany. I did my utmost, night after night, to 
keep out of the paper anything that might hurt their susceptibilities. I can really 
think of nothing that has been printed now for many months past which they 
48 could possibly take exception to as unfair comment. 
Critics of Dawson and appeasement see here evidence that the paper would stop at 
nothing - even suppression of news - to appease the Nazis. 
49 They too easily disregard 
the context and Dawson's justification: `No doubt [the Nazis] were annoyed by [a report 
on the bombing of Guernica], but its essential accuracy has never been disputed, and 
there has not been any attempt here to rub it in or to harp upon it. '50 The bombing was 
widely reported in the British press, but where other newspapers left the question of 
responsibility unspoken, The Times had directly charged Germany with the outrage. 
5' 
Dawson did, then, allow criticism of Germany, where it was true and 
fair. 52 
Critics are usually concerned with editorial comment or journalists' articles, 
ignoring 
46 Dawson to Daniels, 11 May 1937, MS Dawson 79. 
4' Ibid. 
48 Dawson to Daniels, 23 May 1937, MS Dawson 79. 
49 See Margach, Abuse, p. 163; Coote, Editorial, p. 169. 
50 Dawson to Daniels, 23 May 1937, MS Dawson 79. 
51 See Gannon, British Press, p. 113. 
52 See McLachlan, Chair, p. 133. 
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the way in which The Times was committed to accurate factual reports. In any case 
`facts' were `not left out because no newspaper can suppress important ne"-s', 53 Iverach 
McDonald, who worked for the newspaper in these years, gave an important insight into 
how Dawson edited it: `He held to the old (and never entirely workable) convention that 
the news column should be reserved for news and that all comment should be confined 
to the leader columns'. It follows that in the Dawson-Daniels correspondence, ' Da«vson 
was referring not to news despatches at all but to contributed articles to the editor which 
he selected or turned down, as was his right'. 54 Even when The Times was regarded as a 
mouthpiece of appeasement in the minds of British public, the paper did not shrink from 
expressing strong judgements on German domestic affairs. Thus, only a few weeks after 
it had supported the Anglo-German naval agreement, the newspaper pointed to the 
striking structural similarities between the National Socialist and the Bolshevist 
dictatorship. 55 In Berlin, the Nazi government reacted with considerable annoyance to 
this sharp analysis. 56 Furthermore, the paper criticised and exposed the darker side of 
National Socialism, like the treatment of the churches and persecution of the Jews. As 
Martin Gilbert admits, `Even The Times gave prominence to stories of religious 
persecution inside Germany'. 57 
Not only was analysis critical of German internal policy published in the paper; 
articles critical of British foreign policy appeared if it ran counter to the editor's views. 
The paper's stance during the Abyssinian crisis illustrates this very clearly. In 1935 the 
British government pledged its support for collective security and the League of 
s3 Ibid., p. 134. 
sa McDonald, Man, p. 53; see also McLachlan, Chair, pp. 131-137,282,283. 
ss See Times, 7 August 1935, p. 11. 
56 See Huttner, Britische Press, pp. 667-9. For the German reaction see Markus Huttner, 
Totalitarismus 
und säkulare Religionen. Zur Frühgeschichte totalitarismuskritischer 
Begriffs-und Theoriebildung in 
Großbritannien (Bonn, 1999), p. 91. 
57 Gilbert, Roots, p. 165. See also Andrew Sharf, The British Press and Jews under. 
V'a: i Rule (Oxford. 
1964). 
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Nations, 58 and the outcome of the general election indicated that the public supported 
this policy. Yet this did not solve the problem of the Italian armies fi`ghting in Abyssinia, 
so Hoare as Foreign Secretary was sent to Paris to negotiate a peace plan for 
presentation to the Italian and Abyssinian governments. The resulting Hoare-Laval pact 
proposed a substantial transfer of land to Italy, leaving Abyssinia with just a narrow 
zone for access to the sea - and one in which it would not be allowed to build a railway 
line. After the terms of the pact were leaked in French newspapers, it became apparent 
that British `public opinion' was hostile towards it as an excessive concession to Italian 
demands. The Times also criticised the plan and the government's apparent willingness 
to accept it, dismissively dubbing the zone `A Corridor for Camels'. 59 The Times alone 
did not cause the government to change its policy, drop the plan and persuade Hoare to 
resign his post, but considering its high reputation `its biting criticism was undoubtedly 
a significant factor'. 60 
Critics further argue that Ebbutt's despatches from Berlin were cut or distorted 
to suit the newspaper's support for Chamberlain's policy. This argument, however, is 
valid only if the cutting of despatches can be shown to have started with the accession 
of Chamberlain, and if it was not already common editorial practice at the time. 
McDonough had to admit that even `before the Nazis came to power, Ebbutt vas 
already finding his task difficult'. 61 Moreover, while it cannot be denied that Ebbutt's 
despatches were often and substantially cut, the reason for such editorial cuts was not 
their content, but their length. As early as 1931 Deakin, the foreign news editor, wrote 
to Ebbutt: `Your complaint about the lopping off of the last sentence in nearly every 
58 See Hoare's speech on 11 September 1935 in Geneva, in DBFP 2,14 no. 650. 
59 See Times, 16 December 1935, p. 15. 
60 Seymour-Ure, Impact, p. 76; see Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters (Oxford, 1954), p. 161, claiming 
that `public opposition has been mounting throughout the Press of the country led by The Times'. 
For 
public opinion during the Abyssinian crisis see D. Waley, British Public Opinion anal the . -fbi ssinian 
War 
1935-36 (London, 1957), pp. 48-50. 
61 McDonough, The Times', p. 408. 
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paragraph is all a matter of space'. 62 Or again a few years later: 'I sent y-ou a request not 
to exceed a column on any story. You sent a column and a half of comment for which 
we could find no place. '63 Ebbutt himself was well aware of the problem. In 1929 he 
had written that `Every message one sends is cut and though there may be very good 
reasons of space, I find it depressing to see the results of what I do send'. 64 It seems that 
he could not restrain himself, even after warnings in 1933: `I fear that, as usual, the 
articles will be found too long; and I realise that Barrington-Ward made this point clear 
enough in a recent letter. Yet I feel incapable of doing anything more about it than I 
have done, even if you give me up as a bad job. '65 That the problem was a matter of 
Ebbutt's prolixity, rather than the substance of his reports, is confirmed by the fact that 
his main dealings on the issue were with a subordinate editor, Deakin, rather than with 
Dawson. 66 In November 1934, Ebbutt wrote that on twelve occasions his articles had 
been cut, and therefore, quite possibly, distorted. 67 When, at times, he thought he could 
not achieve anything by writing to his responsible sub-editor, he wrote directly to 
Dawson. Significantly, again, he often got a supportive answer: `I will tell the sub- 
editors you are to be the best judge of what you can or cannot say and of how your 
messages can be framed most discreetly. ' 68 In spite of this, the length of Ebbutt's 
articles continued to be cut, and he continued to complain. But Ebbutt never resigned; 
so one can assume that whatever happened to his work in London, he was still content 
with the outcome published in the paper - that he did not think that the substance and 
purpose of his articles was changed. 
62 Deakin to Ebbutt, 7 June 1931, TTA, TT/FN/1/RD/1, and also Ebbutt to Deakin, 2 June 1931, TT: A. 
TT/FN/1/RD/1. See Gannon, British Press, p. 123. 
63 Deakin to Ebbutt, 4 April 1935, TTA, TT/FN/1/RD/1. 
64 Ebbutt to Deakin, 29 March 1929, TTA, TT/FN/1/RD/1. 
65 Ebbutt to Deakin, 1 April 1933, TTA, TT/FN/1 /RD/1. 
66 See McDonald, History, p. 466. 
67 Ebbutt to Deakin, 11 November 1934, TTA, TT/FN/1/RD/l. 
68 Dawson to Ebbutt, 20 December 1934, TTA, GGD/1. 
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In August 1937 Ebbutt was expelled from Germany. Gannon offered as the 
reason German government retaliation for the expulsion of three German journal IStS. 69 
while the official History of The Times stressed that the Nazis feared his articles more 
than they valued Dawson's calming editorials. 70 McLachlan more or less agreed, that 
Ebbutt's printed articles caused his expulsion. 71 Woods, more specifically, stressed the 
importance of his articles on the Church struggle in German}'. 72 This explanation 
seemed to be confirmed by a Times leader commenting on German criticisms of Ebbutt, 
published three days before his expulsion: 
It is permissible, perhaps, to remind these well-drilled German newspapers that 
The Times has stood rather conspicuously for an attitude towards their country 
which is by no means universal in England. The distinction which it has always 
drawn between the internal affairs of Germany (which are her own concern) and 
those national activities - due to some extent, no doubt, to the character of their 
rulers - which may threaten the peace and security of other countries, or strike at 
the world-wide freedom of religious belief. There is too much reason to believe 
that Mr Ebbutt's main offence has been his repeated exposure of these 
persecutions of religion which are the worst feature of the Nazi regime and 
which are bound to be a permanent stumbling block in the path of international 
friendship. 
So even when Dawson's staff `edited' Ebbutt's articles, cutting out or altering sentences 
for reasons of length, these articles still remained so critical of the German government 
that in the end it expelled him. 73 In the face of German complaints. Dawson had been 
loyal to Ebbutt and refused to withdraw him. `The case against Mr. Ebbutt was frankly 
based on dissatisfaction with his published record of affairs in Germany. '74 As Woods 
69 Gannon, British Press, p. 121. 
70 History, p. 908. 
71 McLachlan, Chair, pp. 131-8. 
'` Woods and Bishop, Story, p. 294. 
73 See Seymour-Ure, Impact, p. 93. 
74 The Times, 17 August 1937, p. 13; see also Dawson to Daniels, 9 August 1937. MS Dawson 79, where 
the editor believed that the reason for the expulsion was `that he has not been sufficiently sympathetic to 
the Nazi regime. ' 
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justly comments `unlike the Government, who replaced an ambassador [Phipps in 
1937]... The Times never attempted to shift its representative in Germany'. 75 
What none of Dawson's critics explain is the particular timing of Ebbutt's 
expulsion. McDonough explains it by a change in Nazi press policy, dating from 
January 1937.76 He denied that the removal was the result of critical articles on 
Germany in 1937'. 77 Although this remains a possibility, it seems more likely that 
dislike of Ebbutt's articles was indeed the reason for the German action. Goebbels 
seems to have been the force behind it. 78 His gloating remark after he got news of 
Ebbutt's physical collapse months after the latter was back in England ('The Times is 
now bearable'79) indicates his level of personal satisfaction. Certainly it seems that after 
Ebbutt had left, the German news in The Times was less offensive in the Nazis' eves. 
Even Hitler praised the paper: `The Times leader had not worried him so much, because 
The Times had given ... a 
fair deal on balance and had often been very kind. '80 When 
during the summer of 1939 rumours about a change of the Berlin correspondent became 
public, Dirksen let it be known to the Foreign Office that the German government 
wanted Ebbutt's successor, Holburn, to stay in post because of his `general objective 
correspondence'. 8' 
However, Douglas Reed, the Central European correspondent since May 1935, 
had a different story. Reed quite quickly became a strong opponent of The Times' pro- 
75 Woods and Bishop, Story, p. 294; see McDonald, Man, p. 53. 
76 See McDonough, `The Times', pp. 420-1. 
" McDonough, `The Times', p. 421; cf. Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 223. 
78 For Ebbutt's expulsion see Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, ed. Elke Fröhlich vol. iii (Munich 
1987). p. 229 (8 August 1937), p. 234 (12 August 1937), p. 236 (15 August 1937), p. 239 (18 August 
1937), p. 241 (20 August 1937) and p. 262 (11 September 1937). 
79 Ibid., p. 334 (13 November 1937). 
80 Reed memo, 19 December 1937, Deakin papers, TTA, TT/FN/l 'RD! 1. 
81 Dirksen memo, 16 June 1939, Auswärtige Amt, 8.121672. 
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appeasement stance. 82 He complained that as the international tension grew, his 
warnings were ignored, and he was purposely pushed off the 'news maps of Europe'. 
Instead of being sent to Prague to report on the Sudeten crisis, the paper sent him to 
Belgrade. As a consequence Reed left The Times in October 1938, moving to the Neil's 
Chronicle. 83 He never alleged that the substance of his articles had been altered, but by 
this time he no longer felt he could identify with The Times. Reed was not the only 
journalist who was unhappy at The Times in the late 1930s. 84 Colin Coote, leader writer 
and convinced opponent of appeasement, was moved away from covering events in 
Europe, and asked to write on British rearmament instead. 85 He only remained at The 
Times because his friend Churchill asked him to do so. 86 There was also the case of 
Anthony Winn, who resigned as the paper's Lobby correspondent after his report on 
Duff Cooper's October 1938 resignation speech had been altered by Dawson. 
Cooper's version of this episode quickly became part of the criticism of The 
Times. According to him, `not only did the editor suppress it but he inserted a 
concoction of his own in which the speech was described as a "damp squib" and headed 
it "from our lobby correspondent"'. 87 This is completely misleading. In fact, Cooper's 
speech was not suppressed: it was fully reported in two columns on the Parliamentary 
pages. Nor was it attributed to the `Lobby Correspondent' - and the phrase `damp 
squib' does not appear in it. 88 Certainly there was an argument about the precise 
reporting of Cooper's words, which prompted Winn's resignation. But the underlying 
82 See Dawson's judgement of his Vienna correspondent in a letter to Churchill, 23 March 1938, MS 
Dawson, 79/178: `an extreme anti-Nazi'. See also Douglas Reed, Insanity Fair (London, 1938), his 
critical judgment of the European situation. 
83 Reed to Dawson, 10 October 1938, quoted in Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 199. 
84 See McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, p. 118. 
85 See Coote, Editorial, p. 169. 
86 See ibid. pp. 170-1. Churchill told him that he would like to have `a friend in the "enemy's camp"': 
Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. v (1922-39) (London, 1976), p. 579. 87 Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (London, 1954), p. 250; see also .4 Durable 
Fire. The Letters of Dutt and 
Diana Cooper 1913-1950, ed. Artemis Cooper (London, 1985), p. 292. 
88 See Times, 3 October 1938, p. 15. 
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reason was Winn's growing disillusionment with the paper's editorial stance. 89 In his 
letter of resignation Winn wrote: 
The Duff Cooper episode apart, my distaste for what I frankly regard as a silly 
and dangerous policy has been hardening for many weeks.... Since, rightly or 
wrongly, I hold these views it is impracticable for me to be the Parliamentary 
Correspondent of a paper which was the first responsible advocate of secession, 
and which still has hopes of a genuine friendship with the Nazi regime. 90 
Dawson took the criticism of his editorial policy very much to heart. His reply 
constitutes a reasoned and far from discreditable justification of the paper's policy: 
I do not myself believe that the [Nazi] system will last for ever. But in am' case I 
am convinced that the best way to consolidate and perpetuate it would be by 
staging a worldwide war on an issue that would be profoundly misinterpreted, 
not only in this country and in Germany, but in the Dominions and in the United 
States. Similarly I am convinced that British rearmament and organisation must 
go forward with redoubled vi 
1our 
if we are ever to make the German people cry 
halt to an insane competition. 
*** 
The Times had long-established views on the German problem. These were not 
the product of government influence; rather, the paper's editorial policies tended to 
coincide with Chamberlain's Policies. One of these views was that an Anschluss 
between Germany and Austria would be a means of remedying a German grievance. It 
therefore argued that the British government could have no interest in intervening in a 
purely German-Austrian affair. It believed that many Austrians themselves wanted to 
become part of the German Reich. For the newspaper the separation of the tww o 
countries had been artificial: 
Fundamentally a close understanding between the two German States is the most 
natural thing possible. One of the least rational, most brittle, and most 
provocative artificialities of the peace settlement was the 
ban on the 
89 See Gannon, British Press, pp. 65-8, and McDonough, The Times', p. 418. 
90 Winn to Dawson, 4 October 1938, MS Dawson 80. 
91 Dawson to Winn, 5 October 1938, MS Dawson 80. 
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incorporation of Austria in the Reich. ... These crows are coming home to 
roost. 92 
Nevertheless, The Times reacted to news of the German invasion of Austria unusually 
sharply. Although for a long time it had considered the Anschluss inevitable, it 
expressed deep shock on 12 March 1938 over the brutal method used by the Germans. 9 
The Times now worried over the Anschluss, because it was concerned that it had 
inflicted heavy damage to German-British relations, at a time when progress toward real 
`friendship' had been made: `What is so deeply resented here [was] by applying to it the 
physical strength of the bully, and in so doing to arrest other hopeful movements 
towards a stable peace. '94 As a consequence, Dawson recommended unreserved support 
for the latest British arms programme. 95 This was now a permanent topic in The Tinmes, 
which frankly stated that `the British Government will see first and foremost to their 
own armaments - that is clearly what matters most'. 
96 
Whilst the overriding aim was now to increase the rearmament effort, the basic 
principle of appeasement was not forgotten. The Anschluss would `no doubt increase 
the resources and strength of Germany. Great Britain is also engaged in increasing her 
strength. But it is perfectly appropriate that negotiations should be conducted from 
strength by both parties'. 97 Yet this did not mean that The Times advocated a direct 
response to the Anschluss. Its view was that Austria had never been capable of surviving 
in any circumstances: `she was destined sooner or later to find herself in close 
association with the German Reich. '98 When the initial excitement had died away, 
it 
92 Times 17 February 1938, p. 17. 
93 See Times 12 March 1938, p. 13. 
Q4 Times 14 March 1938, p. 15; on The Times' attitude towards the Anschluss, see Histon, 01 the 
Times. 
pp. 915-7; Wrench, Dativson, pp. 368-70; Gannon, British Press, pp. 149-53; Woods and 
Bishop. Stoa-, 
pp. 303-5.177-8 
95 See Times, 14 March 1938, p. 15; see Huttner, Britische Presse, pp. 
96 Times, 14 March 1938, p. 15, also 15 March 1938, p. 15. 
97 Ibid., 11 April 1938, p. 13. 
98 Ibid., 14 March 1938, p. 15, and see 16 March 1938, p. 15. 
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showed its readiness to go back to its earlier agenda: `Why then should Europe ... be 
stirred to resentment over an act of union in line with the course of history, and ratified. 
as it seems, with a fever of popular gratitude? '99 
A. L. Kennedy, now The Times chief leader writer, who was in Prague when the 
Anschluss took place, wrote an analysis of Nazi foreign policy at this time. His analysis, 
which he sent to Dawson, partly reflected The Times' policy over the coming months. 
He assumed that Britain was strong enough to fight her: The only question therefore 
for us, as I see it, is this - at what point are we going to cry `halt'? Is Czecho-Slovakia 
good ground on which to make our stand? ... They [the Sudetendeutsche] are certainly 
one of the best treated minorities in Europe, now'. These doubts about the 
Sudetendeutsche prevailed through the summer until their fate was finally decided at 
Munich. But he also argued that Germany's ultimate aim was `to challenge the British 
Empire'. 100 Dawson clearly agreed with Kennedy that the Sudeten Germans were a 
well-treated minority. But he certainly had doubts about British military strength, hence 
his frequent calls for increased armaments. It also seems very unlikely that Dawson 
accepted Kennedy's assumption that Germany ultimately wanted to fight the British 
Empire. If he had subscribed to this view, surely he would have advocated stronger 
action over Austria or Czechoslovakia, before Hitler drew strength and confidence from 
his invasion and became a more formidable threat to the Empire. 
The Times now shifted between an understanding of the rightfulness of some 
German grievances, and the problem that would evolve for the Czechoslovakian 
government in dealing with their complaints. The longer it took, the more the 
newspaper grew anxious that the Czechoslovakian problem prevented the possibility of 
99 Ibid., 15 March 1938, p. 15; Kieser, Englands Appeasementpolitik, pp. 86-7. 
100 Kennedy to Dawson, 18 March 1938, TTA, GGD/1; also quoted in Kennec/i'Journal, p. 263. 
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an Anglo-German settlement. 101 The turning-point seemed to have been around the so- 
called `May crisis'. Earlier, The Times supported the idea that Czechs and Sudeten 
Germans should solve their problems alone. 102 Then on 16 May. its opinion changed. 
The Times argued that the Czechs should concede most of the demands of the , coup 
around Henlein, in order to maintain the peace: `The best chance of a friendly 
settlement is that the maximum of concessions - and concessions there must be - 
should be offered now and not in ineffective instalments. ' 103 The newspaper now asked 
for a stronger role on the part of the British government in helping to settle the 
Czechoslovakian problem, even if this meant increased pressure on the 
Czechoslovakian government. 104 Already the paper's policy towards Czechoslovakia 
was beginning to take shape. On 30 May 1938 the paper argued that 
The Governments which refuse even to entertain proposals of peaceful change 
must therefore take their full share of the responsibility if, by popular vote or 
otherwise, some change is shown to be desired by a majority of the 
population. 105 
This indicated a clear step towards secession, although not expressed quite as strongly 
as it was to be in its notorious editorial of 7 September. In other words, The Times 
stance on the Sudeten problem was established well before the Czechoslovakian crisis 
really developed: it was not a policy adopted quickly in response to the events of 
September. Its editorials during the crisis expressed long-considered editorial views, 
and were not an effect of government `guidance' or 'pressure'. 
By June The Times had modified its opinion again. It now held that the Sudeten 
Germans should be permitted to chose their future freely, according to the principle of 
national self-determination. Although the Sudeten areas and their well-treated people 
10, See Gannon, British Press, pp. 173-4. 
102 Times 20 April 1938, p. 17. 
103 Ibid., 16 May 1938, p. 15. 
104 See Ibid., 23 May 1938, p. 15. 
105 Ibid., 30 May 1938, p. 15. 
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had for centuries been part of Bohemia and not of Germany, it would be better in the 
long term for Czechoslovakia to grant autonomy to the ethnic minority. From the 
Czechoslovakian point of view this was not the most favourable solution, but through 
the separation of Bohemia they could 
in the long run be the gainers in having a homogenous and contented people still 
more numerous than the population of Belgium or Holland, and twice as 
numerous as those of Denmark or Switzerland ... It would be a drastic remedy for the present unrest, but something drastic may be needed. 106 
To this suggestion of Sudeten autonomy the Foreign Office reacted with a prompt 
denial that it expressed government policy: the paper was plainly taking an independent 
line, in advance of ministerial views. 107 It is in fact probable that the article was inspired 
by a letter to The Times the day before from the Dean of St. Paul's, William Matthews. 
He wanted to see the Sudeten question solved in a radical way: `I suppose that the 
British Empire has now adopted the view that it is both wrong and unwise to coerce a 
people into remaining within a State system against their will. ' 108 
In official German circles this proposal in The Times was seen as corresponding 
to `Chamberlain's trains of thought'. Hesse, the press attache at the German Embassy, 
claimed that it was well-known that The Times was being used `for such official ballon 
d'essai', and would not act against the opinions and intentions of Chamberlain on 
foreign policy questions. 109 Within The Times, John Walter IV, co-chief-proprietor felt 
the need to protest against the idea: 
I feel that our leader on Czechoslovakia yesterday must have come as a shock to 
many readers of The Times, advocating as it did the cause of the Wolf against 
the Lamb, on the ground of justice. ... 
In contemplating the dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia as a measure of justice to the Sudeten Germans. our leader 
writer made no allusion to the flood of injustice and cruelty that would certainl}' 
106 Ibid., 3 June 1938, p. 15. 
107 See Huttner, Britische Presse, pp. 178-9; see DBFP, III, vol. 1, no. 374. 
108 Times, 2 June 1938, p. 15. 
109 See Hesse memo, `On probable genesis of the oft-quoted article in The Times of June 
3rd', DGFP, vol. 
11, Series D, p. 399; see also Kieser, Englands Appeasementpolitik, p. 95. 
79 
overwhelm the minorities thus handed over to the tender mercies of Messrs 
Hitler, Goering and Goebbels. 110 
Walter, however, could do little more than register his criticism, since the newspaper's 
policy was in the editor's hands, and the paper seemed to believe that the fate of 
minority populations should not be allowed to drag Europe into a new war. Within the 
pages of The Times, the handling of the Sudeten issue was no longer open to debate. 
The issue was whether the Sudeten Germans should be forced to remain part of a 
country within which they were being held by the unjust terms of the Versailles Treat}'. 
The Times urged all governments involved to make the necessary sacrifice to preserve 
the peace in Europe: 
It would really be the bankruptcy of European statesmanship if this question of 
the future of something over 3,000,000 German Czech subjects were allowed to 
plunge a continent into devastating war. ... 
What remains to be done is to rectify 
the error of 1919, and to allow the Sudeten Germans peacefully to express their 
own views as to their future. ' 11 
Again Dawson had been in advance of government policy. In mid-June Kennedy 
reported that Halifax `regards our advocacy of a plebiscite as being at least rather 
premature & embarrassing the negotiations between Benesh and the Sudetens'. 
Nevertheless, Halifax `indicates that he may come to supporting the idea of a plebiscite 
himself, but asks us to go slow'. This in turn showed the Germans, who were beginning 
to think that the British government was on the Czech side through its preferred support 
for a `solution maintaining the present boundaries' that their position was in fact more 
flexible than had hitherto been assumed. 112 
Although no definite solution had been proposed, the underlying idea was 
repeated in mid-July: `The wishes of the nationalities themselves ought to 
be the 
110 John Walter to Dawson, 4 June 1938, TTA, Dawson papers GGD/1. 
111 Times, 14 June 1938, p. 17. 
112 Kennedy Journal, p. 274 (17 June 1938). 
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determining factor, and no solution should be considered too drastic which is desired by 
an overwhelming majority. ' 113 In August, with tension growing, the paper stated that 
Britain could not stay out of a possible conflict, but urged the essential wisdom of 
revision. 114 The leader now clearly prepared the ground for secession, but chose to call 
the process 'autonomy': `to reject claims for autonomy merely as incompatible with the 
security of the State may itself be an impairment of that security. ' 115 
The Times editorial of 7 September 1938 secured it a prominent place in the 
prehistory of the Munich conference. At the time of publication the Czechoslovakian 
president Benes, aware of the pressure of the British mediation efforts and faced with 
the threat of war, agreed to concessions which the Sudeten German minority had 
already demanded in their `Karlsbad demands' on 24 April 1938.116 In this context The 
Times introduced a suggestion which exceeded anything the leaders of the Sudeten 
German minority had dared to require officially from Czechoslovakia. 117 The paper 
expressed scepticism about the feasibility of the plan of a `Kantonalisierung' of 
Czechoslovakia, which was about to be negotiated in Prague, and speculated: 
whether they should exclude altogether the project, which has found favour in 
some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogenous state or the 
secession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation 
with which they are united by race. In any case the wishes of the populations 
concerned would seem to be a decisively important element in any solution that 
can hope to be regarded as permanent, and the advantages to Czechoslovakia of 
becoming a homogenous state might conceivably outweigh the obvious 
disadvantage of losing the Sudeten German districts of the borderland. 
118 
13 Times, 15 July 1938, p. 17. 
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The dramatic proposal, which pressed forward the transfer of the Sudeten Germans of 
the border areas to Germany, had been completed during the evening of 6 September 
1938.119 Dawson's diary reads: 
an extremely arduous afternoon & evening - Leo Kennedy was there rather 
reluctantly prepared to write on the Czech crisis wh[ich] was obviously coming, 
to a head & and produced an article wh[ich] I had to get him to re-write at the 
last minute. Even so it ventilated rather crudely the idea which we have often 
[made] before, of a secession of the Sudeten fringe in Germany & there was a lot 
of hurried revision to be done at midnight. 120 
But however well informed Kennedy and Dawson now were on Halifax's and 
Chamberlain's views, the article nevertheless expressed their own long developed line 
of argument. What caused most excitement was not the suggestion of a plebiscite to 
hand over the Sudetendeutsche areas to Germany: only a year previously the Saarland 
had been handed over to Germany after one such peaceful plebiscite. 121 The most 
striking part of the piece was the reference to anonymous political circles ('which has 
found favour in some quarters'), which led to speculation that the article had been 
inspired by the government. 122 The Foreign Office now had to deny for the second time 
that summer any connection with The Times' point of view. After the intervention of the 
Czechoslovak envoy, the British government stated by official communique that The 
Times' suggestion was not representative of their foreign policy. 
123 Critics of the 
newspaper thus had good reasons for reproaching The Times, claiming it had sent a 
signal of Britain's readiness to make concessions to the German dictator. 
Despite the Foreign Office denial, it is clear that Dawson and Kennedy were 
well aware that their proposal was acceptable to Halifax and Chamberlain. Halifax 
led 
1 19 See History, pp. 929-934; McLachlan, Chair, pp. 146-150, and Harold Nicolson. Diaries and 
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Dawson to understand that, in his opinion, during the talks in Prague all possibilities 
had to be considered of a peaceful solution of the problem, even if they included the 
separation of the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia. 124 This points to the fact that The 
Times editorial was not far removed from the `inner Cabinet' thinking, '25 something 
well understood in the German embassy, where Kordt wrote that whilst The Ti mies 
article was certainly not inspired by the Foreign Office. The possibility exists ... that it 
derives from the Prime Minister's entourage'. 126 
Nevertheless, it is clear that The Times independently expressed a view which 
happened to coincide with the Cabinet line. 127 Halifax's statement to Dawson came after 
the publication of the editorial, and so is not evidence of government pressure or Times 
deference to the government. Indirectly, this is admitted by Cockett, who stated that 
`whether Halifax actually invited Dawson to make the suggestion in his article can 
never be known, but it is evident that Dawson had correctly interpreted the minds of 
Halifax and Chamberlain'. 128 
Since so much historical attention has been paid to the issue it should be asked 
just how important was the leader of 7 September 1938. Undoubtedly, the article made 
progress on the part of the Runciman mission very unlikely, but had it any deeper 
political significance? Seymour-Ure saw its importance as lying `in the widespread 
assumption that it foreshadowed the British view'. 129 This being so, the issue of whether 
the article was actually inspired by anyone in the government or not is ultimately of 
124 Cf. Barrington-Ward's notes on 9 September 1938, printed in McLachlan, Chair, p. 148. Liddell Hart 
says Dawson felt sure that Halifax was `privately in agreement, even though [he] was expressing the 
opposite view to the representatives of the other countries concerned': Memoirs of Liddell Hart, vol. 11, p. 
160, and see Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 181. 
its See Seymour-Ure, Impact, p. 81. 
126 Kordt to German Foreign Ministry, telegram no. 406,8 September 1938, DGFP, II/D, p. 723. Later he 
added that `it was very probably the office of the Prime Minister at Number 10 Downing Street, which, if 
it did not actually approve that publication, nevertheless permitted it': Kordt to German Foreign Ministry, 
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little importance. 13 0 The Times at that time was already regarded as so closely involved 
in the inner circles of the British government that it did not really matter if it actually 
`announced' the government's policy or only hinted at its future course. This was the 
result of being the British `establishment' paper. In fact the article was not expressed as 
explicitly as Dawson had wished: `It was not worded quite as I should have done if I 
had rather more time to revise it'. 13' Nevertheless, it was not a recommendation of 
secession, but a suggestion `that it should not be excluded as a solution if all others 
failed'. 132 
It should also be reiterated that The Times had published versions of this idea 
earlier. Nor was the idea exclusive to itself. It had already been made by the left-wing 
journal, The New Statesman: `the question of frontier revision, difficult though it is, 
should at once be tackled. The strategical value of the Bohemian frontier should not be 
made the occasion of a world war. We should not guarantee the status quo. ' 133 The fact 
that similar editorial views existed on opposing sides of the political spectrum shows 
how widespread the desire was to solve the Sudeten crisis. 134 
Kennedy later found time to reconsider the genesis of the article. He gave the 
same explanation as Dawson: that the policy of secession had developed in the minds of 
the responsible people at The Times since at least May 1938. And he stressed that `It 
was incidentally this suggestion of ours that evoked a private letter from Lord Halifax to 
GD ... in which 
he begged us not to pursue the proposal of a plebiscite, as they (the Brit. 
130 On the source of the article McDonald, Man, p. 33, remembered: `For myself I was not at all 
comforted by knowing that the article was entirely home made in PHS. Given the standing and great 
influence of The Times in those years ... 
I knew the damage would be at least as great as if the article had 
been inspired directly by the Government. In many ways it would be greater. The article was a signal that 
Chamberlain had allies. The Times was not simply tagging along behind the Government. ' 
131 Dawson to Astor, quoted in History of The Times, p. 935. 
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Government) were trying another solution'. 135 Halifax in that letter did not rule it out as 
an `ultimate solution'. When it became obvious that the Runciman mission would fail, 
the newspaper put forward the proposal of secession at the beginning of September. The 
Times was further encouraged to press forward with this solution since it knew 
Chamberlain's position: `We also knew in a roundabout way that Neville Chamberlain 
was ready to consider secession. He had attended a luncheon given by Lady Astor to 
some American journalists in the summer, at which one of them had asked him whether 
he would consider that solution -& he had answered in the same common sense way as 
Lord Halifax, that he would not refuse to consider it'. '36 Kennedy, with this background 
information, thought it completely acceptable to propose the solution. If he had grounds 
for complaint they lay in Chamberlain's handling of the situation. Because the prime 
minister never openly stated the possibility of secession `until Hitler faced him with it at 
Berchtesgaden. Then he accepted it at once. It looked like capitulation to a dictator'. 137 
When Chamberlain decided to start his personal diplomacy by visiting Hitler in 
Berchtesgaden, The Times supported him in the strongest terms. Its editorial of 15 
September praised Chamberlain's decision to travel to Germany as proof of `courage 
and common sense'. 138 However, it is difficult to chart the paper's policy in September 
1938, because it fluctuated considerably as events unfolded. Initially it argued that it 
would be absolute madness for general war to break out over the question of some three 
and one-half million folk in the pleasant land of Bohemia'. 
139 But of course the desire to 
avoid war did not rule out the possibility of conflict. Later, The Times criticized 
Czechoslovakian obstinacy and reminded the Benes government that it could not draw 
any advantage by holding the German population of the area against their will. In 
135 Kennedy Journal, p. 278 (17 October 1938). 
136 Ibid, p. 279; see McDonald, Man, p. 30, and McDonald, History, p. 18. 
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stating this, the paper was doing nothing more than continuing its long-standing 
advocacy of self-determination. It argued that Czechoslovakia had nothin, -, to fear from 
the transfer of territory, since it would receive larger security by an international 
warranty of its new boundaries. 140 
Meanwhile, events in international relations unfolded very quickly, and parts of 
the British press became more critical. 141 The Times defended Chamberlain against 
accusations that he had given in to Hitler, because Great Britain was not in a position to 
protect Czechoslovakia, even in the case of a war. 'Would war save or spare 
Czechoslovakia? Would victory restore it as now composed and under its present 
constitution? ' 142 If the argument of considerable government influence, even control, 
over `the press' were to have real validity, at this time of maximum government effort 
newspaper support - especially that of The Times - could have been taken for granted. 
Yet Chamberlain was relieved to find that The Times would support his mission. '43 This 
was not a prime minister confident even of the chief `establishment' newspaper. 
The Times argued that Chamberlain's readiness to negotiate Sudeten cession was 
`certainly not betrayal. He has made a surrender, not to Herr Hitler but to justice - and 
that is not dishonourable... Justice does not become injustice because a dictator demands 
it. ' 144 In the last week of September 1938, however, The Times began to pursue a harder 
line towards Germany, and in doing so contributed to a state of opinion which made it 
more difficult for Chamberlain to reach agreement in negotiations with Germany. 
145 An 
editorial of 27 September condemned Hitler for aggravating the crisis. The article also 
Sao See Times, 20 September 1938, p. 13. 
141 See Harvey diaries, p. 191 (21 September 1938). 
142 Times, 21 September 1938, p. 11. 
143 See Dawson diary, 22 September 1938, MS Dawson 42. 
144 Times, 22 September 1938, p. 11. 
145 See Ibid., 26 September 1938, p. 13. 
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questioned whether his attitude did not point to a wider interest in Eastern Europe rather 
than a specific interest in the Sudeten Germans: 
What are the ultimate intentions of the Nazi regime ...? 
Are they determined to 
get a stranglehold? Are they seeking to murder a nation because it is in the way? 
And then to stride on, reaching forward to the rich prizes of the Danubian and 
the Balkan granaries? That is the question mark which looms so large behind the 
immediate issue. 146 
The Times not only indicated its own reservations. An aspect ignored in most critical 
studies of the newspaper is that it was a forum for airing alternative views, including 
criticism of government policy and the paper's own editorial views. The Times 
correspondence columns remained open even to leading anti-appeasers. This had been 
the case during the peak of the Austrian crisis, 147 and it remained so even to a point 
when the German government officially noted the `malicious letters' that appeared in 
The Times. 148 During the Sudeten crisis, even after Hoare had in late September started 
to speak with newspaper editors in order to try to moderate published criticisms, a 
stream of critical letters continued to be published. For example, letters from Eden and 
Amery - leading Conservative anti-appeaser - were printed. 
149 Moreover, speeches and 
other public statements from opposition politicians like Attlee and Sinclair continued to 
appear in the newspaper throughout the crisis, as did reports of the Labour Party 
Conference. As a newspaper `of record', The Times was expected to do nothing less: it 
was not at all suppressing views hostile to the government. 
In the days following the Munich agreement The Times defended Chamberlain 
unreservedly. It stressed that there was so little real difference of opinion between the 
Germans and the British and French governments that a war over Czechoslovakia 
146 Ibid., 27 September 1938, p. 13; see Kehoe, `British Press', pp. 217-8. 
147 See History of The Times, p. 916. 
148 See Dirksen memo, 10 June 1938, Auswärtige Amt, Political Archive, R. 1022778. Pol. II 1875. 
ia9 Times, 12 September and 26 September 1938, p. 13; and see Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (London, 
1965), p. 23 and The Empire at Bay. The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-1945, ed. John Barnes and David 
Nicolson (London, 1988), pp. 485,516: hereafter Amery Diaries. 
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would be considered as 'criminal'. 150 The Munich agreement was regarded by the paper 
as a `hopeful' agreement, and Chamberlain was credited with proposing all of the 
peace-keeping measures. '5' The Times emphasized that `justice has been the victor at 
Munich', and attacked critics of the agreement for advocating a policy which would 
have driven Great Britain into a war, without themselves offering alternatives to 
Chamberlain's actions. 152 `The lessons of the crisis are plain and urgent. The policy of 
international appeasement must of course be pressed forward, working through the 
peoples, who have shown that they desire it'. 153 Privately, writing to his friend Brand, 
Dawson agreed about the barbarity of the Nazis - but added that it was `very largely the 
creation of ourselves and the French in the past'. 154 Here, once again, the Versailles 
6 guilt complex' was the guiding principle of the editor. 
Nevertheless, there was a discernible toughening of the paper's stance - one 
more in line with Halifax's doubts about German intentions than Chamberlain's 
confidence in `peace in our time'. In the midst of the parliamentary debates on Munich, 
it emphasised that the agreement had bought the necessary time that Britain needed to 
close the armament gap that existed between itself and Germany. `On the most 
pessimistic estimates on the future, we have gained a respite in which to make up a 
backwardness in armament that is now recognized even by those who most bitterly 
opposed all attempts to put it right. ' 155 When it argued in mid-October for the need to 
combine `the strengthening of our defences with an active cultivation of the tender 
shoots of the policy of appeasement', the order of priorities was telling. 
'56 It needed an 
intense situation to `awaken the people of England to the dangers of their vulnerable 
150 See Times, 30 September 1938, p. 13. 
15' See Ibid., 1 October 1938, p. 13. 
's' See Ibid., 4 October. 1938, p. 15. 
153 Ibid., 3 October 1938, p. 11. 
154 Dawson to Brand, 2 October 1938, TTA, GGD/1. 
Iss Times, 5 October 1938, p. 15. 
156 Ibid., 18 October 1938, p. 15. 
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state', 157 but they had now accepted that `British rearmament is the key to 
disarmament'. 1 58 Over the coming months suspicion over German intentions be Egan to 
grow in the Times office as Hitler's behaviour made it clear that his strategy was to 
follow `agreements' with new demands. These doubts were also increased by the 
pogrom of 9 November 1938, the so-called `Kristallnacht'. This more sceptical point of 
view became public on 30 January 1939, the anniversary of Hitler's accession to power. 
Barrington-Ward wrote that by continuing to emphasise and demand redress for 
German grievances, Hitler was going too far. The paper now believed that further 
claims were not justified: they were not `inexhaustible assets and they have been 
swallowed up in the incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland in the territory of the 
Reich'. '59 
After Munich, The Times soon abandoned any idea that Czechoslovakia could 
remain truly independent. It is therefore surprising that The Times reacted with such 
alarm when German forces invaded Prague on 15 March and proclaimed the 
`protectorate of Bohemia and Maehren'. As the paper now saw, by this step the worst 
British fears had been realised: with the forceful incorporation of non-German citizens 
into the German Reich Hitler revealed his true goal to be the conquest of Eastern 
Europe, not the establishment of a homogeneous state. The Times turned from its 
tolerant view of German requests with the statement: `Germany has failed to honour the 
agreement' . 
160 
The Times now accepted that German supremacy over Eastern Europe was 
probably unavoidable. But it concluded that Western Europe should now concentrate on 
its own defence: `They on their own part can only continue with increased energy to 
157 Ibid., 21 October 1938, p. 15. 
158 Ibid., 17 October 1938, p. 15. 
159 Ibid., 31 January 1939, p. 13; see Gannon, British Press, p. 229. 
160 Ibid., 15 March 1939, p. 15. 
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look to their own security'. 16 1 For The Times appeasement was now a dead policy, but it 
nevertheless argued that it had been the right policy to follow until Germany's true 
intentions had become clear. 162 `The invasion, occupation, and annexation of Bohemia- 
Moravia are notice to the world that German policy no longer seeks the protection of a 
moral case. ' 163 The most recent Nazi act of aggression was now clearly regarded as not 
being in line with the principle of self-determination. The purpose was only too clear, 
and was `more and more revealed as sheer aggrandisement - the brutal domination of 
other countries for the sole purpose of increasing the power of the Reich'. 164 
The newspaper now urged close cooperation among the Western powers, 
because there was an obvious fear: `Is the recent invasion the last of a series we know or 
the first of a new series? ' 165 In the eyes of The Times the need for friendship with 
France had never been greater since 1919. As a consequence of the stiff British response 
to the Prague occupation, rumours began to spread in Berlin about the old claim of 
`encirclement'. This time, however, The Times remained strong in its argument and 
presented any `encirclement' as a consequence of German foreign policy, which had 
made it `a natural and even an inevitable process'. 166 The Times was no longer prepared 
to justify German acts by reference to its old grievances, as it had done earlier. 
167 
The occupation of Prague changed the paper's policy completely: its support for 
the policy of appeasement stopped. The change in the Times's stance did not occur 
because Chamberlain ceased to seek its support. The means of government influence. 
such as they were, remained in place. What had changed was the paper's assessment of 
German intentions and the appropriate British response. Where before it had supported 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid., 18 March 1939, p. 13. 
163 Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 17. 
'64 Ibid., 17 March 1939, p. 17. 
165 Ibid., 18 March 1939, p. 13. 
166 Ibid., 20 March 1939, p. 15. 
167 See Ibid.; see Gannon, British Press, pp. 237-8. 
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appeasement, now it turned instead to advocating an alliance of the democracies against 
German aggression. In neither case were its views `controlled' by the government. 
Nevertheless, on 31 March 1939, when Chamberlain surprisingly told the House 
of Commons that the British government had decided to guarantee the independence of 
Poland, The Times published an editorial which was generally felt to qualify the 
guarantee. 168 It introduced a distinction between Polish `independence' and its territorial 
`integrity', in a way which seemed to weaken the guarantee pledge to defend the Polish 
frontier automatically; instead, the decision to go to war would remain with the British 
government. Foster argues that this limitation of Chamberlain's speech in parts of the 
press (Evening Standard and Reuters also qualified the guarantee) `suggested a guiding 
hand at work'. 169 The leader received strong criticism in the House of Commons 
debate, 170 and Simon had to give an assurance that 
no one, either at the Foreign Office or on behalf of the government authorised 
Reuters or The Times to minimise the effect of the Prime Minister's statement 
on Friday. I am given this specific sentence which I repeat, as I have it before 
me: `These comments were made on the responsibility of the agency and the 
newspaper concerned. ' 171 
Dawson noted `a good deal of to-do about Saturday's leader which was suspected (quite 
wrongly) of watering down the British declaration ... 
it also ran the gauntlet in the 
House of Commons where there was a big debate in the afternoon and an admirable 
speech from the Prime Minister'. 172 This was also Kennedy's impression: `Possibly GD 
and I between us put a shade too much stress on the limitations of the guarantee, and too 
168 Ibid., 1 April 1939, p. 15. See Gannon, British Press, pp. 263-5; Cockett, Twilight, pp. 108-10. 
169 Foster, `Unequivocal', p. 36. 
170 See HcDeb 345, cols. 2501,2513 (3 April 1939). For the debate see Foster, `Unequivocal', pp. 
39-41 
171 HcDeb 345, col. 2583. 
172 Dawson diary, 3 April 1939, Mss Dawson 43. 
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little on its implications. ' 173 The reception of the article, therefore, did not reflect the 
intention of the authors, who were both unhappy with the general interpretation. Even 
so, Dawson's logic is hard to believe, because he knew that the newspaper's 
interpretation conformed to the government's ideas. ' 74 Dawson knew that the leader 
originated from a meeting between Kennedy and Cadogan, permanent secretary at the 
Foreign Office, where the latter `gave him the low-down'. 175 Dawson himself had been 
seen in the House of Commons on the evening of 31 March. 176 Chamberlain was 
content with the Times interpretation, noting in his diary that he `stressed the important 
point perceived alone by The Times ... 
it is we who will judge whether their 
independence is threatened or not'. 177 
It seems very likely, then, that there was some degree of government influence 
on the article. 178 Yet the circumstances raise the question: why was the exercise of 
influence so selective? Why was it confined to so few media outlets? Chamberlain 
could only approach those newspapers which he thought likely to support his own views. 
Now, however, it seemed that only The Times and the Evening Standard could be 
depended upon. Other newspapers, even the former `loyal' Daily Telegraph, were no 
longer reliable, so limited had government influence become. 
*** 
Dawson's actions as editor - his argument with Northcliffe, his fight for editorial 
independence and his long-standing conviction of the just German grievances - make 
173 Kennedy Journal, p. 286 (4 April 1939). Dawson noted in his diary on 31 March: `Leo K writing the 
leader after a great deal of discussion and diplomatic, parliamentary notes etc. all requiring a lot of 
revision (and excision)': MS Dawson 43. 
174 See McDonald, History, p. 22. 
175 Cadogan diary, p. 165 (30 March 1939). 
176 See Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years (London, 1957), p. 244. 
177 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 April 1939, NC18/1/1092; see also Cadogan diary, p. 16' 
178 See Foster, `Unequivocal', p. 43. 
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the charges against him, that he subordinated The Times to government wishes, most 
unlikely. Dawson undoubtedly talked with and listened to leading ministers, but, as 
McDonald wrote: `he went to them disposed to agree. ' 179 Such a stance was one of the 
features of being an establishment paper, whose editor was himself a part of the 
establishment. This, however, was crucially distinct from government 'inspiration' or 
`manipulation' in the way the newspaper reported events. 
Dawson came to support appeasement through his own conviction about what 
constituted a desirable British foreign policy, and he needed no `pressure' or `control' 
from the government to pursue his thinking in the paper. Margach, though very critical 
about what Dawson had done, admitted that he was `a man who needed no persuasion 
for he was the patron saint of appeasement'. ' 80 It is difficult to find a stronger and more 
committed supporter of Chamberlain's policy than The Times. `I shall always be an 
impenitent supporter of what is called the "Munich policy"', wrote Dawson in his last 
letter to Chamberlain before the latter died. 181 Dawson never changed his conviction 
that war with Germany at the time of the Munich crisis would have been a mistake. 
No one who sat in this place [The Times] as I did during the autumn of '38, with 
almost daily visitations from eminent Canadians and Australians, could fail to 
recognise that war with Germany at that time would have been misunderstood 
and resented from end to end of the Empire. 182 
As such, he supported Chamberlain's actions because they accorded with his own vision 
of how the country should respond to the European situation. The policy of The Times 
was not, then, shaped by the government, but moulded by an independent editor whose 
outlook, at a crucial time, was close to that of the prime minister. Rather than proving 
Cockett's argument of government control, the case of The Times shows that agreement 
179 McDonald, History, p. 14. 
180 Margach, Abuse, p. 54. 
181 Dawson to Chamberlain, November 8,1940, NC 13/18/830; see Wrench, Dawson, pp. 432-3. 
182 Ibid.; see McDonald, Man, p. 52. 
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could be reached between independent parties without the need for bringing direct 
influence to bear. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 
By the late 1930s, the Daily Telegraph had long been regarded as loyal to the 
Conservative party, and therefore to the National Government. Cockett has claimed that 
by 1937, the paper had been `used' by Chamberlain to support his policy of 
reconciliation with Germany; ' yet in 1939 it became a champion of Churchill. What had 
changed, and what can we learn from the newspaper's case about government-press 
relations? 
The Daily Telegraph was a significant Conservative newspaper, because its 
readership was predominantly from the upper and middle classes. 2 Throughout the 
1930s it could claim to have the highest `quality' circulation in the world, 3 reaching 
about 750,000 in 193 9,4 compared with less than a quarter of a million for The Tinges. 
Its importance among right-wing Conservatives increased in 1937 when it took over and 
amalgamated with the Morning Post, because in international relations the latter had the 
`preservation and protection of Britain and the British Empire at heart'. 5 
The Daily Telegraph had a distinctive way of setting its political direction, 
different to that of other newspapers. The Times and The Observer had owners who 
allowed real control to lie with the editors. The Daily Express and Daily Mail had weak 
editors, but strong, interventionist owners, who adopted their own political policies and 
were prepared to run the newspapers as personal propaganda instruments. The 
Daily 
' See Cockett, Twilight, p. 38. 
2 See Gannon, British Press, p. 44, and R. A. C. Parker, Churchill and Appeasement (London, 
2000), p. 
233. 
3 See Hartwell, Camrose, p. 171. 
4 See Gannon, British Press, p. 44. 
5 Ibid., p. 49. 
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Telegraph stood somewhere between these two methods of control. Wizen Camrosý6 
took control of the Daily Telegraph in 1928, he became not just the principal owner but 
also the paper's final arbiter in editorial matters. ' The editor, Arthur Watson, is 
described by Koss as being in accordance with `the tradition of faceless editors', acting 
mainly as head of staff. 8 Camrose wanted to ensure that he was the only power behind 
editorial policy, 9 and that this policy was broadly in line with a Conservative outlook. '0 
He made this clear to his staff when he set out his objectives for the newspaper's future. 
It should be Conservative yet detached, in contrast to Beaverbrook's and Rothermere's 
newspapers: 
Politically, The Daily Telegraph is in close sympathy with the policy of the 
Conservative Party 
... 
it has no official or financial connection with any Party... 
it does not hesitate to express an independent view when circumstances warrant 
it. Above all The Daily Telegraph will be a National Newspaper, serving its 
reader with candour and enterprise and approaching all political and social 
problems without personal bias. 11 
Yet - again in contrast to Beaverbrook and Rotheremere - Camrose had no ambition to 
be directly involved in politics. Rather, he exercised `influence through friendship with 
leading politicians'. 12 
During the 1920s Camrose and his brother Gomer (later Lord Kemsley) were 
regarded as press allies by Conservative Central Office, which encouraged them to act 
as rivals to Rothermere and Beaverbrook, and assisted them to build up their national 
6 William Berry, first Viscount Camrose (1879-1954); author of British Newspapers and Their 
Controllers (London, 1947), a useful survey of British national newspapers. 
' See Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence, qq. 7667,7669,7708 and Royal Commission 
on the Press, Report, p. 45; Hart-Davis, House, p. 61. 
8 Koss, Rise and Fall, vol. ii, p. 464; Lord Burnham, Peterborough Court. The Story of the Daily 
Telegraph (London, 1955), p. 178, called this a `model of relations between a working proprietor and his 
editor'. 
9 See Harold Hobson, Phillip Knightley, and Leonard Russel, The Pearl of Davs. An Intimate , tlemoir of 
the Sunday Times, 1822-1972 (London 1972), p. 78; Burnham, Peterborough Court, p. 161. 
10 See Hart-Davis, House, p. 26. 
1' Quoted in Hartwell, Camrose, p. 166, and Burnham, Peterborough Court, p. 201. 
12 Hart-Davis, House, p. 26. 
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and regional press chains. 13 During the `press lords' onslaught against Baldwin in early 
1931, they had been prepared to help him by starting a new London evening 
newspaper. 14 Camrose had also been close to Chamberlain since the early 1930s, indeed 
he urged Chamberlain to make himself Conservative party leader if Baldwin were 
forced to resign. 15 All this indicates the extent to which the Berry brothers had a history 
of close contact with party leaders and organisers. 16 In return for their steady support, 
the brothers had received baronetcies and later the peerages of Camrose (1929) and 
Kemsley (1936). During the Abdication crisis Baldwin made full use of this political 
intimacy by giving Davidson the job of ensuring that the Daily Telegraph was 
completely informed of all developments'. 17 
Nevertheless, despite his connections with Chamberlain, according to Margach, 
during the late 1930s Camrose `successfully resisted all blandishments' from the 
government. '8 Despite his general support for the Conservative party and the National 
government, he thought it important not to be too closely associated with its leaders. In 
Lord Hartwell's biography of his father, written with the advantage of access to his 
private papers, there are such comments as Camrose's advice to his staff to be 
`particularly careful that we do not overdo the Conservative Association Meeting so as 
to be described as a Conservative party organ'. 19 Presumably this stance of semi- 
detachment was preserved largely for commercial reasons: to become too identified 
with the party, and with particular leaders, risked compromising the aims of reaching a 
broad readership and maximising sales. Arguably, a further reason was Camrose's 
13 See Cockett, `The party, publicity, and the media', pp. 554-5. 
14 Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters. The Heir Apparent, 1928 - 33, vol. iii, ed. Robert Self (Aldershot, 
2002), pp. 223,238; and see Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin. Conservative 
Leadership and 
National Values (Cambridge, 1999), p. 80. 
15 See Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, p. 238. 
16 Hart-Davis, House, p. 97; cf. Cockett, Twilight, p. 13, who claimed that Camrose `seemed to 
hale the 
least personal contact with members of Baldwin's or Chamberlain's governments'. 
1' Quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 567. 
18 Margach, Abuse, p. 53; see Gannon, British Press, p. 44. 
19 Hartwell, Camrose, pp. 167-8. 
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friendship with Churchill and sympathy with some of his concerns. 20 Most notably, they 
had long been agreed in wanting more vigorous rearmament: for example. Camrose 
assured Churchill in May 1935 that `you can rely on us to do all we can in respect of air 
parity. You will doubtless have noticed we have kept up well with this subject in the 
Daily Telegraph'. 21 The effect was that the newspaper tended to oscillate between 
support for, and criticism of, Chamberlain's policies. Cockett admits that the Dail 
Telegraph was the only national paper with Conservative loyalties to treat Chamberlain 
and appeasement with a modicum of caution'. 22 It would be more accurate to say that 
although the newspaper gave Chamberlain support in general terms, it became 
increasingly critical of his policy towards Nazi Germany. 23 
*** 
The closeness between the Daily Telegraph and Chamberlain was demonstrated 
by the episode of Halifax's visit to Germany in late 1937. As already noted, after the 
Evening Standard had revealed that the visit was being arranged, Chamberlain was able 
to turn the leak to the government's advantage by making the Daily Telegraph as well 
as The Times aware of the visit's true purpose. 24 According to Hartwell, this closeness 
meant that the paper continued `to support Chamberlain's foreign policy' until the 
Anschluss. 25 Nevertheless, even in this period it should not be assumed that the 
Telegraph toed a Chamberlainite line in all matters. In December 1937, for example. 
20 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 13. 
'1 Hartwell, Camrose, p. 208, and Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, p. 649. 
22 Cockett, Twilight, p. 13. It may be noted that his statement contains a significant qualification, which 
tends to subvert his general argument. Its implication is that newspapers without 
`Conservative loyalties' 
showed more than a `modicum of caution', indeed were critical of appeasement - that 
is to say, any 
Chamberlain influence over the press did not reach very far. 
23 See Gannon, British Press, p. 47; see also Kehoe, `British Press', p. 21. 
24 See, p. 23, above. 
25 Hartwell, Camrose, p. 228. 
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Henderson complained strongly about the `immense harm' 26 caused by its diplomatic 
correspondent, Victor Gordon-Lennox, 27 in an article which gave a disturbing outline of 
the German government's colonial demands. 28 Halifax urged Eden to use his influence 
with Gordon-Lennox to ensure that there would not be similar disturbing reports - but 
Eden refused to intervene. 29 
The Telegraph was surprised and shocked by Hitler's invasion of Austria. 
`Never, indeed, has the mailed fist been wielded with such dramatic effect as by 
Germany between dawn and dusk yesterday. ' 30 Unlike many other newspapers, it 
stressed that the invasion constituted `ruthless aggression' against an independent state, 
and was not a `family affair' among German peoples. 31 It is also significant that the 
paper proposed, at an early stage, that the British government should act with other 
powers to stop further German aggression. This was certainly not what the 
government wished; rather it was close to Churchill's vision of gathering like-minded 
nations in a `Grand Alliance'. 
What is particularly interesting is that in its leader of 14 March the Telegraph 
drew attention to a special attempt that `has lately been directed to securing the docility 
of the British Press'. This, it understood, was a German government initiative: `pressure 
has been brought upon the British Government to institute some form of press 
censorship - open or veiled - as an indispensable preliminary to successful 
Anglo- 
German conversations'. 32 The article suggested, however, that it was most unlikely that 
these proposals would be accepted by the British government, and reported that 
Chamberlain had denied any personal interest in them. The Telegraph was not alone in 
26 Henderson to Halifax, 7 December 1937, Halifax Papers, A4.410.3.2. 
27 According to Cockett, Twilight, p. 18, one of Leeper's `most privileged diplomatic correspondents'. 
28 See ibid., pp. 46-7. 
29 See Halifax to Henderson, 9 December 1937, Halifax Papers, A4.410.3.2, and Eden to 
Halifax, 10 
December 1937, Halifax Papers, A4.410.3.2.; cf. Harvey diary, p. 102 (23 Februar}' 1938). 
30 Daily Telegraph, 12 March 1938, p. 14. 
31 See ibid., 12 March 1938, p. 14. 
32 Ibid., 14 March 1938, p. 12. 
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commenting on alleged attempts to apply pressure on newspapers. Other papers, from 
the opposition to the Conservative (Observer) side, picked up the rumours as well. 
Camrose, through his contacts with ministers, and more so through his experience over 
the Halifax visit of the previous November, was certainly aware of British and of- 
increased German sensitivity towards press criticism, and government attempts to 
exercise influence: he had, after all, allowed Chamberlain to plant material in his paper 
to assist improved relations with Germany. Yet he and his editor were now clearly alert 
to - and prepared to publicise - what they considered to be improper forms of 
`influence'. Camrose and the Telegraph remained inclined to support political moves 
towards Anglo-German reconciliation, but they were privately and publicly resistant to 
attempts to secure the `docility' of the British press. 
As the debate over a British guarantee for Czechoslovakia heated up, the Daily 
Telegraph expressed a position independent of that of the government. It demanded 
`that Great Britain shall range herself forthwith alongside France and Soviet Russia 
and pledge her armed support to Czechoslovakia, should her independence be attacked 
by Germany'. 33 It suggested that there was now a parallel with the situation before 
1914, and argued that a firm stand would prevent the outbreak of war. The 
Telegraph's stance clearly reflected the growing trust that Camrose placed in 
Churchill, who was now writing signed articles for the paper every fortnight. This was 
not an obvious alliance, even aside from Churchill's record of being a Conservative 
maverick. When the two men had first met Camrose had been suspicious of 
Churchill's powerful character. However, after Churchill's contract with the Evening 
Standard was ended after the Anschluss, because of his outright hostility to« ards Nazi 
policy and implied criticism of the government attitude, he turned to the Telegraph. 
14 
33 Ibid., 18 March 1938, p. 16. 
3' See Chisholm and Davie, Beaverbrook, p. 349. 
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This in itself was significant: the most prominent anti-appeaser plainly did not 
consider the paper to be constricted by Chamberlainite influence. Camrose, although 
attracted by the prospect of such a newsworthy contributor, nevertheless had some 
doubts about the compatibility of Churchill's and his paper's stances: 'It is a little 
difficult for us to enter into a definite agreement for ... a series of articles on political 
subjects, having regard to the fact that our policies might well be at serious 
variance. ' 35 Churchill started on a trial contract, but over the following months 
Camrose's reservations about him vanished in the light of the development of the 
international situation. 
The employment of Churchill indicated the Daily Telegraph's readiness to adopt 
an independent position. Churchill probably started his new writing duties at the most 
opportune time for voicing his criticisms, since the situation in Central Europe seemed 
to be deteriorating. A Daily Telegraph article argued that the `very existence of the 
British people as a free community' was at risk. It added that `there can be no more 
toleration for miscalculations or for half-measures. Whatever is not enough is as bad as 
nothing at all', 36 and urged the public to back the government if it was bold enough to 
introduce the necessary steps to check German aggression. In the same issue, 
Churchill 
pleaded for cooperation between as many powers as possible as the 
best means to 
stabilise Europe. 37 
Over subsequent months the Daily Telegraph's outlook came 
increasingly in 
line with that of Churchill, and therefore more critical of the government's 
policy. 
Although after the May crisis it initially welcomed Chamberlain's attempts 
to avoid an 
outbreak of hostilities, it regretted that the government was not creating 
a Ministry of 
3s Camrose to Churchill, 6 April 1938, in Martin Gilbert, Winston 
Churchill, Companion, Vol. V, Part 2 
(London, 1979), p. 982. 
36 Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1938, p. 16. 
37 For a sample of Churchill's newspaper contributions 
in the 1930s, see Winston S. Churchill, Step 
Bi' 
Step 1936-1939 (London, 1939). 
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Supply to help accelerate rearmament and prepare for possible war mobilisation, as was 
demanded by an increasing number of politicians, including Churchill. 38 'No step could 
be better calculated to appease the public mind and convince opinion, both at home and 
abroad, that the Government are in dead earnest'. 39 Another indication of the growing 
tone of criticism in the paper's pages was that it now also published signed articles by 
Robert Boothby, a firm Churchill supporter. In one piece he wrote that `under the 
prevailing conditions of power politics, resolute and quick action is essential to success. 
Hesitancy and delay - conveying the impression of indecision and fear - are fatal', and 
concluded that an `armed defensive alliance against aggression' was the most effective 
answer. 40 Churchill, in an article almost a week later, wrote in the same vein and now 
also argued for the introduction of national service, in other words, the beginning of 
military conscription. 41 
Nevertheless, the following two months saw the Telegraph itself undecided in its 
attitude. On the one hand it argued that the international situation looked bright, due to 
Chamberlain's appeasement policy. 42 On the other hand, it stated that such success as 
had been gained was due to British military power. 
43 Its policy towards Hitler was 
wavering too, in so far as it had doubts about Hitler's non-involvement 
in the Sudeten 
German agitation. 44 In doing so it was not alone; the British government and even 
Churchill never suspected that Henlein, the Sudeten leader was really 
Hitler's puppet. 
Later, however, notwithstanding that it became evident that the whole tensions «ere 
in 
38 Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1938, p. 16; see Gilbert, Churchill, v, p. 942. 
39 Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1938, p. 16; see also ibid., 26 May 1938, p. 16. 
40 Ibid., 31 May 1938, p. 16. 
41 Ibid., 9 June 1938, p. 14. 
42 Ibid., 27 July 1938, p. 14. 
43 Ibid., 4 July 1938, p. 14. 
" Ibid., 2 August 1938, p. 8. 
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fact directed from Berlin, the paper, could still not hold Hitler directly responsible, 
though it was clear that he had `the final and decisive word'. 45 
The next month was a difficult period for the editorial policies of the Daih, 
Telegraph. It was torn between its resolution to support a harder line over German 
policy, while at the same time continuing to support the government on other policies 
and wanting to avoid a decisive break with Chamberlain, because it could not offer a 
suitable alternative as prime minister. The Daily Telegraph rejected The Times's 
proposal of 7 September of secession of the Sudeten areas, because this would weaken 
Britain's position in the negotiations: `[n]o more sinister blow could have been struck at 
the chances of settlement'. 46 It printed in full the Foreign Office's repudiation of the 
proposal and declared that the Czechoslovakian government had offered all that the 
Sudeten could possibly want. 47 It also advised the British government not to be 
indifferent towards this part of the world, which meant pursuing instead a line close to 
that advocated by Churchill: to cooperate with other powers in applying diplomatic 
pressure. The Daily Telegraph's weakness was that although it demanded government 
firmness towards Germany, it never argued outright that ministers should commit 
themselves to fight for Czechoslovakia. 48 The division or indecisiveness of editorial 
policy, either to support Chamberlain, or to break with him and follow Churchill, was 
exemplified in mid-September. Now the arguments of Churchill - for a firm stand from 
Great Britain and a joint British, French and Russian note of warning to Hitler 
personally - and the policies of Chamberlain, who gave a positive outlook of 
his 
meeting with Hitler, virtually confronted each other. 
49 At this crucial point it seems that 
45 Ibid., 30 August 1938, p. 12; see ibid., 29 August 1938, p. 8. See Gannon, British Press, p. 
191. 
46 Daily Telegraph, 8 September 1938, p. 12. 
47 Ibid., 9 September 1938, p. 12. 
48 See Ibid., 10 September 1938, p. 12. 
49 Ibid., 15 September 1938, pp. 12 (Churchill), 13 (Chamberlain); see Parker, Churchill, p. 
175. 
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the Telegraph itself could not advocate a clearly defined point of view, and so left it for 
the readers to make up their own minds. 
Nevertheless, Chamberlain's decision to meet Hitler personally was considered 
by the Telegraph to be a courageous departure from diplomatic precedents. But it did so 
because it considered this to be the ultimate means for conveying to Hitler the firm 
resolution of the British government. 50 The question of plebiscites was not discussed. 
However, when it became obvious first that the Chamberlain-Hitler meeting had not 
replaced provocative utterances with more sober judgement, and that Nazi propaganda 
against Czechoslovakia had increased, the paper became critical of the Berchtesgaden 
meeting. 51 As Cockett states, `owing to Camrose's doubts and Gordon-Lennox is 
convictions, [the Daily Telegraph] now became openly critical of the government's 
stance'. 52 By the time Chamberlain met Hitler for the second time at Godesberg, the 
Telegraph's position was hardening against Hitler's new demands. It questioned 
Hitler's sincerity, and asked whether he was really interested in a constructive 
solution, 53 and was shocked when the Godesberg demands became public. `What would 
be left', it stated, `would be militarily undefendable, economically broken and 
politically subjugated completely to German domination in all aspects of policy'. 54 If 
the Daily Telegraph had found the original Anglo-French proposals offered at 
Berchtesgaden difficult to accept, the Godesberg proposals proved impossible. 5' They 
were `not the basis of negotiation for a peaceful settlement, but a dictation to an enemy 
beaten in the field'. 56 On the day the new terms were discussed in Cabinet, the 
Telegraph printed a list of Hitler's broken promises to date. In the next two days the 
50 Daily Telegraph, 16 September 1938, p. 14. 
51 Ibid., 19 September 1938, p. 10; see Cockett, Twilight, p. 77-8. 
52 Ibid., p. 77. 
53 Daily Telegraph, 23 September 1938, p. 14. 
sa Ibid., 26 September 1938, p. 11. 
ss On this episode see Gannon, British Press, p. 195 and Kehoe, `British Press', p. 22". 
56 Daily Telegraph, 26 September 1938, p. 10. 
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newspaper cautioned its readers that Hitler could not be believed when he claimed that 
the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand, because his behaviour demonstrated 
that he really wanted to eliminate Czechoslovakia as the last block to his expansion into 
Eastern Europe. 57 Clearly, Camrose was now potentially in an awkward position, since 
the Daily Telegraph had so far praised Chamberlain's handling of the crisis and 
supported his efforts to keep the peace. 58 
It was not until late September that any overt government attempt was made to 
influence the paper's direction. At a time when the British press attitude towards 
Germany was becoming increasingly hostile, leading ministers stepped up their efforts 
to tone down the criticism. Hoare tried hard to get the Telegraph back on a pro- 
appeasement course - itself proof of the Telegraph's independence. Critically, at this 
point, Camrose was absent and had left his son Seymour Berry in charge of the 
paper. 59 Hoare asked Berry not to criticise Chamberlain's attempts to reach an Anglo- 
German settlement. 60 The outcome of this talk leaves much room for speculation. 
There is evidence that the Telegraph did momentarily soften its tone. Did it do so 
because of Hoare's intervention? 
According to Gannon, Seymour Berry and J. C. Johnstone, the leader writer, 
who had written a critical draft on the Munich talks, were determined to ignore Hoare 
and go ahead with the paper's critical stance. At this point Gordon-Lennox intervened. 
He had hitherto the strongest reservations about Chamberlain's policy; but he was also 
the paper's most experienced commentator on international affairs. He urged Berry not 
to jeopardise the outcome of the Munich meeting by premature condemnation, which 
might contribute to an excessive public reaction. His view prevailed and the 
leader 
57 Ibid., 27 September 1938, p. 14; see also 28 September 1938, p. 12: `Menace of World 
Domination'. 
58 Ibid., 28 September 1938, p. 12. 
59 For the events see, Hartwell, Camrose, pp. 248-60. Although Cockett, Twilight, pp. 
78-81. places much 
emphasis on Hoare's success with press controllers, he does not examine the position of 
the Telegraph. 
60 See Gannon, British Press, p. 45; see McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, pp. 120-1. 
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was softened. 61 In other words, the crucial element was not government pressure itself, 
but a sense within the Telegraph of national interest. Faced with the imminent 
prospect of war, even journalists critical of appeasement chose to moderate the public 
expression of their views. 
In contrast to The Times, there was never any suggestion that the despatches of 
the Daily Telegraph's foreign correspondents were toned down. McDonough stressed 
that the paper's Berlin correspondent, Arthur Mann, 62 never encountered any problems 
over publication of his critical articles about Nazi policies. 63 The only divergence of 
opinion on the Telegraph seemed to have been with its Vienna correspondent, Eric 
Gedye, who was expelled by the Nazis because of his critical coverage of the 
Anschluss. 64 Gedye's subsequent expulsion from the staff of the Telegraph was due not 
to his articles but to his book Fallen Bastions (1939). 65 Gedye promised to give his 
readers `the uncensored truth' about Nazi policy and Chamberlain, and Watson at the 
Telegraph explained that he could not continue to work for the newspaper as a reporter 
and `simultaneously give vent to extreme views on countries on which he was supposed 
to be writing factually'. 66 Yet it must have been the degree of Gedye's criticism, not his 
criticism of government attitudes as such, that the Daily Telegraph found intolerable, 
because its editors were well aware that another of its journalists was also publishing 
alternative views elsewhere. 
While continuing to write for the Telegraph, Gordon-Lennox edited his own 
journal, the Whitehall News Letter. This had begun as a means of publishing 
observations on government policies which he knew the Telegraph would not print; the 
61 See Gannon, British Press, pp. 44-5. 
62 This is not the editor of the Yorkshire Post. 
63 See McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, p. 120. 
64 See Daily Telegraph, 25 March 1938, p. 14; for the coverage see Hartwell, Cainrose, p. 223. 
65 See Gannon, British Press, p. 47. 
66 Hartwell, Camrose, p. 223. 
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newsletter was broadly `Edenite'. 67 This was not because of any government pressure 
on the newspaper - we have seen that Camrose was resistant to such attempts to 
interfere with editorial policy - but because the paper itself had then been committed to 
support Chamberlain's line. Contrary to Cockett's assertion, the existence of the 
newsletter was not a consequence of the Daily Telegraph's subordination to government 
pressure, but rather a response to its own preference for Chamberlain - and it remained 
sufficiently tolerant of other views to allow Gordon-Lennox to produce alternative 
commentaries in his own time. 68 
Even after Hoare's attempt during the Czechoslovakian crisis to influence its 
editorial policy, the Daily Telegraph continued to express reservations and doubts. 
though not yet to the point of turning against Chamberlain. It could not bring itself to 
advocate a war in defence of Czechoslovakia, but it was disappointed with the 
`sacrifice' of the nation. The tone of criticism was plain: 
The danger against which Mr. Chamberlain must be vigilant is that of loosening 
what ought to be held fast. Already so much has been given away that there is 
little left to surrender if Czechoslovakia is to be left as a viable entity. All the 
hope and promise which the Munich conference holds out will be frustrated if 
such a `settlement' is reached as results, a few months hence, in a revival of all 
the present trouble. 69 
After the Munich settlement had been signed, however, the Telegraph shared in the 
general relief at the avoidance of war. As it commented, `Peace, even at a price, is a 
blessing so inestimable that the first and predominant reaction to our release 
from the 
torturing fears of the past few days is one of profound thankfulness'. 
70 Nevertheless, the 
Telegraph continued to argue that a firm line towards Hitler, backed 
by the threat of 
force, could have - and would - halt Hitler's aggression. 
`Great as is the debt we owe to 
67 See Ronald Tree, When the Moon was High. Memoirs of Peace and War, 1897-1942 
(London, 1975), 
p. 75. 
68 See Cockett, Twilight, pp. 101-3,125. 
69 Daily Telegraph, 29 September 1938, p. 12. 
70 Ibid., 1 October 1938, p. 12; see Gannon, British Press, p. 197. 
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Mr Chamberlain', it stated on 3 October, `it would be greater if he had stood out more 
forcefully' in aid of Czechoslovakia. 7' 
In mid-October the Telegraph largely pushed all its concerns away, believing 
that it was now a dead issue and urged instead to strengthen British defences. 72 Now 
that the damage to the integrity of Czechoslovakia and to Britain's reputation had been 
done, Britain should step up rearmament to make the country safe in readiness for a 
possible attack. Articles critical of the slow Air Raid Precautions (ARP) pointed in the 
same direction. 73 It was now an open secret that the Telegraph was becoming a critic 
of the whole tendency of British foreign policy. Dawson of The Times, the 
Telegraph's main Conservative rival, was told that it was `so obvious ... that the Daily 
Telegraph is working to bring down Chamberlain and to put in Eden, Duff Cooper & 
Churchill' that one self-styled `old reader ... 
dropped [it? ] in favour of The Times'. 74 
The government was also worried that a newspaper on whose support it could once 
rely was now becoming openly critical. As Koss stated: In terms of practical politics, 
the equivocations of the Telegraph were more damaging than abuse from predictable 
sources. ' 
75 
The newspaper's criticism after Hitler's invasion of Prague in March 1939 was, 
therefore, the logical consequence of what had now become the paper's established 
view. The Telegraph concluded that appeasement, finally, was no issue any longer: 
`The "spirit of Munich" is dead and buried, for who can hope to "appease" a boa- 
" Daily Telegraph, 3 October 1938, p. 10; see Churchill in Daily Telegraph, 4 October 1938, p. 16. See 
Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 583. 
72 Ibid., 15 October 1938, p. 14; see Kehoe, `British Press', p. 239-40. 
73 Daily Telegraph, 10 and 11 October 1938, p. 12. 
'' Donald Macleod to Dawson, 17 October 1938, quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 583. The reader was 
an exception, because as Hartwell, Camrose, p. 262, states, the Telegraph received about 
3000 letters of 
support against the normal 300, and most had been anti-government. But `as far as 
humanly possible we 
have kept the scales even'. 
75 Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 583. 
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constrictor? '76 According to the Telegraph the invasion of Prague had made 'a complete 
and utter mockery' of Munich. 77 Though the paper stated that the policy of appeasement 
had not been wrong, since it demonstrated Britain's belief in peace, the Telegraph 
called for the policy to be abandoned on the grounds that it was evident that Hitler 
would not honour any agreements and was out to conquer Eastern Europe. 78 The 
paper's stance reflected how far the situation had changed since Munich. In 1938 Hitler, 
using the slogan of `self-determination', was able to proceed with his ambition, which 
the paper, to a certain degree, found it hard to resist. Now, however, under the slogan of 
`self-preservation', it seemed that Hitler was free to advance in any direction without 
being likely to face strong opposition. 79 As a consequence, the Telegraph called for 
immediate action by the government, and even came close to suggesting a military 
alliance: 
Clearly what the situation demands is a policy which is at once closely concerted 
between the Powers, which formulates exactly the course to be followed in 
given circumstances, and which is capable of instant application. In default of 
such a policy Europe will just crumble piecemeal before the spreading Nazi 
attack. 80 
It is noteworthy how close this conception was to opinions that Churchill had held 
since the beginning of 1938. The Telegraph included Russia in its list of states which 
should be involved in the `united resistance of Europe'. 
8' Here again, the newspaper 
asked for a firm lead and no further delay. In March 1939 it became obvious to the 
paper that Hitler could not be stopped unless he was faced with a united front of all the 
major powers. 82 However, it did not single out Chamberlain specifically for criticism, 
76 Daily Telegraph, 16 March 1939, p. 16. 
" Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 16. 
78 Ibid., 18 March 1939, p. 14; and see 15 March 1939, p. 16. 
79 Ibid., 17 March 1939, p. 16. 
80 Ibid., 20 March 1939, p. 12; see Gannon, British Press, pp. 240-1. 
8! Daily Telegraph, 20 March 1939, p. 12. 
82 Ibid., 23 March 1939, p. 14. 
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but its editorial did `regret the delay in signing a treaty with Russia'. 83 Russia was 
certainly an issue on which the policies of the Telegraph and the government differed 
widely. No doubt, the Telegraph had to overcome a `natural' Conservative scepticism 
towards Communist Russia, but it now saw an urgent need for an alliance. For the 
Daily Telegraph a moral question had been raised: `In a word, we find ourselves in a 
situation which demands a realistic not a legalistic view of our undertakings. The 
firmer and more decisive the policy of the Government the more certainly will they be 
assured of the unstinted support of the country. ' 84 The leader directly attacked the 
government: `At a moment when the whole country is waiting unanimously for an 
instantaneous and vigorous lead it would be lamentable indeed if unanimity on this 
issue were lacking within the Government itself. ' 85 When the British government 
finally announced the Polish guarantee, the Daily Telegraph supported the initiative as 
a sign that something would be done to show Germany its limits. The paper called it 
`the nucleus of a powerful defensive alliance', and thereby put more faith in the value 
of Poland than any other Conservative paper. 86 
Gannon is wrong to assume that at this point an outcry following allegations of 
government efforts to limit press freedom `was enough to cause the government to issue 
inspired denials through the Daily Telegraph'. 87 The Daily Telegraph was certainly not 
included in the government's efforts to minimise the implications of the Polish 
guarantee. Instead the paper believed the assurances made by the government in 
Parliament: `So thought the world until a qualifying and limiting interpretation of the 
pledge was put forward by The Times'. 
88 In any sense, the episode shows the distance 
83 Ibid., 7 July 1939, p. 16. 
84 Ibid., 25 March 1939, p. 14. 
85 Ibid.. 
86 Ibid., 1 April 1939; see Kehoe, `British Press', p. 281 
87 Gannon, British Press, p. 21. 
88 Daily Telegraph, 4 April 1939; see Foster, 'Unequivocal', p. 41 
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that the Telegraph had travelled from being a trusted government supporter in late 1937 
to a newspaper that had fallen out of favour with Chamberlain and was consequently 
left in the dark about the government's real intentions. 
The Telegraph's independent political role was finally established by its role in 
the efforts to change the composition of the government - to have Churchill and Eden 
included in the Cabinet. The Telegraph was considered to be crucial for the success of 
the campaign because it was a highly respected Conservative newspaper and because 
Camrose had once been close to Chamberlain, yet it was now plainly sympathetic to the 
Eden group of 'anti-appeasers'. 89 
In late June two members of this group, Macmillan and Nicolson, wrote to 
Camrose to put the case for Churchill's inclusion in the Cabinet, and together with 
Astor they spoke with him on 30 June 1939. As a result, Camrose was now `known to 
be sympathetic to the idea of an all-party coalition', 90 and to be convinced that `Winston 
is the vital figure'. 91 Although Astor's Observer prepared the ground for the campaign 
on 2 July - without mentioning Churchill - the campaign was really begun on the 
following day with a forceful Telegraph article in praise of Churchill. The government, 
it claimed, did not include all 
those counsellors who are best qualified to decide upon fateful issues and to plan 
strategic strokes. One name will leap at once to everyone's cognisance. It is that 
of Mr. Churchill... True, Mr Churchill has a strong and masterful personality 
which estranges and even antagonises some persons; but strong and masterful 
personalities are just what the present situation demands.... The act of inviting 
Mr. Churchill to join the Cabinet would be the most popular step which Mr. 
Chamberlain could make. 92 
Other papers followed the Telegraph's lead. As Hoare commented in July, the papers 
of the Left and the important papers of the Right' were 'shouting with one voice 
for his 
89 See Amery Diaries, p. 554 (29 June 1939). 
90 Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 387. 
91 See Parker, Churchill, pp. 232-3. 
92 Daily Telegraph, 3 July 1939, p. 14; see Parker, Churchill, p. 233-4 
inclusion'. 93 Chamberlain himself was `vexed that Camrose who used to be such a firm 
supporter should now have committed himself to Churchill'. 94 He now sent for Camrose, 
and tried to convince him that it would be inappropriate to include Churchill in the 
Cabinet, because of his occasional `lack of judgement', and because the German 
government would regard this appointment as evidence of British preparedness to fight, 
making war more - not less - likely. 
95 As he had written privately about Churchill in 
April, `the nearer we get to war the more his chances improve and vice versa'. 96 
As Dawson well understood, Chamberlain had no `intention of being bounced 
into taking back Winston'. 97 Chamberlain's stubbornness, and then a further 
deterioration in the international situation meant that Camrose and the Telegraph did 
not press their campaign. As war became unavoidable, Camrose reverted to support 
for Chamberlain because `patriotic duty demanded that the paper support the Prime 
Minister' - though in the event the outbreak of war did also force Chamberlain to 
appoint Churchill (and Eden) to his Cabinet. 98 
*** 
The Telegraph's policy was always to report the news straight, and this was 
usually what gave offence to the German government and came to 
irritate British 
ministers. The paper also considered it a duty to report on the range of public 
debate. 
Not only did it gave space to Churchill's articles from April 
1938, and later to 
93 Quoted in Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, p. 263. 
94 Neville Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, 8 July 1939, NC18/1/1106. For Chamberlain's reaction, see 
also Channon diary, p. 204 (9 July 1939). 
95 Lord Camrose, notes of a conversation with Neville Chamberlain, 3 July 
1939, in Gilbert, Winston 
Churchill, Companion, pp. 1544-6. On the attempt to get Churchill back 
into the government, see Parker, 
Churchill, pp. 233-7. 
96 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, April 1939, NC18/1/1095; also quoted in Parker, 
Churchill, p. 235. 
97 Dawson diary, 16 July 1939, MS Dawson 43. 
98 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 164. 
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Boothby's views; it also reported the speeches of other `anti-appeasers'. 99 In terms of 
editorial comment, as Camrose had written when he first took control of the paper, his 
aim was to support the Conservative party in general terms, while retaining the right to 
differ on specifics. The distinction became more delicate when there were divisions 
between Conservative politicians. In the late 1930s foreign policy was an issue on 
which it shifted from the perspectives of Chamberlain towards those of another 
Conservative, Churchill. Even so, it never quite pressed outright for an overthrow of 
Chamberlain and his policy, because it remained committed to general support of the 
Conservative leadership. 
99 E. g. E. L. Spears, connected with the Focus, on 19 March 




THE BEAVERBROOK NEWSPAPERS 
Lord Beaverbrook, in the view of many historians second only to Dawson of The 
Times in his support for Chamberlain's policy, was one of the notorious `press lords'. 
Like other leading newspaper proprietors, he owned a chain of newspapers, chiefly the 
Daily Express, Sunday Express and Evening Standard. This alone did not make him a 
`press lord': what made him distinctive was the way he used his papers to promote his 
own political interests. Given his past history of vigorous political independence, he 
provides a particularly good case study of government-newspaper relations during the 
period of appeasement. Was his support for the policy the result of active government 
persuasion? Or was it the product of his own deeply-held opinions? There is a further 
issue. If government pressure had been effective with him, one might expect that his 
various newspapers would all adopt similar attitudes on British foreign policy. If they 
did not, this surely raises doubts about the ability of the government to control or 
manipulate the press. This chapter therefore examines - and compares and contrasts - 
two of Beaverbrook's papers, the Daily Express and the Evening Standard. 
I. The Daily Express 
Beaverbrook had taken control of the Express in 1916 with the support and 
encouragement of his friend, the Unionist party leader Bonar Law, and with financial 
assistance from the Unionist party's Central Office. Both had expected him to maintain 
its existing position as an official Unionist paper, but Beaverbrook quickly loosened 
its 
ties with the party. As he told Law, in politics I am bound - for no man can really 
be a 
politician without submitting to the necessary trammels of 
Party. In the press, on the 
114 
contrary, I am free and can work from the outside'. ' As Koss claimed, his departure 
from the traditional party attachment of the paper `struck at the very heart of the old 
political press'. 2 
Beaverbrook considered himself to be Conservative, but he was not a party- 
Conservative. Apart from support at election times, he gave little active support for the 
Conservative party. Instead he claimed that `I have tried to persuade the party to walk in 
my direction instead of walking with the party'. 3 This independence from the 
Conservative party he tried to defend, claiming that `inside the Conservative party, 
whether as politician or journalist, I should be prohibited from appealing to popular 
opinion against the decision of my leaders'. 4 He was throughout, as Benson claimed, 
`an outsider and an individualist', running his newspapers according to his own wishes. 5 
Beaverbrook would therefore not allow party loyalties to get in the way of the 
running of his newspapers, and they were expected to advocate views that were 
independent of party affiliation. He held that `the normal attitude of the Press towards 
the politicians must be one of complete independence. This will take the form of 
criticism when it appears that the political leaders are going wrong and adopting 
policies of which the nation does not approve'. 
6 Several times he denounced all parties, 
rather than support a particular one. 
Moreover, Beaverbrook was a businessman, who expected his particular 
newspapers, and certainly his whole newspaper empire, to yield a profit. This meant 
1 Quoted in Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 156, and see also Peter Howard, Beaverbrook. A Study of Max the 
Unknown (London, 1964), p. 104; Dennis Griffiths, Plant Here the Standard (London, 1996), p. 218; 
Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 355-6. 
` Ibid., p. 357; see Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 136. 
3 Alan Wood, The True History of Lord Beaverbrook (London, 1965), p. 196. 
4 Edgar Middleton, Beaverbrook: The Statesman and the Man (London, 1934), p. 196; also Piers 
Brendon, The Life and Death of the Press Barons (London, 1982), p. 160. 
5 Timothy S. Benson, `Low and Beaverbrook: The Case of a Cartoonist's Autonome' (PhD thesis, 
University of Kent, 1998), p. 23. 
6 Daily News, 24 November 1925, quoted in Benson, `Low', p. 24: see also David 
Low, Low's 
Autobiography (London, 1956), p. 175. 
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that he was sensitive to the different readerships of the individual newspapers he owned. 
He understood that each had a body of loyal readers, and that there were commercial 
advantages in having his newspapers express different shades of opinion. To seek to 
impose identical attitudes on them all could well be damaging; far better, within limits, 
to leave each paper to develop its own distinctive style. He himself strongly denied that 
he controlled the general policies of his various newspapers: as he put it, when on 
certain issues a paper like the Daily Express accepted his point of view, it was still 
possible that his two other papers would take an opposing stance. 7 He saw no point in 
`instructing' his editors to write something they did not agree with, arguing that `you 
must not coerce them, you must carry them along with you'. 8 This comment needs to be 
treated with some care, as Beaverbrook did admit that he urged his editors to support his 
campaigns for Empire Free Trade. Even so, he said that he did not intervene `on other 
issues'. 9 
Nevertheless, it is very likely that Beaverbrook exercised a vigorous control over 
his newspapers. Former journalists have claimed that he played a ceaseless part in their 
control'. 10 Beaverbrook's statements about political independence of his editors were, as 
Benson states, a `smoke-screen' for his constant intervention in editorial matters: 
`complete freedom of expression was in fact only tolerated when the article or cartoon 
was either in sympathy with, or indifferent to Beaverbrook's own political views and 
allegiances'. " 
See Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence, 18 March 1948, q. 8642,8644,8754. 
8 Ibid., q. 8752,8757. 
9 Ibid., q. 8751; see Royal Commission on the Press, Report, p. 43. 
10 Howard, Beaverbrook, p. 61. 
Benson, `Low', pp. 34-5. 
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In Cockett's study, the Daily Express is raised to the same level as The Times in 
its support for appeasement - `a mere cipher for Chamberlain's policies'. 12 Yet such 
assertions say nothing about the degree of government influence. Indeed, as Cockett 
expresses the point, it was Beaverbrook who `put his papers totally at the service of the 
government' - which is crucially distinct from the government successfully imposing 
control. 13 Besides being independently-minded, Beaverbrook had a tough and 
unpredictable character, and it is probable that ministers did not dare to attempt 
asserting `control' as such. Indeed, during Chamberlain's premiership, they only once 
tried to influence the Express's political stance. 
Beaverbrook later told the Royal Commission on the Press that `yes, we would 
always support any political party that took a favourable attitude to our views, and we 
attacked parties one after the other because they would not take favourably to our 
views'. 14 What, then, were Beaverbrook's political views, and to what extent did the 
Daily Express mirror them? Its readership represented a cross-section taken from every 
social group; indeed, it has been argued that `Beaverbrook's Daily Express was the only 
classless and ageless newspaper in the world', 
15 with a circulation of about 2.2 million 
in the mid-1930s. The paper was very much Beaverbrook's own. Arthur Christiansen, 
the editor 1933-57, accepted that the Express's `policies were Lord Beaverbrook's 
job', 
not that of himself and his staff. 
16 It is in connection with the Daily Express that one has 
to regard Beaverbrook's famous remarks when giving evidence at the 
Royal 
Commission on the Press: `I ran the paper purely for the purpose of making propaganda 
12 Richard Cockett (ed. ), My Dear Max. The Letters of Brendan Bracken to Lord 
Beaverbrook, 1925-1958 
(London, 1990), pp. 20-1, and Cockett, Twilight, p. 65. 
13 Ibid., p. 80 
14 Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence, q. 8659. 
15 Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. xi, 175; see also Taylor, English History, p. 
310. 
16 Arthur Christiansen, Headlines All My Life (London, 1961), p. 144. 
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and with no other object', in relation to Empire Free Trade - 'my own issue, the issue I 
have advocated all these years'. 17 
His priority in foreign policy was clearly expressed as support for 'splendid 
isolation' from continental entanglements, and it was principally as a consequence of 
this that he supported Chamberlain's appeasement policy. 18 Beaverbrook was an 
imperialist, and since the 1920s he had committed himself and the Daily Express to the 
cause of imperial unity. This stance also entailed non-involvement in Europe. 
`Interference in Europe means war for certain.... It is a policy which means the break 
up of the British Empire. ' 19 Any entanglements in Europe, even under the `the League 
of Nations is now a greater danger to peace than the armament makers. ... 
Turn away 
from Europe. Stand by the Empire and Splendid Isolation'. 20 Because his newspapers 
were `popular' papers, whose circulation might have been affected by grim news, 
European coverage was kept at a minimum; instead overseas reporting concentrated on 
the British Empire and the United States. 21 
According to Taylor, `Beaverbrook had one steadfast conviction which he put 
far above party loyalty. This was a desire to promote the economic unity of the British 
Empire'. 22 In launching his Crusade in 1929, he directly challenged the Conservative 
party hierarchy. According to Koss, from the very start `the venture had all the qualities 
of a breakaway political movement'. 
23 In the Daily Express, space was strictly occupied 
just by `our supporters'. 24 As for editorial control, Beaverbrook wrote that the truth 
is 
that an Editor ... 
is only useful as long as he works honestly and earnestly in 
furtherance of the political programme. The moment he shows the slightest tendency to 
" Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence, 18 March 1948, qq. 8656,8657. 
18 See Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 163-4, and Benson, `Low', p. 140. 
19 Beaverbrook in the Sunday Express, 15 July 1934, quoted in Benson, `Low', p. 140. 
20 Daily Express, 17 November 1934, p. 8. 
21 See Kehoe, `British Press', p. 25; Gannon, British Press, p. 36. 
`` Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 163. 
2; Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 498. 
,' Beaverbrook, quoted in Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 273. 
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"stall" he can do incredible injury'. 25 Journalists were free to write what they wanted, as 
long as they were in accordance with Beaverbrook's Empire policy. 
Another example of Beaverbrook's independent-mindedness occurred over 
government foreign policy. Here, he followed his own conception about the appropriate 
policy attitude towards the problem of Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia. He did not go 
as far as to challenge the government itself over the issue, but he was one of the few 
who stood by the Foreign Secretary Hoare, when the Cabinet dropped the Hoare-Laval 
plan in the face of a widespread public outcry in favour of the League of Nations and 
collective security. 26 Beaverbrook welcomed Hoare's proposal because he resented 
involvement in Europe, which was what membership of the League involved. `The 
peace plan was sound and should have been pressed as a basis for negotiation', insisted 
the Daily Express. Hoare resigned and left the Cabinet in December 1935, but he 
returned to office in summer 1936. Beaverbrook had long been friendly with him; and 
he now cultivated him to the extent of secretly giving him substantial sums of money. 
The advantage of the connection was that it gave Beaverbrook access to the inner 
thinking of the government. Later, during the Sudeten crisis, this special relationship 
between Beaverbrook and Hoare became very important for the Chamberlainite 
ministers. 
*** 
When the tension over German claims on Austria rose with Hitler's ultimatum. 
the Daily Express strongly advocated a policy of isolation, claiming that Britain had no 
,' Ibid., p. 274. 
26 Beaverbrook to Hoare, 14 December 1935, Beaverbrook papers C/307b; see also Chisholm and Davie, 
Beaverbrook, p. 329. For Beaverbook's support for Vansittart, see Norman Rose, Vansittart. 
Study of a 
Diplomat (London, 1978), pp. 181-2. 
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right to interfere: `our business is to unite our own peoples in our own commonwealth 
by a policy of Empire Free Trade and Splendid Isolation'. 27 From this position it sought 
to defend the government against the criticism of Churchill. whom it dubbed the most 
powerful enemy of the Government'. Churchill was especially suspect because he had 
become a leading critic of isolationism, and a keen supporter of alliances. The Daily 
Express implied that Britain could have stayed out of the First World War and saw 
Churchill's criticism of government foreign policy as a 'dangerous campaign to drive 
this country into war since he drove us into it himself against Russia in 1919'. 28 
In a noteworthy article on 10 March 1938 the paper claimed that in his policy 
towards Germany `the Prime Minister recognises the same principle in foreign affairs as 
the Isolationists do'. The crux was that the government had largely adopted the policy 
set out by Beaverbrook, allowing the Daily Express to state that `the programme of the 
Government in relation to foreign affairs brings us much nearer to the policy of 
Isolation for which we have laboured and striven over the years'. 29 Beaverbrook's 
support for Chamberlain's foreign policy was not really due to a belief that appeasement 
represented the right way to address German claims. Rather it was an expression of a 
larger commitment to British non-interventionism. Given that personally he disliked the 
nature of the fascist dictatorship, 30 it seems likely that he was less interested in the 
specific policy decisions relating to Germany than in the long-term implications of 
appeasement. As long as isolation was the ultimate goal, he supported Chamberlain. 
Once Chamberlain stepped away from the path, Beaverbrook would become critical. 
Daily Express, 16 February 1938, p. 10. 
2g Ibid., 25 February 1938, p. 10. 
29 Ibid., 10 March 1938, p. 8. 
30 Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 378. He wrote to Lloyd George after a visit to Germany that `I hated so much 
the regimentation of opinion that I could not 
bear it': Beaverbrook to Lloyd George, 6 October 1936, 
Beaverbrook papers C/218a. 
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At the same time as supporting appeasement, he was prepared to go further than 
Chamberlain in demanding through his newspapers a stronger rearmament programme. 
`With the policy of isolation there comes the need for adequate defences. ... The price 
for our safety will be high. We should prepare to pay it.. 31 In this respect, 
Beaverbrook's newspapers were closer to Churchill than to Chamberlain. 32 
The Daily Express's attitude towards the Anschluss was that it was inevitable, 
and a purely German affair. 33 Even so, it was worried about the ruthless manner in 
which it was executed, and forecast that more of the same was likely to come from 
Germany. 34 Nevertheless it continued to advocate its own policy of isolation towards 
Europe, and stronger links with the Empire and the United States. While it showed 
some sympathy towards France in its anxiety towards its powerful neighbour, it asked 
the French to understand Britain's position - that Britain was not prepared to go to war 
for `the ramshackle State of Czechoslovakia'. 35 
Throughout the Czechoslovakian crisis the Daily Express maintained its position 
of avoiding commitments at almost any cost, stressing that Britain had no obligation to 
defend Eastern Europe. It argued that Hitler's demands from mid-September cleared the 
air and considerably lessened tension by showing where Germany stood. It also argued 
that `war is not inevitable'. 36 On 14 September it placed much emphasis on German 
government statements that no war was necessary between Germany and Britain. 
`Britain has a great responsibility, for if she wants to she can prevent such military 
action being taken. She should use influence in Prague. '37 This suggestion that pressure 
should be placed on the Czechoslovakian government in order to prevent a European 
31 Sunday Express, 13 March 1938, quoted in Benson, `Low', p. 257. 
32 See Howard, Beaverbrook, p. 105. 
33 See Daily Express, 16 and 17 February 1938, p. 12. 
34 Ibid., 12 March 1938, p. 12. 
35 Ibid., 29 April 1938, p. 12, and Ibid., 21 May 1938, p. 12 
36 Ibid 13 September 1938, p. 1. 
37 Ibid., 14 September 1938, p. 1. 
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war came very close to Chamberlain's appeasement policy. The effect of this attitude 
was that Beaverbrook became eager to assist the Cabinet in its dealings with the media. 
This was certainly not a case of a newspaper proprietor yielding to government 
influence. 
When Chamberlain started his `shuttle-diplomacy' in September, Beaverbrook 
offered Halifax advice on how to improve and co-ordinate press support. His 
assumptions about government-newspaper relations at this point are significant. He 
claimed that the newspapers were `all anxious to help the Prime Minister and to help 
you. But they are greatly in need of guidance'. His concern was evidently that in the 
past British newspapers had not always published responsible commentaries, and that 
these might jeopardise sensitive negotiations with the German government, and public 
support for compromise. He suggested that a leading minister be `authorised to have 
direct contact with the newspaper proprietors individually and personally', and 
suggested Hoare for the task. He argued that `great benefits would flow from the 
decision', because the government would be able to prevent misrepresentation which 
might upset Hitler. The aim would be `to guide the newspapers in their policy, to strike 
out errors and to crush rumours'. 38 Beaverbrook promised that through this step `the 
newspapers of the right and left will go with you in your decisions'. 
39 
Beaverbrook's initiative was welcomed by Chamberlain, who thought it an 
excellent suggestion -a reaction which does not indicate ministerial confidence 
in their 
existing influence with the press. 
40 Indeed, if the newspapers had been under significant 
government influence, Beaverbrook would not have needed to make the offer. Nor was 
his suggestion that the newspapers needed `guidance' tantamount to proposals 
for 
38 Beaverbrook to Halifax, 16 September 1938, Beaverbrook papers C/152. 
39 Beaverbrook to Chamberlain, 16 September 1938, Beaverbrook papers 
C/80, also quoted in Taylor, 
Beaverbrook, p. 384, and Cockett, Twilight, p. 75. 
40 Chamberlain to Beaverbrook, 17 September 1938, Beaverbrook papers 
C/80. 
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controlling the press - something to which Beaverbrook «as most certainly opposed. 
Earlier in 1938, when the German government had complained about British newspaper 
criticism of Hitler and implied that greater government control of the press was needed, 
Beaverbrook had quickly rebutted the notion in a Daily Express article. 'This. I can say 
emphatically, will be declared by Mr. Chamberlain to be impossible. The view in 
Whitehall is that the British press is not unfairly critical of Germany and her rulers. In 
any case, no attempt will be made to "muzzle" the press. ' 41 The paper vigorously 
defended freedom of speech; after all independence had been at the heart of 
Beaverbrook's conduct of his own papers. The Daily Express's own independence, 
commitment to free debate, and eye for the commercial necessity to maintain 
`newsworthiness' was manifested in the prominence it continued to give to speeches by 
anti-appeasers, from Churchill to Attlee, even when its editorial line was firmly 
Chamberlainite. 42 
In late September, when there were rumours that a deal with Germany might 
include a British guarantee towards Czechoslovakia, the Daily Express voiced alarm at 
this prospective departure from isolationism. In such circumstances it was even 
prepared to admire the opinions of Attlee, the Labour party leader: 'Mr. Attlee accepts 
the view of the Daily Express. For he wants to call Parliament to discuss thoroughly 
what he designates the grave departure from traditional British policy in giving frontier 
guarantees. ' 43 The paper demanded that government policy should be `founded upon 
reality', in other words isolation. The paper could not understand why Chamberlain, 
`claimed by the Isolationists as a wise statesman', was willing to support such a 
guarantee. 
44 
'1 Dailti, Exprress, 7 March 1938, p. 2. 
42 See Ibid., 8 March 1938, p. 2, Ibid., 15 March 1938, p. 8. 
43 Ibid., 21 September 1918, p. 10; see also Ibid., 22 September 1938, p. 7. 
41 Ibid., 22 September 193 8, p. 10. 
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Certainly the Daily Express was one of the more optimistic papers about the 
prospect of peace, but its criticism of the proposed guarantees casts doubts on the claim 
that Beaverbrook `put his papers totally at the service of the govermuent'. 45 The 
freedom of comment enjoyed by the Daily Express was such that, after a Cabinet 
meeting on 25 September 1938 during which growing criticism of government's policy 
was noted, Hoare asked Beaverbrook to `stick at present to supporting the P. M. as 
about the only hope of peace'. 46 This has been presented as a prime example of 
government exerting influence over the newspapers. But it can more convincingly be 
regarded as evidence to the contrary: the appeal indicated a lack of government control 
and a fear of the implications of newspaper independence. 
When Chamberlain flew to Munich on 29 September he had the full support of 
the Daily Express. Its headline read: `It's all Right'. Next day, reporting the Munich 
agreement, the front page printed the now notorious headline: `The Daily Express 
declares that Britain will not be involved in a European war this year, or next year 
either. ' Given its deep commitment to isolationism, this is hardly surprising: but the 
paper also struck a critical note. It took issue with the guarantee given for the remaining 
state of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain had committed Britain to stand by a nation on the 
continent, something that Beaverbrook had always tried to avoid. The newspaper 
thought that the country should concentrate solely on national rearmament, and keep 
clear of any European commitments. 47 Privately, Beaverbrook had to defend the Daily 
Express's isolationist position. A prominent reader recalled that in 1914 England and its 
allies had only narrowly escaped defeat by German forces, and asked whether isolation 
45 Cockett, Twilight, p. 80. 
46 Hoare to Beaverbrook, September (undated) 1938, Beaverbrook Papers C/299; see also Cockett, 
Twilight, p. 81. 
47 Daily Express, 3 October 1938, p. 10. 
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was 'feasible' ? 48 Beaverbrook, the arch-isolationist, answered the letter personally and 
pointed out that the policy of the paper was precisely to back up isolation with 
`preparations for defence'. 49 Shortly afterwards the Daily Express found the appropriate 
headline, combining both principles: `Armed Isolation'. 50 Rearmament now became the 
paper's most urgent rallying-cry. 
There is no doubt that Chamberlain valued Beaverbrook's support and tried hard 
to obtain it. This provided Beaverbrook with the chance of being more closely involved 
in government business than at any time since 1918. Beaverbrook was keen to maintain 
his newly-regained influence and reminded Halifax in November 1938 that `my 
newspapers will do anything to help you in your difficult negotiations with the central 
European countries, or indeed in any direction. Besides, I am in agreement with your 
policy and I can give you the strongest support'. 51 The similarity between 
Beaverbrook's Daily Express and the Cabinet's position was still such that Robertson, 
the Express's general manager, declared that `Chamberlain's speeches read like Daily 
Express leaders'. 52 In private, however, Beaverbrook's support for Chamberlain was 
certainly not unqualified: `we set out on the road with him, on his policy of 
appeasement in Europe, and we cannot turn our back until he ceases to lead us in that 
highway'. 53 
After the New Year Beaverbrook became more optimistic, because he felt that 
Chamberlain was now `running an isolationist policy all the time', and would ultimately 
`isolate the Empire from the quarrels of Europe'. 54 He saw the prospects of peace 
growing, but was realist enough to put this down to `the growing strength of our armed 
48 See Agate to Christiansen, October 1938, Beaverbrook papers B/292. 49 See Beaverbrook to Agate, 5 October 1938, Beaverbrook papers B/292. 
50 Daily Express, 8 October 1938, p. 2; see Kehoe, `British Press', p. 240. 51 Beaverbrook to Halifax, 14 November 1938, Beaverbrook papers C/152; see Cockett, Twilight, p. 56. 52 Lockhart diaries, 7 November 1938, p. 408, quoted in Chisholm, Beaverbrook, p. 353. 53 Beaverbrook to Blumenfeld, 8 December 1938, Beaverbrook papers C/45c. 54 Quoted in Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 388. 
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forces', 55 rather than the policy of appeasement. When tension grew over Prague in 
March 1939, Beaverbrook was content that the pledges given at Munich were not 
applied: `our Government could never have defended Czechoslovakia, and that 
combination of races could never have worked together ... 
The structure was bound to 
fall as soon as the weight of reality was imposed upon it'. 56 Nevertheless, after the 
German armies had occupied Prague, in one respect the paper argued for a resolute 
response: `while everything will be done by Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues to 
promote peace, the policy of making Britain strong, militarily and diplomatically, will 
be pressed forward and speeded up'. 57 
When on 31 March 1939 the British government announced its guarantee to 
Poland, the Daily Express, naturally opposed the pledge. It was thereby nearly alone in 
doing so. Like The Times, the Daily Express gave a narrow definition of its scope and 
criticised the step: 
There is no discordant voice anywhere save only from this newspaper. The Daily 
Express regrets 1, that a guarantee should have been given that involved Britain 
in the concerns of Eastern Europe, 2, that it was given without seeking and 
obtaining the approval of the Dominions and their concurrence in the obligations. 
The Daily Express opposes the commitment to Poland. 58 
Not only did the Daily Express criticise the Polish guarantee, it now accused 
Chamberlain of being weak, `since his decision in fact adopted the policies of his 
Socialist opponents, of his Liberal opponents, and of his critics in his own party like Mr. 
Eden and Mr. Churchill'. 59 What annoyed the newspaper in particular was that the 
prime minister followed the prevailing `public opinion': Chamberlain was going with 
the tide, not with the Daily Express and Beaverbrook. However, the paper hesitated to 
ss Beaverbrook to Swope, 21 February 1939, Beaverbrook papers B/297. 
56 Beaverbrook to Macdonnell, 15 March 1939, quoted in Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 390. 
57 Daily Express, 16 March 1939, p. 1. 
58 Ibid., 1 April 1939, p. 10; Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 391. 
59 Ibid., 4 April 1939, p. 7. 
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break completely with the government, because it anticipated that in a case of war the 
Daily Express should be in a position to encourage and fortify the resistance and 
endurance of the British Nation'. 60 
It was now plain that the Daily Express had not supported Chamberlain as such 
- still less subordinated itself to Chamberlainite blandishments or pressure - so much as 
welcomed Chamberlain's support for Beaverbrook's isolationism. As Beaverbrook 
stated in 1947: 
Up to March, 1939, Chamberlain had a policy that we accepted and supported 
very strongly, and then he changed his policy and decided to give a guarantee to 
Poland. The Daily Express made a most furious attack upon that guarantee. 
Chamberlain was angry about the attack, and so I had no further conversation 
with him after that date, until after the outbreak of war. 61 
Beaverbrook privately wrote that `this was a pledge that should not have been made, 
that could not be honoured, and which defied the bounds of practical reality when it was 
entered into'. 62 He continued to oppose entanglement on the continent right up to the 
outbreak of war - and beyond. Contrary to Taylor's assumption that his newspapers 
now preached an alliance with Russia, 63 as the only means of sustaining the Polish 
guarantee, in July the Daily Express criticised negotiations with the Soviet government. 
A treaty would allow Stalin to lure Britain into a war it did not want, and from which 
only Russia could benefit. 64 Even after the outbreak of war, Beaverbrook still wanted to 
reach a negotiated settlement with Hitler, and to avoid an expansion of the conflict. 
Only with Churchill's accession as prime minister in May 1940 and Beaverbrook's 
appointment to the War Cabinet did he change his position. 65 
60 Beaverbrook to Dunnico, 10 April 1939, Beaverbrook papers B/296. 
61 Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence, q. 8756. 
62 Quoted in Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 391. 
63 See Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 391. 
64 Daily Express, 31 July 1939, p. 10. 
65 See Benson, `Low', p. 31. 
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II. The Evening Standard and Low 
The Evening Standard was considered to be `independent conservative'. 66 In 
1939 it had a circulation of 382,000.67 According to Seymour-Ure and Schoff, it was 
Beaverbrook's `plaything', to which he allowed a greater degree of political freedom. 68 
This was partly because as an evening newspaper for a well-informed readership (in 
London and South-East England) it offered sophisticated entertainment as well as 
serious discussion. It was also because it served as an outlet for Beaverbrook's more 
mischievous, or maverick, instincts. He even employed radical journalists like Frank 
Owen, editor 1938-1941, and Michael Foot, the future editor, as well as the left-wing 
cartoonist, David Low. 69 
The Evening Standard had even the freedom to disagree with views and opinion 
published in the Daily and Sunday Express. 70 For example, Percy Cudlipp, editor 1933- 
1938, was among the first to call for a popular front against Hitler. When he left 
(significantly to join the Daily Herald) Owen continued to pursue a more critical 
approach towards Germany than that of the Daily Express. 71 Beaverbrook occasionally 
tried to restrain him, but Owen took little or no notice. 72 Later, Beaverbrook did not 
deny that he tried to convince his various editors to adopt a more optimistic line on 
international affairs; but he also stated that he only succeeded up to a point. He did not 
convince all his editors: `My own view was accepted by the Daily Express. John 
Gordon of the Sunday Express, for instance, and Frank Owen of the Evening Standard 
did not accept my view'. 73 In consequence, the political stances of his various 
66See David Butler and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts 1900-1985, sixth ed. (London, 1986), p. 
489; Benson, `Low ', p. 90, and Colin Seymour-Ure and Jim Schoff, David Low (London, 1985), p. 44. 
67 Ibid., p. 167. 
68 See Ibid., p. 44, and Benson, `Low', p. 20. 
69 See My Dear Max, p. 21 and p. 18: `an impish sense of mischief were the guiding lights of his life'. 70 See Benson, `Low', p. 260. 
71 Curran and Seaton, Power Without, p. 49. 
72 Ibid.; cf. Benson, `Low', p. 260. 
73 Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence, 18 March 1948, q. 8754. 
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newspapers were sometimes contradictory. Even while personally supporting 
Chamberlain during 1938, he did not insist that all his newspapers were favourable 
towards appeasement. 
Probably the most remarkable feature of the Evening Standard was its 
employment of Low. In the early 1930s, as a committed supporter of the League of 
Nations he had drawn attention to the importance of disarmament and collective 
security. When these failed, faced with Italy's annexation of Abyssinia, Low modified 
his view to advocate backing up the League with military force. After the reoccupation 
of the Rhineland, he supported an increase in rearmament, and in the summer of 1938 
he `rampaged' against Germany. 74 After the occupation of Prague he looked for an 
agreement with Russia. On all these points, Low was in direct opposition to the thinking 
of Beaverbrook as well as the government. 75 Where Low was a supporter of the League, 
Beaverbrook was a fervent supporter of isolation. 76 During the late 1930s there was 
probably just one point of agreement: as Benson argues, `they both saw an increasing 
need for rearmament'. 77 
Given their differences, would Beaverbrook really allow Low to express his 
markedly independent views during the delicate conditions of 1938? When Low had 
joined the Evening Standard in 1927, he was free to define his conditions: `Policy: It is 
agreed that you are to have complete freedom in the selection and treatment of subject 
matter for your cartoons and in the expression therein of the policies in which you 
believe'. 78 Beaverbrook confirmed this right to independence in terms that also cast 
doubt on his own susceptibility to outside influences: 
" Low, Autobiography, p. 306. 
75 See Seymour-Ure and Schoff, Low, p. 166. 
76 See Seymour-Ure and Schoff, Low, pp. 42,45, and Benson, `Low', p. 124. 77 Benson, `Low', p. 141. 
78 Low, Autobiography, p. 182. 
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My views as shareholder in any newspaper are that its columns ought to be free 
and open to the expression of opinion by men and women of distinction. I should 
no more be in favour of excluding such work because I disagreed with the 
opinions contained in it than I would countenance the colouring of news to suit 
preconceived ideas. 79 
Low always maintained that he had independence from Beaverbrook's interventions, 
and that there was only one case where a cartoon was left out for political reasons. 80 Of 
course, there were certain topics which Low felt he should leave untouched, as a matter 
of tact, particularly the monarchy and Rothermere, Beaverbrook's fellow press lord and 
ally, who objected to being in cartoons. Some other cartoons had to be omitted because 
of fear of libel action. 8' 
Low's independence is affirmed in some of the earliest studies of his 
relationship with Beaverbrook. Streicher, in 1965, argued that `crucial for Low's status 
as a commentator was unique freedom. He was privileged and sheltered to speak the 
truth as he personally saw it, regardless of Lord Beaverbrook's politics and editorial 
policies'. 82 This claim was also made by Taylor in his biography of Beaverbrook. `Low 
had a free run for the best part of twenty years in the Evening Standard'. 83 It was not 
until 1985 when Seymour-Ure and Schoff published their biography of Low that some 
doubts about his independence arose. They argued that `The contract clause "worked" 
in as much as both parties publicly maintained that it worked. Like many contracts, 
however, it symbolised a working relationship more than actively sustaining it'. 84 
Benson's thesis goes in the same direction: `Low's independence in reality depended on 
how far Beaverbrook felt that freedom should go. Low on his part, it is argued, was not 
79 Ibid., pp. 196-7. 
80 See Benson, `Low', pp. i, 12. The subject matter was Greece in 1945: see Low, Autobiography, p. 197. 
81 See Seymour-Ure and Schoff, Low, pp. 49-50. 
82 Lawrence H. Streicher, `The Political Imagery in the Caricatures of David Low' (Phd. thesis, 
University of Wisconsin, 1965), p. 220. 
83 Taylor, Beaverbrook p. 216. 
84 C. Seymour-Ure and Schoff, Low, p . 47 
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only prepared to ignore such blatant infringements to the terms of his contract, but also 
toed the line to suit his proprietor's political whims. '85 If the Evening Standard, like 
other newspapers was in `Chamberlain's pocket', as Chisholm and Davie claim, this 
issue needs to be addressed. 86 
*** 
Low was certainly aware of the dangers posed by the dictators, and tried to alert 
the public with his striking caricatures of them. 87 As Seymour-Ure and Schoff state, he 
helped to fix `the lasting image of Hitler and Mussolini'. 88 He foresaw that if a firm 
policy was not adopted towards the dictators they would be still more aggressive, and 
eventually cause the outbreak of war. During the late 1930s Low was an outright 
opponent of appeasement. 89 
Even before the Evening Standard received official complaints about Low's 
cartoons, the newspaper knew that they could have a bearing on Anglo-German 
relations. The editor hinted to Low as early as September 1937 that `a newspaper must 
be very keenly alive to its responsibilities'. The dictators were `people whose tempers 
are inflamed more by a cartoon than by any letterpress'. 90 Matters came to a head with 
Halifax's visit to Germany. During the visit, Goebbels specifically complained about 
cartoons in British newspapers, and Halifax resolved to try and soften matters. As he 
wrote to Henderson: `I haven't as yet devised any approach that is satisfactory to Low, 
85 Benson, `Low', p. i. 
86 Chisholm and Davie, Beaverbrook, p. 354. 
87 See e. g. Low cartoon, `Cause preceeds effect', Evening Standard, 20 March 1935, and `Stepping 
Stones to glory', 8 July 1936. 
88 See Seymour-Ure and Schoff, Low, p. xi. 
89 Benson, `Low', p. 2. 
90 Cudlipp to Low, 9 September 1937, quoted in Peter Mellini, `Why Didn't They Listen? Political 
Cartooning and British Foreign Policy 1933-1940', Journal of Newspaper and Periodical History 6 
(1990), p. 33. 
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who draws the picture in the Evening Standard, and these I expect are the most 
troublesome of any. '91 
Any government action was made more difficult because Halifax and 
Beaverbrook were not on good terms. Also Beaverbrook was known to maintain that 
Low had artistic independence to draw as he wished. So Halifax instead tried to 
circumvent Beaverbrook by approaching the Standard's manager, Michael Wardell, 
asking him to put some pressure on Low. 92 But he was firmly told that such a request 
could not be met: 
Low has a contract which gives him complete immunity. Of course, I could 
refuse to publish a cartoon, if it were blasphemous or obscene or libellous, or in 
such bad taste as to bring discredit on the newspaper. But Low's cartoons don't 
fall into any of those categories. They just make you mad, if you don't agree with 
them. 93 
Nevertheless, Wardell arranged a luncheon in order to give Halifax the chance to talk to 
Low personally, and try to persuade him to tone down his attacks. Low was not 
convinced that a softer tone would result in a more moderate policy in Germany, and on 
a more personal level, that Halifax or Chamberlain were equipped to understand the 
dictators. He rather thought that the British government was being `taken for a ride'. 94 
Low finally stated that `I understand you to say that you would find it easier to promote 
peace if my cartoons did not irritate the Nazi leaders personally? T 'Yes', Halifax 
replied. 95 This, as Shepherd splendidly stated, was `a very English attempt at 
censorship'. 96 As Low added, `We left it at that, and sitting on Wardell's roof-garden 
we looked at Hyde Park below and talked about the weather'. Even so, Low did agree to 
91 Halifax to Henderson, 25 November 1937, Halifax papers A4.410.3.2 (ii), quoted in Benson, `Low', p. 
266. 
92 See Timothy Benson, `Low and the Dictators - Editorial cartoonist David Low, and his ridiculing of 
Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini', History Today 51 (2001), p. 38; cf. Chisholm and Davie, 
Beaverbrook, p. 350, who argue that the contact was `at Beaverbrook's behest'. 
93 Quoted in Benson, `Low and the Dictators', pp. 38-9. 
"4 Low, Autobiography, pp. 278-9; see also Mellini, `Why', p. 33. 
95 Quoted in Low, Autobiography, p. 278. 
96 Shepherd, Class Divided, p. 119. 
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modify his criticism of the dictators, and established the composite figure of `Muzzier'. 
in order to continue his criticism in a `less personal key'. It seems that he chose the 
name as an allusion to the ministerial attempt to `muzzle' his work. But his self-restraint 
lasted only for a short period. 97 
*** 
A further indication of the Evening Standard's independence from 
Beaverbrook's views is that Churchill was a frequent contributor. For a period he wrote 
a fortnightly article, including all his favourite themes such as collective security and 
rearmament. For example, his article `Britain Rearms' in early January 1938 advocated 
still more rearmament than that proposed by the government, and caused no problems 
with either the editor or proprietor. 98 A week later, Low drew a critical cartoon about 
the state of air-armament, showing Swinton sleeping on an unfinished plane and 
dreaming of lots of planes in the air. 99 It is an indication of the paper's `inconsistent' 
policies at the time that on the next day its `Londoner's Diary' praised Swinton for 
performing his task with great competence. '°° 
How can this be explained? Even Low remarked on this strange contrast: 
`Things got a bit mixed up at times between me and the Evening Standard. Cartoons 
and leading articles often flatly contradicted one another. "°' This strange feature also 
appeared between articles; a leader at the end of January 1938 claimed that the League 
was `in effect, a meeting of undertakers. Its business is to dispose of the body. For the 
97 Low, Autobiography, p. 279; see Chisholm and Davie, Beaverbrook, p. 350, and Shepherd, Class, p. 
119. 
98 Evening Standard, 7 January 1938, p. 7: `Britain Rearms', by Churchill. 
99 Ibid., 12 January 1938, p. 10. 
100 Ibid., 13 January 1938; Ibid., 1 February 1938, p. 6. 
101 Low, Autobiography, p. 280. 
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League has expired. This is a fact which everybody knows, but which everybody does 
not admit. ' 102 Yet this was followed by Churchill's contribution `The League is not 
dead yet'. 103 It seems that there were no editorial conferences and little attempt to co- 
ordinate a common attitude. 
With the tension rising over Austria in mid-February, the Evening Standard did 
argue for a policy of isolationism, in line with Beaverbrook's preference. '04 The events 
were seen as `a reminder to us that to pursue fanciful "objects of British policy" in 
Europe is a course which can never lead to satisfactory results'. It `illustrates once more 
the truth that Europe is a tract of shifting sands. And on those sands we can found no 
sure and lasting policy'. '05 The following day the paper declared that `politically, events 
on the Continent ... 
have reinforced the conclusion that the course of wisdom for us is to 
keep ourselves free from European commitments. ... 
Our real interests lie within the 
British Commonwealth of Nations and primarily within our own island shores. ' 106 In 
any case, the Standard asked, `Did anyone ever think that the post-war settlement in 
Europe was destined to last forever? ' 107 
The build up to the Anschluss was interrupted by Eden's resignation as Foreign 
Secretary. Although the newspaper's leaders played down the importance of the 
event, 108 Churchill's column paid more attention to it. He pointed out that the National 
government had lost their only popular figure, at a time when British policy seemed to 
be uncertain. Churchill also doubted if Mussolini was willing to distance himself from 
Hitler, join Britain, and help sustain the independence of Austria. '09 Here, as on other 
occasions, the paper appeared to speak with different voices. The Eden resignation and 
102 Evening Standard, 25 January 1938, p. 6. 
103 Ibid, 4 February 1938, p. 7: The League is not dead yet, by Churchill. 
104 Ibid., 7 February 1938, p. 6. 
105 Ibid., 16 February 1938, p. 6. 
106 Ibid., 17 February 1938, p. 6. 
107 Ibid., 18 February 1938, p. 6. 
108 Ibid., 21 February 1938, p. 6; Ibid., 26 February 1938, p. 6. 
109 Ibid., 4 March 1938, p. 7: `Carry On! ', by Churchill. 
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the Anschluss prompted Low to return to his unreserved critical position towards the 
dictators and the British government, just at the time when there were rumours of 
increased government attempts to influence press opinion. His cartoon `Press control? 
Why certainly, Rib old boy! ' criticised any attempt to `muzzle', and his own actions 
showed how impossible it was for the government to achieve restraint. ' 10 So too did 
Chamberlain's reference to Low's cartoons in a May 1938 speech to the Newspaper 
Society: 
Such criticism might do a great deal to embitter relations when we on our side 
are trying to improve them. German Nazis have been particularly annoyed by 
criticisms in the British press, and especially by cartoons. The bitter cartoons of 
Low of the Evening Standard have been a frequent source of complaint. " 1 
When Hitler finally sent his armies into Austria, the Standard was quick to assure its 
readers that there would be no war in Europe at present, but was critical of France's 
position. More specifically, it reflected Beaverbrook's characteristic view of calling 
both for faster rearmament ('We must build up our fighting forces'), and for 
isolationism: `No more pledges. No more European responsibilities. No more 
declarations that Britain's frontier lies on the Rhine. No more promises to go to the aid 
of Czechoslovakia. ' 112 Last but not least, the paper was content with the outcome: one 
major German grievance had been settled, and without bloodshed. ' 13 
Yet again, the next day, Churchill drew a different lesson, arguing that time and 
advantage had been lost by the government's misreading of the German mind. While 
Churchill also emphasised the need to increase British defences, in a crucial distinction 
from Beaverbrook's stance he stressed the need for Britain to bear its part with the 
1 10 Ibid., 11 March 1938, p. 10. 
111 Quoted in Benson, `Low', p. 274. 
112 Evening Standard, 12 March 1938, p. 6. 
113 Ibid., 14 March 1938, p. 6; Ibid., 17 March 1938, p. 6. 
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French Republic in a joint effort to avert a European war, urging his readers that action 
should be taken according to the Covenant of the League of Nations. l 14 
So far, his articles had not crossed Beaverbrook's views: this changed after 
Churchill realised after the Anschluss that Hitler was a bigger threat than ever, and 
proposed a Grand Alliance to counter German aims. This was the opposite of 
Beaverbrook's stance of `splendid isolation'. When Beaverbrook was asked in mid- 
March 1938 to talk to Chamberlain about the possibility of including Churchill in the 
government, Beaverbrook rejected the proposal. 115 Indeed he considered him to be 
probably `the worst' possible alternative, 116 whilst Chamberlain, in Beaverbrook's eyes, 
was `the undisputed leader of the Isolationists'. 117 This is a remarkable comment since 
its syntax indicates that Beaverbrook believed that Chamberlain was finally following 
his policy, not vice versa. 
Churchill's intensified criticism of appeasement and arguments for intervention 
now became too much for Beaverbrook, who now really did exert his influence over the 
Evening Standard. Churchill's contract was terminated. As R. J. Thompson, Wardell's 
successor as manager, wrote: `your views on foreign affairs and the part which this 
country should play are extremely opposed to those held by us. ' 118 While Churchill had 
been sacked, Low was still working for the Standard. Churchill grasped this 
contradiction and wrote crossly back: 
With regard to the divergence from Lord Beaverbrook's policy, that of course 
has been obvious from the beginning, but it clearly appears to me to be less 
marked than in the case of the Low cartoons. I rather thought that Lord 
Beaverbrook prided himself upon forming a platform in the Evening Standard 
for various opinions including, of course, his own. 119 
"4 Ibid., 18 March 1938, p. 7: `The Austrian Eye-Opener', by Churchill. 
1 1s See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 571. 
116 Beaverbrook to Grigg, 20 June 1938, quoted in Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 383. 
117 Beaverbrook to Cummings, 4 March 1938, Beaverbrook papers C/104. 
118 R. J. Thompson to Churchill, 24 March 1938, quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Companion, 
vol. V, part 3 (London, 1979), pp. 957-8. 
1 19 Churchill to Thompson, 1I April 1938, quoted in Gilbert, Churchill, Companion, vol. V, p. 987, and 
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From the explanation given to Churchill it is evident that he had lost his job because the 
policies he advocated directly contradicted Beaverbrook's views. 120 Churchill was 
certainly right about the continued licence given to Low. The difference, perhaps, was 
that Low offered humorous images rather than reasoned policy alternatives. Low was 
also careful not to offend his employer directly. For instance, in late March, his cartoon 
`The Shiver Sisters Celebrate', 121 implied that politicians and journalists who favoured 
appeasement - like Garvin, Dawson, Grigg, Lothian, Lady Astor and Halifax, members 
of the so-called `Cliveden set' - were under the influence of German propaganda. As 
Mellini states, `Low's cartoons turned the Cliveden Set into a household phrase for an 
elite right-wing pro-Nazi conspiracy'. 122 Beaverbrook was not a member of the `set'; 
even so Low knew Beaverbrook's opinions perfectly well - yet he did not target him in 
his cartoons. 
During summer 1938, Low's cartoons warned the Evening Standard's readers of 
the dangers of isolationism, most notably in the famous cartoon `What is 
Czechoslovakia to me, anyway? ' 123 In contrast the paper published optimistic articles 
about the conditions of Europe, and its editorials still expressed confidence in the 
government. 124 In early September it declared that `opinion in this country is unanimous 
in having confidence in one thing - that Mr. Chamberlain and his ministers can be 
trusted to follow unswervingly two aims: peace, and the defence of Britain's interests 
and security. ' 125 And again `our luck at the moment is that we have in Neville 
120 See Benson, `Low', p. 48 , and Parker, Churchill, pp. 8-9. 1'`' Evening Standard, 23 March 1938, p. 10. 
122 Mellini, `Why', p. 33; see also Low, Autobiography, p. 311. 
123 Evening Standard, 18 July 1938, p. 10. 
124 See Evening Standard, 25 July 1938, p. 6; ibid., 3 August 1938, p. 7; ibid., 18 August 1938, p. 6; ibid., 
19 August 1938, p. 7. 
125 Evening Standard, 14 September 1938, p. 6. 
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Chamberlain a man who knows how to talk to men'. 126 Even so, it again forecast that 
rearmament might need to be intensified beyond the levels so far contemplated by the 
government. Rearmament `has not been allowed to interfere to any considerable extent 
with the ordinary industrial activities of Britain. But if now the mobilisation of our 
might overlaps in some ways with the day-to-day tasks of the nation we shall not 
complain' . 
127 
As early as 20 September the paper warned against any commitment towards 
Czechoslovakia, in line with Beaverbrook's support for isolationism, rather than in 
support of appeasement as such. The possibility of guaranteeing any revised 
Czechoslovakian frontiers was described as a `sinister departure from recent British 
policy' and was vigorously opposed. 128 In consequence, it became critical of the prime 
minister: `Mr. Baldwin gave us the Rhine as frontier; Mr. Chamberlain extends it to the 
Danube'. 129 Yet the newspaper's line was unsteady. On 27 September, it declared that 
if Hitler `rejects peace and the full satisfaction offered of every legitimate claim, he will 
be challenging the united strength of Britain, France and Russia and defying the 
condemnation of almost the whole world. ' 130 Two days later, it reverted to warning of 
the dangers of intervention: `if British policy abroad was to persist in building up 
commitments to other States, then we should one day be presented with the bill to be 
paid in full and on the instant. ' 131 
After the publication of the Munich settlement, the paper regretted that there was 
an implied guarantee to the rump Czechoslovakian state. 132 Low now published two 
further famous cartoons, criticising the Russian government's exclusion from the 
126 Ibid., 19 September 1938, p. 7. 
''' Ibid., 15 September 1938, p. 6. 
128 Ibid., 20 September 1938, p. 6. 
129 Ibid., p. 7. 
'30 Ibid., 27 September 1938, p. 6. 
"' Ibid., 29 September 1938, p. 6. 
132 Evening Standard, 30 September 1939, p. 6; see also ibid., 1 October 1938, p. 6, and ibid., 3 October 
1938, p. 6. 
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Munich talks -'Why, no chair for me? ' 133 - and the condition of British rearmament in 
`Our New Defence', showing a piece of paper covering a breached wall. 134 
In an article entitled `A Fourth Arm' the paper called for the establishment of a 
Ministry of Supply, in particular to make aircraft production more effective. 135 
Beaverbrook's tendency for mischief-making (but also his sense of commercial 
opportunities) again became apparent, when Duff Cooper - the only Minister to resign 
in protest against the Munich settlement - was immediately given a column in the 
Evening Standard. In his first article he demanded a firm stand against the dictator 
states, 136 followed a week later with a call for conscription. 137 These views hardly fitted 
with the general Beaverbrook line, especially proclaimed in the Daily Express, that 
there would be no European war - any more than giving a platform to Cooper was 
compatible with suggestions that Beaverbrook's newspapers were under Chamberlain's 
influence. To those who complained about Cooper's articles Beaverbrook, 
notwithstanding the earlier termination of Churchill's contract, restated his long- 
standing claim that his papers provided an area for free debate. `If I were to depart from 
that practice, it would be a complete reversal of policy, and I am not prepared to go so 
far at the present time. ' 138 
Early in 1939 the dissonance between the Evening Standard's editorial line and 
some of its contributors (as well as its cartoonist) continued. 13 9 The paper remained 
generally supportive of Chamberlain's foreign policy and optimistic about the European 
133 Low, `Why, no chair for me? ', Evening Standard, 30 September 1938. 
134 Low, `Our New Defence', Evening Standard, 5 October 1938. 
135 Evening Standard, 20 October 1938, p. 6; cf. also ibid., 22 October 1938, p. 6. 
136 Ibid., 11 October 1938, p. 7: `Who Wants War? ', by Duff Cooper. 
13' Ibid., 19 October 1938, p. 7: `The Will To Serve', by Duff Cooper. 
138 Beaverbrook to Chaplin, 2 February 1939, Beaverbrook papers B/295; for a confirmation of the 
independence see, Cooper, Old Men Forget, p. 252; see also Benson, `Low', p. 285. 
139 See Low's `Si vis pacem pare umbrellum', in `Low's Topical Budget', Evening Standard, 12 
November 1938, in which he turned Chamberlain's umbrella into a symbol of appeasement, trying to 
stress the point of Britain's inadequate armament program. 
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situation. 140 Yet Cooper warned the public that it would be mistaken if it thought that 
there has recently been a great improvement in the international situation', and urged 
the people to show their determination to resist Nazi aggression by enlisting for national 
service. 
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On the brink of the German invasion of Prague the Evening Standard reminded 
its readers that the fate of the Czech state `does not concern the people of Britain'. It 
also recalled that it had declared the Munich commitment to be an impossible 
undertaking. Britain should not intervene again in Eastern Europe diplomacy, but 
instead follow the path of detachment. 142 After the invasion, the paper reiterated that the 
Munich terms did not apply because they had not defined the Czechoslovakian 
frontiers, 143 and they were bound to crumble anyway. 144 Nevertheless, again in contrast 
to the `no war' declarations in the Daily Express and Chamberlain's continued 
determination to avoid war, the newspaper urged a firm stand against further German 
aggression and the introduction of conscription. 145 This did not, however, stretch to 
support for the Polish guarantee, as Beaverbrook again asserted his authority. According 
to a Polish observer, he himself wrote the Standard's article which interpreted the 
guarantee in a narrow sense, limiting British responsibility to supporting Polish 
`independence', not `territorial integrity'. 146 
140 E. g. Evening Standard, 4 January 1939, p. 6; ibid., 10 March 1939, p. 6. 
14' Ibid., 28 February 1939, p. 7: Is The Storm Over? By Duff Cooper. 
142 Ibid., 13 March 1939, p. 6. 
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144 Ibid., 15 March 1939, p. 6. 
gas Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 6; Ibid., 17 March 1939, p. 6; Ibid., 21 March 1939, p. 6; Ibid., 23 March 
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It seems most unlikely that either Chamberlain or the Foreign Office had any 
meaningful influence over Beaverbrook, to the point where they could shape the 
opinions expressed in his newspapers. Beaverbrook, as his long experience as a 
`political maverick' demonstrated, was fiercely independent. As comments from the 
Chamberlainite loyalist, Ball, in the mid 1930s indicated, the government could never 
rely upon Beaverbrook's support. When he supported Chamberlain's foreign policy, he 
did so for his own reasons, and on his own terms; indeed his commitment to British 
isolation from Europe meant that he could never go as far as Chamberlain towards 
appeasement, with its readiness to become involved in central European diplomacy. 
When there was special contact between Beaverbrook and ministers, as in September 
1938, the initiative came from Beaverbrook. 
Beaverbrook exercised different degrees of control over his various newspapers. 
With his main title, the Daily Express, it was tight, whereas he allowed the editor, 
journalists, columnists - and cartoonist - on the Evening Standard a greater degree of 
expression. 147 The Evening Standard sometimes stated contrary views to those of the 
Express; and at times Low's cartoons or Churchill's and Cooper's articles flatly 
contradicted the Standard's editorial position. The one issue on which Beaverbrook 
required a common commitment by all his newspapers was imperial unity. Otherwise, 
he allowed a degree of independence to some of his editors, even on foreign policy. 
The case of Low is significant and indicative. Beaverbrook himself did not seek 
to censor his cartoons, least of all under government pressure. As Seymour-Ure stated, 
the actual number of cartoons omitted was very small. 148 Halifax's appeal to Low on the 
grounds of national interest did persuade him to tone down his caricatures of Hitler, but 
147 See Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 377, and Chisholm and Davie, Beaverbrook, p. 348. 
148 Seymour Ure and Schoff, Low, p. 50; also Mellini, `Why', p. 31. 
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only for a brief period, ended by the Anschluss. Yet at the same time his critical 
commentary on British politics continued unabated. Low only acknowledged one 
limitation - that he should not ridicule Beaverbrook's commitment to the Empire. The 
difficulty with Churchill arose because his articles directly contradicted Beaverbrook's 
isolationist attitudes. For all Beaverbrook's affirmations about the editorial 
independence of his newspapers, there were some limits. 
In his two newspapers, allowing expression of different perspectives, 
Beaverbrook `could burn both ends of the candle at once'. He could promote his own 
views on foreign and defence policy, while retaining the appeal of his newspapers to 
readers of different opinion - and he could keep open his contacts with different 
political elements, including the developing body of anti-appeasers. Consequently it 
was difficult to identify his newspapers with any single attitude, which indeed, saved his 
reputation after May 1940. Beaverbrook was certainly among the strongest supporters 
of Chamberlain's appeasement during 1938. Yet the Evening Standard's employment of 
Liberal and Labour radicals - crucially including few of the co-authors of Guilty Men, 
Owen and Foot - and its openness to alternative opinions, meant that 
from 1940 
Beaverbrook was able to escape the now almost universal condemnation of the 
appeasers. 
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J. L. GARVIN AND THE OBSERVER 
Founded in 1791, The Observer was Britain's oldest Sunday newspaper. As one 
of just two quality Sunday newspapers, alongside the Sunday Times, its influence was 
considerable. This was especially so because J. L. Garvin, its long-serving editor (1908- 
42), commanded attention as a brilliant and trenchant political commentator - arguably 
the `leading political journalist of the day'. ' An independent Conservative, on 
international issues he was an `intellectual Chamberlainite', in the sense of Joseph 
Chamberlain: an imperialist arguing for Anglo-Saxon understanding but not, like 
Beaverbrook, for British isolation from continental European affairs. 2 What Garvin 
wanted was a stable, satisfied, peaceful Europe which posed no serious challenges to 
British power. Before 1914 this had made him `anti-German'. 3 But from 1919 he had 
been a consistent critic of the Treaty of Versailles, because in his view it created more 
problems than it solved: as late as 1938 he was still complaining of `the purblind and 
botching statecraft of Versailles'. 4 From this perspective he was, in Gannon's words, 
`the British Press's most outspoken Czechophobe'. 5 For him, Czechoslovakia was an 
artificial and dangerously unstable state, which `never ought to have been created'6 and 
1 Philip Williamson, National Crisis and National Government. British Politics, the Economy and 
Empire, 1926-1932 (Cambridge, 1992), p. 141; Rose, Cliveden, p. 19. See also Cockett, David Astor, p. 
76; see also John Stubbs, `Appearance and Reality: A Case Study of The Observer and J. L. Garvin, 
1914-1942', in Boyce, Curran and Wingate (eds. ), Newspaper History, p. 325; Alfred M. Gollin, The 
Observer and Garvin 1908-14: a Study in a Great Editorship (Oxford, 1966), passim. 
2 Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler. British Politics and British Policy 1933-1940 (Cambridge, 
1975), p. 122; cf. Kehoe, `British Press', p. 190, who saw in him `the most influential spokesman for the 
isolationist section of the Conservative press'. 
3 Cowling, Impact, p. 123. 
4 Observer, 6 March 1938, p. 16. See also Observer, 20 March 1938, p. 14 and 27 March 1938, p. 21. 
For criticism, see Benny Morris, The Roots of Appeasement. The British Weekly Press and Nazi 
Germany during the 1930s (London, 1991), pp. 31-2; Gannon, British Press, pp. 10-1; Kehoe, `British 
Press', p. 21. 
5 Gannon, British Press, p. 5 1. 
6 Observer, 6 March 1938, p. 16. 
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which should not be supported or defended. More generally, for the purposes of 
preserving European peace he was from early 1937 prepared to envisage German 
hegemony in Eastern Europe, 7 and even the return to Germany of its former overseas 
colonies. 8 
Although Garvin campaigned in the 1930s for Anglo-German reconciliation, 
this certainly did not mean that he was naive about the nature of the Nazi regime. He 
disliked its racial policies, and was fully aware of the German military threat to 
European security. 9 Consequently he also campaigned for greater British rearmament, to 
ensure that Britain could act as a counter-weight to `the new barbarism in the centre of 
Europe'. 10 It is therefore difficult to accept Gannon's claim that until the Munich crisis, 
Garvin was convinced of Hitler's desire for peace, and can - without qualification - be 
described as an appeaser. " It should also be emphasised that Garvin had thought about 
and commented on European politics for some forty years; that his attitudes towards 
Nazi Germany had become firmly established well before Chamberlain became prime 
minister, and that his influence rested upon his reputation for independent 
commentary. 12 
Although Garvin had partly learned his trade from close association with party 
leaders and ministers, 13 by the 1930s he had - for a political journalist - become 
unusually detached. 14 He edited the newspaper from his home near Beaconsfield, rarely 
visited London for any extended period, and had no sustained contact with or influence 
on the Conservative prime ministers of the 1930s, Baldwin and Chamberlain. This did 
Observer, 21 March 1937, quoted in Stewart, Burying, p. 271; see also Neville Thompson, The Anti- 
Appeasers. Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s (Oxford, 1971), p. 34. 
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II See Gannon, British Press, pp. 51-2; see also Morris, Roots, p. 34. 
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not mean, however, that he was out of touch with ministers and leading Conservatives. 
As well as conducting a vast correspondence with politicians and other newspaper 
controllers, he had further access to political opinions through The Observer's 
proprietor, Waldorf, 2nd Viscount Astor, and his wife Nancy, the Conservative MP. 
The Astors were famous political hosts, bringing together ministers and other 
public figures at Cliveden, their Berkshire country house. In the late 1930s a so-called 
`Cliveden Set' was made notorious by the radical newsletter The Week, edited by the 
Communist Claud Cockburn. He claimed that the politicians and `opinion formers' who 
visited Cliveden - including Lothian, Brand, Dawson, Londonderry, Halifax, Hoare and 
Simon -joined with the Astors in forming a group which manipulated foreign policy in 
pro-German directions. In a recent examination of these charges, Rose has described it 
as 4a classic conspiracy theory'. 15 In reality the `Cliveden set' was not a coherent group 
which acted together in shaping policy. Rather, most of those invited to Cliveden by the 
Astors were like-minded individuals, who happened to be in favour of coming to terms 
with Nazi Germany. Nor should it be supposed that The Observer was an organ for this 
supposed `Cliveden set'. Garvin was fiercely independently-minded and quite capable 
of disagreeing with his proprietor. Also, despite being linked with the `set' in Low 
cartoons, he was not a frequent visitor to Cliveden. 16 
The newspaper's circulation was about 214,000.17 Garvin and Astor were not 
overly concerned with increasing that figure, because their primary concerns were not 
profit-making. Astor had originally bought the paper in order to `get certain things 
done' - to promote the courses of a broadly progressive Conservatism, 
imperial 
integration, and Anglo-American friendship. As he stated to Garvin `you and I agree in 
fundamentals. To bring about what we want or believe in, some independent thought 
15 Rose, Cliveden, p. 5; also Cockett, Astor, p. 59. 
16 Stubbs, `Appearance and Reality', p. 330. 
17 Gannon, British Press, p. 51. 
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and the formation of sound opinion is essential'. 18 This combination of solid sales vet 
refusal to engage in circulation wars gave the newspaper the advantage of a financial 
independence which underpinned its editorial independence. 19 
Garvin and Astor agreed that Chamberlain's succession as prime minister 
represented the best possibility of achieving an Anglo-German settlement. In July 1937 
Garvin wrote that because Chamberlain had been `staunch on social reform', so he 
seemed to have the `right instinct for the main things in foreign affairs'. He hoped that 
Chamberlain would come to an agreement with Germany, at the expense of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, and thus exclude them from what he termed Britain's `contingent 
obligation' to Central Europe, under the Versailles Treaty. 20 Astor, too, saw the 
possibility of a fresh start in Anglo-German relations and suggested that Garvin should 
write articles `reminding the reader of some of the grosser mistakes of the Versailles 
and other treaties'. 21 
Garvin's criticism of Versailles was one reason why he had gained a reputation 
as a leading pro-German commentator, even to the point of appearing in the famous 
`Shiver Sisters' cartoon by David Low, next to Dawson, Lothian, and Nancy Astor, 
dancing to the propaganda of Goebbels. But did he deserve his place in the cartoon? 
And was he susceptible to influence of any kind? The Observer had a well-established 
perspective on Germany, supported nearly all the time by Astor. While this attitude 
undoubtedly generated independent support for Chamberlain, it was not at all a response 
to government pressure. Far from supporting the government unequivocally, after 
Munich The Observer became fiercely critical. 
18 Astor to Garvin, 27 December 1912, quoted in Stubbs, `Appearance and Reality', p. 330; see also 
Cockett, Astor, p. 77. 
19 See Stubbs, `Appearance and Reality', p. 320. 
20 Garvin to Astor, 19 July 1937, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 26. 
21 Astor to Garvin, 16 May 1937, quoted in ibid.. 
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*** 
The Abyssinian crisis was vital in determining Garvin's policy towards Europe 
in the late 1930s. Initially he believed that Italian Fascism, though hideous to the British 
mind, was a lesser evil than German National Socialism, and that Italy was essential to 
the stability of Europe in the face of Hitler. 22 Garvin, like members of the National 
government, had hoped and believed in 1934 that Mussolini shared French and British 
anxieties over Hitler's designs against Austria, and could be included in a co-ordinated 
attempt to check German ambitions, the `Stresa Front'. 23 However, the Abyssinian 
crisis separated Britain and France from Mussolini, and their antagonism not only ended 
the prospect of an anti-Nazi bloc but drove Mussolini towards association with Hitler. 
Faced with this setback, and acutely aware of Britain's military weakness, Garvin 
decided to support Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler. 
More particularly, the failure of League policy over Abyssinia forced Garvin to 
reconsider his stance over Austria. In summer of 1935, he had described Austria as `the 
keystone' of a lasting peace in Europe, and argued that the defence of its independence 
was `the acid test of British Policy'. 24 A year later his position had completely reversed: 
he now argued that a possible unification of Austria and Germany was `about the last 
question on earth in which British policy should dream of interfering'. 
25 As the Austrian 
crisis developed in February 1938, Garvin therefore urged some kind of cooperation 
between Austria and Germany, claiming that this was what the public wanted. 26 Such a 
stance was also the logical consequence of his political views on the injustice of the 
Versailles Treaty, which had separated the two countries: `[Austria] is riven with 
22 See Stubbs, `Appearance and Reality', p. 333. 
23 See Cowling, Impact, p. 125. 
24 Observer, 14 July 1935, p. 16, quoted in Morris, Roots, pp. 121-2. 
25 Observer, 22 November 1936, p. 16, quoted in Morris, Roots, pp. 123. 
26 Observer, 20 February 1938, p. 14. 
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discord. A powerful section passionately demands closer union with the Reich. Conflict 
would mean civil war. It is a family issue within the German race. We have nothing to 
do with it. ' 27 
Clearly Austria was no longer important to Garvin. Indeed, he thought that a 
solution to the Austrian problem `may even help the all-important cause of a Anglo- 
German settlement'. 28 Nevertheless, the precipitate and forceful manner in which Hitler 
conducted the Anschluss was a matter of concern, to which Garvin responded by urging 
that the British government `should extend [its] rearmament without delay'. 29 Still, for 
Garvin the Anschluss removed `an obstacle to European settlement', 30 and could be 
justified on the purpose of German `self-determination'. 31 
Garvin was unconcerned that Czech security was now fatally weakened; rather 
he represented Czechoslovakia as another `obstacle to European peace'. 
32 Long before 
other newspapers - and indeed the government - began to think hard about the 
Sudeten 
issue, The Observer proposed a solution. `The Bohemian Germans in 1919 were 
promised equality "on Swiss principles". The promise has not been kept. It has got to be 
fulfilled. ' 33 According to Garvin, reorganisation on the Swiss model - with local 
autonomy for each of its various nationalities - would result in the creation of a neutral 
state. 34 But the paper did not argue for secession or dismemberment of the area, because 
the strategic consequences were of such magnitude. This seemed of great importance to 
Garvin, because he was concerned about the way in which the European alliance 
systems might operate in the existing circumstances. Russia and France were 
bound by 
treaties to defend the integrity of Czechoslovakia. Although Britain had no such 
27 Ibid., 6 March 1938, p. 16. 
281bid., 20 February 1938, p. 14. 
29 Ibid., 13 March 1938, p. 16. 
30 Ibid., 20 March 1938, p. 14. 
3' Ibid., 20 March 1938, p. 14. 
32 Ibid., 30 March 1938, p. 141; see Morris, Roots, p. 124. 
33 Observer, 6 March 1938, p. 16; see also ibid., 20 March 1938, p. 14, and 27 March 1938, p. 21. 
34 Ibid., I May 1938, p. 16; see Morris, Roots, p. 145. 
148 
commitment, if a German intervention resulted in a French military response, the 
British government would probably feel bound to support the French and be drawn into 
war. 35 The Russian treaty was no less dangerous: it gave the Soviet government an 
opportunity to intervene in Central Europe, which might in turn encourage Soviet 
ambitions to invade Western Europe. The importance of rearmament and security for 
Garvin became increasingly clear over the month. He constantly attacked the 
government on the rearmament issue, in particular the air threat. `Though we are the 
most vulnerable people on earth to the new arm, instead of parity we have disparity. 
Instead of the parity promised more than three years ago we have disparity, humiliating, 
dangerous, and increasing. '36 
Through July and August 1938, Garvin's line was to welcome moves towards 
settlement of Sudeten demands. The Czechoslovakian government, he argued, would 
never make `sufficient concessions' to the Sudetens so long as it thought it could count 
on British support. 37 On the other hand, he rejected Hitler's proposals as a `reasoned 
amendment' to the Czechoslovakian government's suggestions. 38 Such attitudes were 
welcomed by Chamberlain, though at first he was less hopeful than Garvin about the 
prospects of a peaceful solution. `I wish I could have that conviction; I doubt if Garvin 
would be so confident if he had all my information. ' 39 In other words, Garvin was not 
being influenced by ministerial briefings. As well as continuing to recommend his own 
proposal of cantonal autonomy, 40 he was at this point actually in advance of 
Chamberlain's own expectations. Garvin also differed in his awareness of how far 
German actions were affecting British public opinion. `There is not one particle of 
35 Observer, 29 May 1938, p. 16; see Morris, Roots, p. 129. 
36 Observer, 8 May 1938, p. 18; see ibid., 15 May 1938, p. 16, where the state of British rearmament is 
described as: `We are sorry to have to call it an anti-climax. It is another chapter in the interminable story 
entitled "Too small and too slow". ' 
37 Observer, 29 May 1938, p. 16. 
38 Ibid., 24 July 1938, p. 14. 
39 Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 21 August 1938, NC 18/1/1064. 
40 Observer, 28 August 1938, p. 12. 
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sympathy any more with Germany. Not an atom. That's dead.... the Germans could not 
possibly have been clumsier ... 
[or] more egoistical. ' Indeed, he went so far as to state 
that the British daily press `no longer gives any true idea of the feeling of this 
country'. 
41 
As the crisis deepened during September, Garvin feared that 'a German 
onslaught on Czecho-Slovakia would be a deliberate and unparalleled destruction of the 
world's peace, and that it would be impossible for Britain to remain neutral'. 42 Yet at 
first he disliked The Times's suggestion that the Sudetenland should be ceded to 
Germany. This, he argued, would weaken Czechoslovakia, which in turn would weaken 
French security - again with potentially terrible consequences. Instead, as late as 11 
September he continued to propose that Czechoslovakia should transform itself into a 
second Switzerland, `decentralised but federalised, neutralised and guaranteed'. 43 Yet 
just one week later Garvin reversed his position, and now advocated secession: `Britain 
and the Empire will not go to war against the doctrine of self-determination. ' Even so, 
he hoped the government would engineer a `peace with honour', not `a peace of 
surrender'. 44 
In order to understand the shift in The Observer's position, Garvin's private 
thinking has to be examined. Although publicly supporting secession and 
Chamberlain's appeasement, the new crisis had much increased his suspicion of 
German ambitions and his private doubts about the prospect of Anglo-German 
reconciliation. But given his fears about the condition of British rearmament, he did not 
feel that he should press the case for resistance to German demands. At this point, the 
situation was so serious that Garvin was conscious of an editorial responsibility to 
41 Garvin to Lord Astor, 30 August 1938, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 64. 
42 Observer, 11 September 1938, p. 14. 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Ibid., 18 September 1938, p. 14. 
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exercise great restraint, in order to avoid complicating the negotiations and alarming (or 
inflaming) public opinion. There was, he told Astor, much that could not be said or 
`hinted at in print'. 45 Garvin was therefore among those newspaper controllers whom 
Cockett describes as `freely engaging in a conspiracy of silence based on a policy of 
self-censorship'. 46 Yet it should not be concluded, as Cockett does, that this was the 
effect of intervention by Hoare, or indeed by any other minister. Rather, from an acute 
sense of what he considered to be the pressing national interest of avoiding a European 
war, Garvin himself chose not to publish his worst fears but instead accepted what 
seemed to be the only possible means of preserving peace. The crucial words in 
Cockett's statement are `freely' and `self-censorship'. None of this meant that The 
Observer endorsed the whole of Chamberlain's analysis. During the crisis Astor was 
already looking to a reconstruction of the government on new principles: 
Britain was bound to lose face whatever happened now - that the best chance of 
restoring some kind of world position for ourselves and of regaining our self- 
respect was to set up a new and national Government for defence with a striking 
programme of increased output of aero engines ... to negotiate 
from strength. 47 
As he revealed a year later, the Czechoslovakian crisis had made him realise that Britain 
was dealing with `a more heavily armed gangster'. 
48 Garvin agreed, and even in The 
Observer hinted at the need for a new start and a firm stand: `The Nazi power last week 
threw off the mask before the British Prime Minister. ... 
They counted that their armed 
advantage had made them already the masters of the earth. Not yet. '49 Wickham Steed, 
former editor of The Times, grasped the change of opinion in Garvin's editorial: `You 
as Garvin to Astor, 21 September 1938, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 77. 
46 See ibid.. 
a' Astor to Garvin, 21 September 1938, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 146. 
48 Astor to John Stewart Bryan, 1 November 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 146. 
a9 See Observer, 25 September 1938, p. 14. 
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have lifted a load from my heart this morning. It has lain there many long days. ... Now, 
thank goodness, you have recaptured your old self. '5° 
Nevertheless, The Observer welcomed the Munich pact, and even described it as 
a sign for `healing statesmanship'. 51 Was this because of government influence? There 
is nothing in Chamberlain's diaries and letters to indicate any attempt to influence the 
Astors and Garvin at this time. Indeed, as Garvin confirmed to Amery's wife: 'I nne1'er 
ask to see Neville'. 52 In the same way as Chamberlain made his own decisions about 
British foreign policy, so Garvin independently came to his own conclusions on how to 
lead the paper. 53 Here, the relief of having avoided war was universal and was not only 
expressed in The Observer. It argued that the result was the `very best that could be 
achieved in the stern and stark circumstances'. 54 
There is simply no need to point to `government influence' as an explanation. 
The reason for The Observer's acceptance of the Munich pact is plain in its 
simultaneous calls for full-scale rearmament and immediate conscription - or as it stated 
a week later, if British and French armaments had `been as strong as their words, the 
world's recent ordeal would not have arisen at all'. 55 Instead, the power of the German 
air force had been `a dominant factor behind the ultimatums'. 56 Over the following 
months, Garvin appealed for unity between the political parties in support of stronger 
defence and demanded the creation of a Ministry of Supply and a National Register, in 
anticipation of conscription. `The crucial need is unity for defence. '57 
50 Steed to Garvin, 25 September 1938, quoted in Ayerst, Garvin, p. 269. 
st Observer, 2 October 1938, p. 11; see Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 583. 
52 Garvin to Mrs Amery, 4 October 1938, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 26. 
53 See Gannon, British Press, p. 5 1. 
54 Observer, 2 October 1938, p. 14 
ss Ibid., and Observer, 9 October 1938, p. 18. 
56 Ibid., 9 October 1938, p. 18. 
57 Ibid.. The Observer continued its criticism over the autumn, and the demand for a Ministry of Supply 
and National Register; see Observer, 16 October 1938, p. 18, Observer, 6 November1938, p. 16, and 
Observer, 13 November 1938, p. 16. 
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Moreover, Garvin and Astor disliked the reception of the Munich settlement in 
other newspapers. Garvin privately criticised the `hysterical raptures for Chamberlain'. 
in contrast, he noted, `we have written under the strictest reserve', demanding that 
`comment on many aspects must be rigorously postponed'. 58 Astor too was sensitive to 
the contrast, comparing his own newspaper's independence to what he assumed to be 
the ministerial `inspired dope in the Sunday Times'. 59 
The Observer's public acceptance of the Munich settlement, which might be 
seen to represent a high point of Chamberlainite influence over newspapers, was in 
reality anything but that. Munich was the moment that pushed Garvin into `the anti- 
appeasement camp'. 60 Privately, he was now critical of Chamberlain and his Cabinet, 
and of the conditions which he believed they had created: `this peace with humiliating 
weakness ... 
is something worse than I ever saw in my time'. 61 Even so, Garvin and 
Astor felt they had to continue general public support for the government, because as 
yet they could see no viable alternative, and because preserving as much political 
stability as possible seemed vital if rearmament was to be pressed forward in any 
form. 62 
Garvin linked the occupation of Prague in March 1939 with Chamberlain's 
shortcomings at Munich: by failing to stand up to Hitler, Czechoslovakia's fate had 
been decided. 63 His own disillusionment with Germany was now complete: `Most 
odious and intolerable is the systematic deception they [the Germans] employ in order 
to make dupes of those of us who have honestly wished to be friends. '64 It was now 
clear to him that Hitler was following the plan set out in Mein Kampf, which Garvin 
58 Garvin notes on `Correspondence and Documents Relating to Czechoslovakia', September 1938, 
quoted in Cockett, Twilight, pp. 82-3. 
59 Astor to Garvin, October (undated) 1938, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 83. 
60 Morris, Roots, p. 160. 
61 Garvin to Astor, 3 November 1938, quoted in Morris, Roots, p. 147; also Cockett, Twilight, p. 148. 
62 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 583. ok 
63 Observer, 19 March 1939, p. 16. 
64 Garvin to Astor, 16 March 1939, quoted in Morris, Roots, p. 160. 
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read in the full German version. 65 Consequently, The Observer abandoned anv 
remaining hope of agreement with Germany. 66 
Instead, Garvin proposed a `commitment for military action' with Russia and 
France: `the apostle of force' had to be `stopped and beaten by counterforce in the shape 
of a world's coalition'. 67 The shift in priorities was stark: for The Observer. Germany 
had replaced Russia as the greatest threat. For Garvin, to reach this conclusion, he had 
to overcome great doubts. As Ayerst wrote, Garvin `loved Russia' and valued the 
country as a power, but had strong reservations about its political system. 68 The 
divergence from Chamberlain's government became still more manifest with Garvin's 
scepticism towards the Polish guarantee: this, he implied, was inadequate - what was 
really needed was a Russian alliance. 69 
But this was as close as Garvin came to an open break with the British 
government, which still rejected the idea of an alliance with Russia. In private, however, 
he had no illusions about the government, and its attitude towards Germany. The events 
of the past have not changed its approach towards Germany, he told Astor: `I doubt 
whether the Cabinet yet comprehends the breadth and urgency of the business ... or the 
size of the game that Hitler is attempting'. At the same time he hoped for `the dramatic 
stroke' to complete an alliance with Russia. 70 
65 Observer, 26 March 1939, p. 16; see Gannon, British Press, p. 261. For Garvin reading Mein Kampf, 
see Morris, Roots, p. 5. 
66 A German Foreign Office official saw Garvin at Cliveden and recorded: `that it was better to end an 
honourable history of 800 years with a desperate struggle, rather than "allow oneself to be kicked around 
like a fool and a coward" (Garvin evidently believes war with Germany to be inevitable)', DGFP, Ser. D, 
vi, doc. 497, p. 684; also quoted in Gannon, British Press, p. 52. 
67 Observer, 26 March 1939, p. 16; see also ibid., 19 March 1939, p. 16. 
68 See Ayerst, Garvin, p. 177. 
69 See Observer, 9 April 1939, p. 10, and ibid., 2 April 1939, p. 14; see ibid., 14 May 1939, p. 12; see 
ibid, 4 June 1939, also 9 April 1939, p. 10. Privately he wrote: `These people here ought to have secured 
Russia first. Without that the Polish engagement would be the worst blunder in the history of our foreign 
policy except the sanctions against Italy in 1935', Garvin to Grigg, 20 June 1939, quoted in Ayerst, 
Garvin, p. 269. 
70 Garvin to Astor, 20 March 1939, quoted in Morris, Roots, p. 160. 
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Although Garvin and Astor were agreed in wanting changes in British foreign 
policy and greater drive in rearmament, at this point they began to diverge. Astor now 
sought wide-ranging reconstruction of the government, to include Liberal and Labour 
leaders. 7' Above all, he wanted Churchill included: this demand, he believed, was the 
most effective means of applying pressure on Chamberlain to revise his policies. In 
contrast Garvin continued to believe even now that - amidst a severely deteriorating 
international situation - as a responsible editor he should support the prime minister. 
Again, his appeal was to the national interest. It was `not possible for us to enable the 
Germans to say or think that the P. M. has lost the confidence of the country and that the 
nation is already split or splitting'. 72 Not just independently, but against the wishes of 
his proprietor, Garvin decided to omit comment and opinions which would weaken 
Chamberlain's position. His refusal to attack Chamberlain directly continued after the 
outbreak of war and right up to the end of Chamberlain's government in May 1940, to 
Astor's growing exasperation. 
Garvin's stand against Astor has wider significance. It demonstrates the force 
among editors of quality newspapers of the principles of press freedom and editorial 
responsibility -a freedom and a responsibility which might 
be exercised as much by 
restraint as by criticism, and which was associated with the conception of the national 
interest which outweighed other influences and pressures. Garvin had publicly 
reaffirmed these principles in March 1938, when explaining press restraint in conditions 
of possible war: 
no muzzling-order and no censorship can be imposed upon the freedom of the 
Press by any British Government. Upon the newspapers and the propagandist 
speakers themselves lies the duty of responsible restraint. Unless they exercise 
it 
with a sense of all that is at stake they may have blood on their hands. 
73 
71 See Cowling, Impact, p. 252. 
'2 Garvin to Astor, 10 July 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 148; see Cockett, Astor, p. 79 
73 Ohscrver, 6 March 1938, p. 16. 
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Not even the outbreak of war changed Garvin's attitude. When Astor called for a 
reconstruction of the government in May 1940, Garvin rejected this, stressing the need 
for `unity' in front of Germany. 74 All Astor could do was to watch how Garvin 
supported Chamberlain to the end, while Britain went into the catastrophe `united in 
silence'. 75 After Churchill had taken over the government, Garvin now 'pledged the 
paper to unquestioning loyalty to the new Prime Minister'. 76 He did so for the same 
reason that he had supported Chamberlain, that it was the duty of a responsible editor to 
support the government in times of crisis. When in August 1941 the paper's political 
correspondent praised Churchill in a report, Astor, who was a critic of Churchill, despite 
his support in the summer 1939, `instructed' Garvin to correct the correspondent. This 
attempt to interfere in the paper's policy was too much for Garvin. He replied: 
Your letter is an insult, almost unique, to the tradition of honest journalism in 
this country. ... 
I refuse to rebuke or suggestionise our parliamentary 
correspondent in that sense ... 
I am sick of these personal feuds that you are 
extending right and left from the Prime Minister down. I will have nothing to do 
with it. But the implication of your letter touch as well the standards of British 
journalism as they have been and shall be maintained by me. Shall be, so long as 
Responsible Editorship belongs to Your affectionate, Garve. 77 
In the light of this rebuttal, it is no wonder that Garvin's contract on The Observer was 
not renewed. 
*** 
Earlier in this chapter, reference was made to Low's `Shiver Sisters' cartoon. 
showing Garvin among those who danced to Goebbels's tune. This was certainly an 
74 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 149. 
75 Astor to Garvin, 3 May 1940, quoted in Cockett, Astor, p. 80. 
76 Cockett, Astor, p. 80. 
77 Garvin to Astor, 14 August 1941, quoted in Ayerst, Garvin, p. 271. 
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injustice to the man. 78 Garvin was never part of the `Cliveden set', and was resistant to 
influence which worked against his own judgment. 79 His problems with editorial 
freedom came from his proprietor, not from the government. He was a fiercely 
independent editor who flatly rejected the notion that an editor simply received 
instructions from his proprietor. This was evident each time a new contract was 
negotiated between them. In 1936, for instance, he wrote that if there comes to be any 
question of muzzle, gag or opinion in it, I must be free to leave and tell the country 
why'. 80 What Garvin insisted upon in his relations with his employer were no less 
evident in his relations towards the government. Given his criticism of the Versailles 
Treaty and desire for an understanding with Nazi Germany before Munich, he could 
certainly be labelled an appeaser. But while his views for long coincided with or were 
similar to those of Chamberlain's government, they were long-established and held 
independently of government influence. 8' 
78 Cockett, Astor, p. 79. 
79 See Gannon, British Press, p. 52. 
80 Garvin to Astor, 12 June 1936, quoted in Ayerst, Garvin, p. 266. 
81 See Cockett, Astor, p. 79. 
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CHAPTER VI 
`SERVING THE NATIONAL INTEREST': 
ARTHUR MANN AND THE YORKSHIRE POST 
The Yorkshire Post is significant because it provides a sensitive test for 
Cockett's claim about Chamberlainite `control' over British newspapers. The problems 
are evident even from Cockett's own text. The Post's editor, Arthur Mann (1919-39), 
can certainly be shown to have experienced political pressure. According to Cockett, it 
was Mann's misfortune that he was the editor of the one paper that was still financially 
run by and for the Conservative Party in Yorkshire. The paper did not have the capitalist 
independence that allowed other editors to pursue a less party-political line'. ' Aside 
from the implicit concession that other newspapers had greater editorial independence, 
the statement is interesting because elsewhere Cockett accepts that the paper was 
sceptical about the `party-political line': 
there was only one paper that attempted to give a true indication of the feeling of 
the country, and that was the Yorkshire Post ... 
Mann, did not suffer from any 
false sense of loyalty to Chamberlain, nor did he acquiesce in the latter's high- 
minded identification of himself with the cause of national unity. 
2 
The interest of the Yorkshire Post was also emphasised by Margach, which in his 
otherwise fierce criticism of the British press at this time described the Yorkshire Post 
as having `a robust independence', and by Koss, who claimed that of all the routinely 
Tory papers ... the 
Yorkshire Post went furthest towards disowning Chamberlain'. 
3 
These interpretative difficulties arose partly from the use of different sources. As 
Margach and Koss indicate - and as Cockett has to concede - the Post's 
independence 
1 Cockett, Twilight, p. 100. 
2 Ibid., p. 97. 
' Margach, Abuse, p. 53; Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 583. 
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was manifest in its published editorial views. But Cockett was the first historian to have 
access to Mann's private papers, which reveal disagreement with the chairman of the 
newspaper's proprietors, Rupert Beckett -a dispute which he identified with pressure 
from Conservative Central Office. However, careful re-examination of the sources 
reveals a more complex position; nor is there clear evidence of the assumed line of 
attempted influence from the Chamberlainites to Mann himself. 
The Yorkshire Post shared with the Liberal Manchester Guardian - considered 
in the next chapter - the distinction of being among the leading English regional 
newspapers. Although they had relatively low circulation figures compared with the 
national newspapers, they exercised a national influence which calls into question 
Koss's decision largely to omit the provincial press from his study, `because it received 
short shrift in reality'. 4 In fact, political leaders aware of the local bases of electoral 
politics knew very well that the best provincial newspapers mattered, a significance 
which meant that their views were quoted in foreign newspapers. 5 Baldwin, for instance, 
considered the provincial press to be valuable and effective as a counterweight to the 
national newspapers of the `press barons'. 6 The Yorkshire Post had long had good 
contacts with national Conservative leaders, who regarded it as generally reliable. It was 
in effect Halifax's local newspaper, and Mann had been consulted at critical periods by 
Baldwin and successive party chairmen. 7 
The paper's Conservative political credentials were evident in the name of its 
publishers - The Yorkshire Conservative Newspaper Association. 
It was based in Leeds. 
The high quality of its reportage and comment, combined with its Conservative 
4 Ibid., ii, p. 3. 
See Mildred A. Gibb and Frank Beckwith, The Yorkshire Post. Two Centuries (Bradford London, 
1941), 
p. 70. 
6 See Williamson, Baldwin, p. 80. 
See ibid. 
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perspective, had led to it being described as `The Times of the North of England'. 8 
Nevertheless, Mann was very much in the tradition of editors who regarded the national 
interest - not party loyalty alone - as the most important concern in a newspaper's 
editorial policy. In the context of the late 1930s, this meant `the safety of the realm is 
still the first principle of true Conservatism'. For Mann, the purpose of editorial 
responsibility and independence meant refraining from close personal contacts with 
politicians. Mann tried to emphasise his own independence by limiting his social 
contacts with both pro-appeasement politicians and critical voices. Accused of being too 
close to critics of the government, such as Eden, 9 he categorically denied any influence 
on the part of the former foreign secretary many times in public and in private. `I should 
like to take this opportunity of letting you know, and through you, any others who share 
this illusion, that Mr. Eden exerts no more influences on the policy of "The Yorkshire 
Post" than you do yourself, he replied on one occasion. 
10 This detachment included the 
rejection of political honours. In the 1920s he declined two such offers. His first letter of 
refusal, to Baldwin, indicates his attitude: `I feel that a journalist who receives a title, 
particularly if that title be suggested as a recognition of political services, may ... 
lessen 
his power to aid the cause he has at heart. ' 
11 
*** 
In the mid 1930s the Yorkshire Post shared an understanding of some of the 
achievements of Hitler's Germany, and sympathy with some of 
its grievances. 
8 See Mann report, no date, Mann papers, Ms. Eng c. 3274, fol. 227; also quoted 
in Gibb and Beckwith, 
Yorkshire Post, p. 44. 
9 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 387, arguing a close alliance between 
Mann and Eden; cf. Cockett, 
Twilight, p. 99, who denied closer political contact between both. 
10 Mann to Radcliffe, 16 June 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng c. 3274. For further 
denials of Eden's influence 
see Mann to Major Pearson, 2 March 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng c. 
3274, fol. 8, Mann to A. G. 
Hebblethwaite, 7 October 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng c. 3274, fol. 40. 
11 Mann to Baldwin, 27 December 1923, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 62. 
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Nevertheless, it supported a firm stand against German aggression. This should, it 
argued, be based upon collective security through the League of Nations. 'We cannot 
swerve from that policy without damaging our prestige and without plainly betraying 
those countries which so far have gone with us in pursuit of League policy. ' 2 Germany. 
it argued, could not complain about `encirclement' when it had withdrawn from the 
collective system by its own decision. The newspaper also strongly supported British 
rearmament, because it believed that the British government could only hope to play an 
effective role in European and League of Nations affairs from a position of strength. If 
Britain's position was clear and strong, it would be up to Germany to decide how to 
react. 
While the Yorkshire Post initially considered some German grievances to be 
justified, it objected strongly to the occupation of the Rhineland's demilitarised zone by 
Hitler's army in March 1936. In the paper's view, this event revealed much about the 
aggressive nature of Hitler's regime and should be regarded as a clear breach of the 
Locarno Treaty, which the Germans had signed voluntarily - not to mention a 
repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles. In its assessment of Hitler's move, the Post 
declared that `we cannot insulate ourselves against the effects on the Continent, because 
the peace of Europe may be endangered by this action, and the peace of Europe is 
Britain's most immediate personal concern'. 13 Such words represented a firm stand 
against the `isolationism' so vehemently supported by Beaverbrook and his newspapers. 
The paper argued that there was a direct correlation between Germany's strength and 
Britain's weakness, a result of its attachment to `pacifism': `we believe Herr Hitler has 
depended to a very large extent upon the known desire of the Government and the 
people of this country to seek peace and ensure it, and in all circumstances to prefer 
12 See Gibb and Beckwith, Yorkshire Post, pp. 81-2. 
13 Quoted in ibid., p. 83. 
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conciliation and negotiation to the pre-war methods of provocation'. 14 But, the paper 
continued, `to avoid the catastrophe which German action has brought dangerously 
near', Britain had to rearm. In doing so the newspaper joined the articulate advocates of 
rearmament in Parliament. `We pay a price for democracy. If it is not to be too high. 
then the people themselves must rally without reserve to the support of the Government' 
in taking necessary defensive measures. 15 
From these perspectives, after the Anschluss Mann made the Post a critic of the 
British government. It had failed to appreciate that Hitler's action followed the plan 
outlined in Mein Kampf. The Cabinet was `unfitted to grasp' the realities of foreign 
policy, basing its policy on 'illusion'. 16 The Yorkshire Post urged the government to 
issue a firm public declaration of its determination to keep the peace, backed by a sharp 
increase in rearmament. 17 It even went so far as to express sympathy with Churchill's 
attacks on the Cabinet and defence policies. 18 
These statements worried the Post's proprietors, who, after all, assumed that the 
newspaper's political raison d'etre was to support the Conservative party and its leader. 
Beckett told Mann that he had read `with growing concern day-by-day the Y. P. leaders 
devoted to foreign policy'. He also detected a desire to have Chamberlain `replaced', an 
objective with which he did not think the paper should be associated. He asked Mann 
not to persist with his criticism, especially because these would increase Chamberlain's 
difficulties in responding to difficult international conditions. 
19 Mann's reaction was 
best stated in a reply to similar observations by another member of the board of 
directors. `I have always enunciated "Yorkshire Post" policy as Editor without receiving 
'a Ibid. [same article]. See Mann to E. J. Radcliffe, 16 and 22 June 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng c. 
3274. 
15 Quoted in Gibb and Beckwith, Yorkshire Post, p. 83. 
16 Yorkshire Post, 16 March 1938, p. 8; Yorkshire Post, 17 March 1938, p. 8. See also Mann to Radcliffe, 
22 June 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng c. 3274. 
1' See Yorkshire Post, 15 March 1938, p. 10; 16 March 1938, p. 8; 21 March 1938, p. 8. 
18 See Ibid., 16 March, p. 8. 
19 Beckett to Mann, 23 March 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng c. 3274; see Cockett, Twilight, p. 61. 
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any instructions from the Directors.... I have offered my personal judgement after most 
careful study, on important national issues - not always on strict party lines'. In the 
present case, his conclusion was that `Mr. Chamberlain's policy ... 
is dangerous to the 
national interest'. 20 
A few days later Mann had an interview with Chamberlain himself. 
Unfortunately the sources do not reveal who took the initiative in arranging the meeting, 
and therefore who was trying to influence whom. Was this a prime example of 
Chamberlain personally trying to influence a newspaper? Or was it a case of a 
newspaper editor trying to influence the prime minister? The tone of Chamberlain's 
comments suggest that the initiative came from Mann; and if Chamberlain did regard 
the meeting as a opportunity to put pressure on an editor, it is striking how unsuccessful 
he was. Mann pressed Chamberlain to take a firm stand against the dictators, and to 
make a bold declaration which would rally the democratic nations in an effort to avert 
war. 21 Attempting to reinforce his appeal, he also reminded Chamberlain of earlier 
occasions - notably the abdication crisis - when, in contrast to other newspapers, the 
Yorkshire Post had judged the `public opinion' correctly. 
Chamberlain was normally sensitive and careful with editors, including those 
from the provinces - and not just those of the Conservative newspaper in his own region, 
the Birmingham Post, which he had long cultivated. Yet he was unusually dismissive 
with Mann. Chamberlain not only refused to respond to Mann's criticism. According to 
Mann's later recollection he said he was `much to busy to read the provincial 
newspapers', and cut Mann short by saying `I'm afraid I have an appointment at 11.1 5, 
20 Mann to Pearson, 23 March 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng. c. 3274 fol. 8. 
21 See Mann memo `Interview with Neville Chamberlain', 21 March 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng. 
c. 3274; see Cockett, Twilight, pp. 63-4, who dates the interview on 27 March 1938. 
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and it is now 11.14'. 22 All this may have been another instance of Chamberlain's 
impatience with and rejection of criticism. But it may also have indicated that he 
understood that there was no point in trying to alter Mann's views - that he was immune 
to such influence. 
*** 
During the Czechoslovakian crisis, the Yorkshire Post continued to offer 
constructive criticism not just on foreign policy, but also on the character of the Cabinet 
- calling for inclusion of the opposition party leaders in a broader, reconstructed 
government. 23 Nevertheless, like other editors - and indeed politicians - he felt the 
European situation had become so serious that it was desirable to exercise temporary 
restraint. As he commented to his diplomatic correspondent at a particularly sensitive 
moment, `we can only deal, I think, tonight with the Godesberg meeting in our 
restrained style on the general lines that the omens are not propitious'. 24 Similarly, he 
commented privately to Churchill about a point of criticism on government policy that 
for `patriotic reasons we may not say so' publicly. 25 Of wider significance was an 
earlier withdrawal, by mutual agreement, of an article analysing the mentality of the 
dictators by the former under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Cranborne. 
26 As 
Cranborne explained: 
The situation has become so delicate that I doubt whether an article on these 
lines is just now justifiable - we don't want to say anything to exacerbate the 
22 Fleet Street, Press Barons and Politics. The Journals of Collin Brooks, 1931-1940, ed. by Nick 
Crowson (London, 1998), pp. 263-4 (11 February 1940). 
23 See Yorkshire Post, 9 September 1938, p. 8. 
'' Mann to Tower, 22 September 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274 fols. 36-7. 
25 Mann to Churchill, quoted in Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. v, p. 969; see also Martin 
Gilbert, 
Winston S. Churchill, vol. v Companion part 3 Documents. The Coming of War, 1936-1939 
(London, 
1982), pp. 1132-3. 
.6 See Cranborne to Mann, 6 August 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 5236. 
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Germans at a moment when they are hovering between peace and war. Nor 
would it be helpful to say anything of a critical nature about the Government, 
who seem now, when we have reached the crisis, to be doing extraordinary 
well. 27 
This comment is of particular interest because Cranborne had resigned from the 
government with Eden in February 1938, and was increasingly regarded as a leading 
anti-appeaser. When even such a figure as this temporarily withheld public comment, it 
becomes especially hard to consider similar restraint by newspapers as necessarily an 
effect of government pressure. 
Mann found it difficult to write positively about the Munich settlement, but was 
encouraged by Beckett to do so. Beckett urged him to consider it as representing 
`success so far' for Chamberlain's policy, and that this attitude should now guide the 
Yorkshire Post's editorial comment. `It is our duty loyally to support this policy and to 
cease personal criticisms which alienate Conservative opinion and with which I do not 
agree. ' 28 Yet however uneasy Beckett was about Mann's attitudes, he continued to 
support him when faced with complaints from readers. He justified Mann's earlier 
criticism by stating that the government had `been somewhat tardy in realising the very 
serious trend of events', argued that no personal attack on Chamberlain was intended, 
and declared that if his policy proved successful, `we shall be second to none in 
recognising Mr. Chamberlain's achievement'. 29 
On this occasion, in recognition again of the delicacy of the international 
position, but also of the general public relief that war had been avoided, Mann heeded 
Beckett's suggestion. He welcomed the Munich agreement as a `well-deserved 
acknowledgment of the personal courage' of Chamberlain, confining himself to the 
Z7 Cranborne to Mann, 31 August 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng. c. 5236. 
28 Beckett to Mann, 30 September 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274 fol. 39. 
29 Beckett to J. W. Clifford Walton, 29 September 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274, fol. 38. 
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qualification that `we have yet to fathom all the consequences'. 30 Nevertheless, within a 
few days the Post was commenting on `The Price of Peace' - the problems left 
unresolved by the Munich agreement - and calling again for a reconstruction of the 
government on a new all-party, national, basis. 31 Such a call was an implicit criticism of 
Chamberlain, an assertion that his government was not representative, and that it should 
be made so by inclusion of critics of the Munich agreement; and it came at a time when 
Chamberlain had been happy to regard the widespread support expressed for Munich as 
proof of national unity, and evidence that any such reconstruction was unnecessary. 
By early November, the Post argued that Hitler had displayed no real desire for 
peace and was still attached to `the doctrine of force', and that British policy amounted 
to little more than `a policy of continual retirement'. 32 From this point, the pressure on 
Mann grew considerably. Both he and Beckett were receiving more complaints from 
important figures in Yorkshire Conservatism. Beckett himself told Mann that he got the 
impression that the editor emphasized news critical of Chamberlain. `Day after day the 
Yorkshire Post takes up an attitude more critical to the Government than any paper 
calling itself Conservative has any right to adopt. ' 33 In November the executive 
committee of the York Conservative Association joined a resolution protesting against 
`the anti-Government attitude adopted by The Yorkshire Post', and alleging that its 
articles were `doing a signal disservice to the country in general and to the Conservative 
Party in particular'. 34 It is possible that some of these complaints were inspired by 
ministers or central party organisers -a point important for Cockett's argument about 
pressure from the government, that is to say from national leaders in London. Yet no 
30 Yorkshire Post, 1 October 1938, p. 10; see Cockett, Twilight, p. 80. 
31 See Yorkshire Post, 3 October 1938, p. 8, and Ibid., 5 October 1938, p. 17 October 1938, p. 8,18 
October 1938, p. 10. 
32 Yorkshire Post, 1 November 1938, p. 8; see also 8 November 1938, p. 10. 
33 Beckett to Mann, 10 November 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274 fols. 44-5; see Cockett, Twilight, 
p. 98. 
34 See Yorkshire Post, 26 November 1938, p. 8; see Gibb and Beckwith, Yorkshire Post, p. 87. 
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proof of this has been found, and Cockett can only offer the assertion that 'Beckett was 
a well-known figure in national Conservative circles and would have been in contact 
with Conservative Central Office'. 35 It is just as likely that the complaints were the 
spontaneous reactions of Beckett and other Yorkshire Conservatives. Beckett was 
probably also motivated by his awareness that the newspaper's sales were falling. As a 
businessman he was bound to be sensitive of fears that the paper's political views could 
be alienating readers. 
Mann's reaction to the complaints was to reiterate publicly that freedom of 
speech involved the right to criticise `authority', by which he meant the Conservative 
party - and that party loyalty was too narrowly interpreted when the safety of the realm 
was at stake. 36 Privately he was now prepared to criticise Chamberlain personally, 
accusing him of 
making of political capital for the party over the greater national interest ... the 
situation would never have become so grave but for blindness as to 
Chamberlain's incapacity due to party loyalty. And by the same token those who 
would spread the truth and restore sanity are now asked to be silent! 
37 
On 8 December 1938 Mann went still further by publishing an article entitled The 
Yorkshire Post and Foreign Policy', replying to those critics whom it described as 
`Conservatives who are surprised to see a Conservative newspaper attacking the policy 
of a Conservative Prime Minister'. Although it conceded that Chamberlain `could not 
have acted differently at Munich', it condemned the succession of errors that had led to 
the agreement. 38 It declared that Chamberlain had endangered the safety of Britain 
for 
35 Cockett, Twilight, p. 64. 
36 See Yorkshire Post, 26 November 1938, p. 10. 
37 Mann to Forbes Adam, 30 November 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274, fols. 47-S4: see 
Cockett. 
Twilight, pp. 87-88. 
38 Yorkshire Post, 8 December 1938, p. 8. 
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the sake of a Party advantage'. 39 In a further article Mann stressed that in expressing 
these views our aim throughout has been to contribute to national unity and strength. To 
keep silence on causes of dissension and distrust cannot further this aim, and would be 
nothing less than a failure in patriotic duty. ' 40 It criticised Chamberlain because in 
`repeatedly surrendering to force, he has repeatedly encouraged aggression', and 
described him as `by nature unfitted to deal with dictators'. Although the paper would 
give Chamberlain the benefit of the doubt if he now abandoned appeasement, it stated 
that `it is because we believe that Mr Chamberlain's policy is even now threatening the 
safety of the realm, and it is likely in the near future to threaten it with danger still 
graver, that we are stating in some detail our case against it' .4 
These criticisms of the prime minister and party leader were so forthright that it 
is hardly surprising that Mann now came under real pressure from his employers. 
Beckett declared that this direct attack on Chamberlain `put the lid on' their 
disagreement over editorial policy, and that Mann had `no right ... to publish these 
extreme comments against the P. M. as the considered opinions of the Y. P'. He accused 
Mann of now being at the same level as an outright opponent of the government 
`alongside the Sinclair Liberals, the Labour Party, and the Manchester Guardian'. His 
letter even implied that his resignation might be welcome: 
I will no longer be a part of the `bounding down' of the P. M. day by day, and 
this must cease. I have heard you say more than once that you will never `write 
to orders'; well, if you consider this letter to be an ultimatum to that effect you 
will of course make your decision as to the course you will adopt. 
42 
Then, shortly afterwards, the newspaper's board of directors intervened, provoked 
further by Mann's publication of a pamphlet - Appeasement or Peril? - which was still 
39 Ibid.; reprinted in Appeasement or Peril?, Mann papers, Ms. Eng. c. 3274, fols. 97-9; see Gibb and 
Beckwith, Yorkshire Post, p. 86 
40 Yorkshire Post, 8 December 1938, p. 8: `Encouragement of Aggression' 
4! Ibid. 
42 Beckett to Mann, 8 December 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274, fols. 59-60. 
168 
more critical of Chamberlain's policy. 13 Beckett told Mann that the board was 'fed 
up ... with this steady spate of personal criticism and recrimination'. He again , earned 
against `this continuing exploitation of the lurid obsession ... against the P. M. ... 
[which] is damaging to yourself. 44 
In response, Mann justified himself by arguing that the criticisms were not his 
alone: `I am not creating lack of confidence [in Chamberlain's policy], but registering 
it'. He also attacked those who valued the fate of the Conservative party as higher than 
`the fate of an Empire! !' He too hinted at the possibility of resignation: `Does the Board 
want its Editor to exercise honest and sound judgement or doesn't it? If it wishes me to 
suppress or ignore facts and evidence that prove the miscalculations of the P. M. you 
will require another Editor'. Mann was also prepared to generalise the issue, and to 
issue a counter-accusation against his critics. 
But the unfairness of any such implied criticism of my conduct of the "Y. P. " is a 
matter that raises an issue of much greater importance than my own particular 
fate. It is this; whether it is in the true interests of a Democratic country that 
honest expressions of opinion by Editors and experts trained to study public 
affairs should be stifled by newspaper proprietors who take their inspiration 
from interested Ministers or their agents or relatives. Judgements on Foreign 
45 Policy should be exercised above Party loyalties. 
In late December Mann summarised his argument with the chairman and other directors 
of the Yorkshire Conservative Newspaper Association. `We criticise or support 
Government policy whether it be in relation to Foreign Affairs or Rearmament from the 
standpoint of what best serves the national interest in our honest judgement'. 
Consequently, Mann argued, `the "Y. P. " does not serve any "master" ... 
if, by that, is 
meant uncritical support of any Government or Minister'. He was now particularly 
troubled at learning that Hoare tried to persuade Stanley Jackson -a 
former 
43 See `Appeasement of Peril? ', Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274, fols. 94-103. 
44 Beckett to Mann, 14 December 1938, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274, fols. 67-68; on episode see also 
Cockett, Twilight, pp. 98-9. 
45 Mann to Beckett, 15 December 1938, Mann Papers, Ms. Eng. c. 3274 fols. 69-71. 
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Conservative party chairman, and a Post director - to interfere with the newspaper's 
editorial policy. This confirmed his suspicion that `an effective censorship ma}, operate 
through subtler channels - for instance, through social contacts between newspaper 
proprietors and persons highly placed in Government circles'. He made it absolutely 
clear, however, that he had no intention of changing his style of editorship: 'I have 
never once been guided by any other principle than what I truly conceived to be the 
national interest, and I am not likely to depart from that guiding principle now. '46 
In a leading article in the New Year - entitled `A Newspaper's First Duty' - 
Mann made these accusations about newspaper-government relations public. He argued 
that the British public was no longer content with the newspaper coverage of events, 
and cited the growing number of newsletters as proof. He criticised newspapers which, 
although not directly influenced by ministers, were guided by the `social contacts' of 
their owners. He accused those proprietors of turning their newspapers into organs of 
government propaganda', which did not serve the best interest of the country. 
47 
Beckett was now in an extremely difficult position, fearing that he would be 
`pilloried 
... as responsible 
for opinions in the paper which people either ascribed to my 
instigation, or charged to my lack of control'. 
48 Yet he did not insist on Mann's 
resignation, as he might have done if he really had been subject to or sensitive towards 
ministerial or national party pressures. Despite his own considerable misgivings, he 
even now continued to defend Mann in public. At the Yorkshire Conservative 
Newspaper Association's annual general meeting in February 1939 he stated that the 
paper's policy was based on reason and experience, not on hasty decisions. 
Against 
Mann's critics he declared that `in so far as you ask me to say anything which will tie 
the hands of this newspaper and prevent it from giving free and honest expression of 
its 
46 Mann to Beckett, 29 December 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng. c. 3274 fols. 74-6. 
4' Yorkshire Post, 3 January 1939, p. 6. 
48 Beckett to Mann, 1 February 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 100. 
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views on policy which may be vital to this country, I shall not sit here and consent to 
that'. 49 Afterwards he privately commented to Mann that `I think my reply was logical 
and fortified the independent attitude of our paper. I am pleased to gather from what you 
say in your letter that you are in agreement with this'. 50 
If any minister had indeed attempted to influence the outcome, this can only 
have increased their evident surprise at finding the chairman and editor in `agreement'. 
For example, Hoare had expected Mann to be publicly rebuked, because no other 
newspaper `tried to do Chamberlain more harm than the Yorkshire Post in recent 
months'. Indeed, Beckett's speech seemed `simply a brief provided for him by Mann'. 51 
These reactions underline the leading feature of the episode - that for all Beckett's 
doubts, in the end he thought it to be in the newspaper's interests that editorial 
independence should be upheld. Even a Conservative-controlled newspaper could take 
an independent line, critical of the party leadership. 
After Hitler's invasion of the remnant of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939. all 
hopes for a peace in Europe lay in ruins. The Yorkshire Post had long criticised the 
British government for lack of leadership and urged it to take a firm stance against 
further Nazi aggression, 52 but it saw no immediate solution to what it considered to be 
one of the inevitable `Fruits of Munich'. 53 Since nothing could be done about the 
international situation, Mann took issue with the state of the British public opinion. 
Only a few days before in a press briefing, Chamberlain had spoken of a hopeful future 
in international relations. For Mann, such words meant that the public was not prepared 
49 Yorkshire Post, 25 February 1939, p. 9; see Gibb and Beckwith, Yorkshire Post, p. 87. 
so Beckett to Mann, 25 February 1939, Mann papers Ms. Eng. c. 3274 fol. 123. 
s1 Hoare to Dawson, 28 February 1939, Templewood papers Box x(4); quoted also in Cockett, Tit'ilight, 
p. 100. 
52 See Yorkshire Post, 11 January 1939, p. 8, and 30 January 1939, p. 8. 
53 See ibid., 14 March 1939, p. 8. 
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for possible conflict: in his view, there was `an extremely dangerous complacency in the 
nation'. 54 
In the end, however, Mann did resign - but only after the outbreak of war, and 
then chiefly because of the newspaper's financial problems. Beckett believed that the 
paper's growing deficit demonstrated that `it is futile to go on vainly attempting the sale 
of a newspaper in a form and style that the public have shown consistently that they do 
not want'. 55 Some directors suggested that the paper was losing money because of its 
long and critical leaders. But Mann drew the opposite conclusion from the complaints 
he had suffered after Munich: 
this pronounced and avowed attachment to the party has not helped our 
circulation ... 
I have no hesitation ... 
in saying that this blatant attempt to 
muzzle the newspaper in the supposed interest of the Conservative Party was 
harmful to that reputation for honest independence of judgement that any great 
journal must preserve, if it is to live. 56 
Beckett's solution to the financial problem was to merge the Yorkshire Post with the 
Leeds Mercury. Mann refused to accept the merger and to edit the amalgamated 
newspaper, believing it would lead inevitably to a lowering of journalistic quality. 
57 
*** 
The case of the Yorkshire Post is a prime example of government-newspaper 
relations in which an independent-minded editor was able to persist 
in the face of 
considerable pressures. There was a fierce dispute over editorial policy 
between the 
proprietors and the editor, in which Mann successfully preserved his freedom to criticise 
sa Ibid., 29 March 1939, p. 8. 
ss Beckett to Mann, October (undated) 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 128. 
56 Mann, Memo on Business, 2 October 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 
128. 
57 Ibid.; for Mann's resignation see report by Mann, no date, Mann papers Ms. 
Eng. c. 3274 fols. 227-29, 
Cockett, Twilight, pp. 127-9; Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 596-7. 
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not just government policy, but also the prime minister personally - presenting his case 
so well that even Beckett felt that he had to support the principle of editorial 
responsibility. 58 Mann met his critics with appeals not just to a national interest larger 
than party loyalty but also to press freedom, and with accusations of `overnment 
pressure. 59 These accusations are grist to the mill for those who argue that a `free press 
was suborned by the government. Yet, aside from the absence of firm evidence of such 
government intervention, Beckett and his fellow directors had adequate reasons of their 
own for being concerned about Mann's editorial policies. And whatever the influences 
and pressures, Mann was not silenced during the appeasement period. 
58 See Mann to Beckett, 22 February 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 100; 
for public statements, see 
Yorkshire Post, 2 March 1938, p. 8, and 11 March 1938, p. 10. 
59 See Mann to Beckett, 29 December 1938, Mann papers, Ms. Eng. c. 3274 
fols. 74-6; see also Mann to 
Beckett, 9 November 1938, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 63. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
Even more than the Yorkshire Post, the Manchester Guardian was a regional 
newspaper with a national - and still wider - reputation. Always identified with the 
Manchester tradition of free-trade internationalism, during C. P. Scott's long and 
distinguished editorship (1872-1929) it had become the most respected Liberal quality 
newspaper, in a real sense embodying the conscience of progressive Liberalism. One 
indication of its significance is that both Scott and W. P. Crozier (editor 1932-1944) 
were, during their occasional visits to London, accorded privileged, confidential 
interviews with leading politicians, civil servants and diplomats (Commonwealth and 
foreign, as well as British). ' Another is that the paper was read by political leaders of 
all parties: in 1938 Halifax told Crozier that he read `the Yorkshire Post out of 
territorial loyalty, but I read the Manchester Guardian in any case', 2 and that `he had 
been for some time studying [its] criticism of the Government's foreign policy'. 
3 
Indeed, the newspaper was said to have `an international reputation as the Liberal 
counterpart of The Times'. 4 Yet for the 1930s the Manchester Guardian has received 
less examination than other leading newspapers. Ayerst's general history of the paper 
did not attempt a critical evaluation of its attitudes on foreign policy. Huttner. s 
detailed study of the Guardian as well as The Times shed new light on its responses to 
changing conditions within Germany, but focused mainly on the German church 
struggle. Otherwise the paper is used to augment broader studies of the press 
in the 
1930s, but Koss is sparing in his references to it and although Gannon gave it 
1 See Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1928, ed. T. Wilson (London, 1970), and 
Cro_ier Interviews. 
2 Crozier Interviews, p. 80 (12 July 1938). 
See Crozier to Voigt, 28 July 1938, Manchester Guardian Archive [hereafter: MGA] 220'64a. 
4 Political and Economic Planning, Report on the British Press 
(London, 1938), p. 48. 
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comparatively generous treatment, he offered no sustained explanation of the 
newspaper's editorial line. Cockett attempted to place the Guardian within his general 
argument about newspapers yielding to government pressure, accusing Crozier of 
`faithfully 
... supporting Chamberlain's efforts for peace' and aiming to help these `in 
any way he could'. 5 But this verdict paid insufficient attention to both the paper's 
history and the editor's background. It also failed to address A. J. P. Taylor's statement 
that `no English editor stood up to the impact of Hitler more firmly' than Crozier. 6 
Although the Manchester Guardian had given the Liberal party general support, 
the paper had never been officially connected with it, and as the party fragmented and 
declined after 1916 its perspectives had become even more independent. 7 Then, in 1936, 
the newspaper's ownership was reconstructed as a trust, probably following the 
example of The Times. Although Koss suggested that this step was taken as a `safeguard 
against the Inland Revenue', 8 it seems more likely that it was taken to guarantee 
permanent editorial independence. In 1947 J. R. Scott, the governing director, stated that 
on editorial matters the board had no influence and refrained from taking part in 
editorial decisions. 9 Moreover, it was not the Guardian philosophy to run the paper 
purely as a profit-making exercise, but to act as a public service by espousing calm, 
rational and moral guidance to its readers-10 Consequently, the Guardian editor was the 
sole arbiter of editorial policy; and the newspaper's integrity was such that once a policy 
course had been decided, it would maintain this line for as long as it believed it to be 
right, irrespective of the effect on circulation or advertising revenue. As a truly 
independent and nationally-respected organ of opinion located outside London, free 
s Cockett, Twilight, p. 77. 
6 Crozier Interviews, p. xx. 
7 See Gannon, British Press, p. 75. 
8 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 554. 
9 See Royal Commission on the Press, Minutes of Evidence (1 1 December 1947), qq. 3934.3935:. \ýerst, 
Guardian, p. 495. 
10 Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 154. 
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from party connections and the network of connections so prevalent between the press 
and politicians, the Guardian had a unique place within the British press. " 
Since the Great War the newspaper had been committed to several basic 
positions on European affairs. It argued for revision of the Treaty of Versailles - 
Crozier himself believed that `Germany never had a "square deal"' - and during the 
1920s had been regarded as Germany's `consistent friend', wanting it to be fully, 
reintegrated into the European states system. 12 It criticised the French government's 
rejection of German demands for equality. 13 It also expressed one of the central 
features of the Liberal conscience of the time: the desire to avoid another European 
war, at almost any cost. It was devoted to the League of Nations and the principle of 
collective security, as an improved method of international diplomacy and a means to 
maintain peace. Crozier was convinced that Germany - even Nazi Germany - had to 
be an important part of any lasting European settlement, and that consequently the 
regime could not simply be dismissed as being beyond civilised means. 14 In the 
broadest sense, therefore, the paper had been committed to `appeasement' long before 
Chamberlain's premiership. 
Yet as a very self-consciously Liberal newspaper, it had from the advent of the 
Nazi regime expressed strong criticism of Hitler's domestic policy, especially the 
pressure on German churches and persecution of the Jews. Crozier regarded it as his 
and the Guardian's special duty to keep the evidence of the regime's harshness in the 
minds of the British public, all the more so whenever other British newspapers 
lost 
11 See Crosier Interviews, pp. xix-xx, xxiv; Ayerst, Guardian, pp. 494-500; Koss, Rise and Fall, 
ii, p. 
466. 
12 Crozier to Werth, 24 March 1936, MGA 215/171; Ayerst, Guardian, p. 507; Huttner, 
Britische Presse, 
242. 
E. g. Crozier to Voigt, 28 January 1935, MGA 213/52. 
14 See Gannon, British Press, p. 79. 
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interest in them. 15 Crozier's belief that Scott had been slow to uncover the truth about 
German intentions before 1914 explains much about his own attitude in the 1930s: 
C. P. S. [cott] had such a profound belief in the goodness of human nature. 
everybody's human nature, that he would just not believe that there was an 
important section in Germany who were a real danger to peace;... I want so far 
as ever possible to work for peace and good understanding, but at the same 
time to be quite realistic in describing the situation. We shall get into trouble 
with many people, but we are bound to do that anyway. 16 
He never had any doubt that it was his duty to tell the whole truth, so far as he could 
discover it, about what was happening inside Germany. The contrast with the editors 
of the other quality papers is striking: they were sometimes reluctant to print all they 
knew, and hesitated to comment on the internal politics of Nazi Germany. As an 
unrelenting critic of Hitler's regime, among the many opponents of the Third Reich 
the Manchester Guardian gained in prestige at the expense of The Times. Within 
Germany, it became the British newspaper most frequently confiscated by the 
authorities, and was finally banned from import altogether on 23 September 1936.1' In 
the difficult task of urging peace while exposing the true character of Nazism, Crozier 
could use his own comprehensive knowledge of European politics. He could also call 
upon the expertise of Frederick Voigt, the special correspondent, who as a reporter in 
Germany from 1920 to 1933 had become an authority on German domestic affairs and 
established his own network of sources there. 
'8 
Long before Hitler came into power Voigt had grasped not only the brutal 
reality of National Socialism but also the problems this posed 
for the Manchester 
15 E. g Crozier to Werth, 6 February 1933, Manchester Guardian Archive, 
[hereafter MGA], 207/53b; 
Ayerst, Guardian, p. 517; Huttner, Britische Presse, passim. 
16 Crozier to Voigt, 25 Januaryl934, MGA 211/23; See also Gannon, British Press, pp. 
76-7. 
17 See Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 239; Holzweissig, Deutschlandbild, p. 58. 
18 Crozier Interviews, pp. xix-xxiv; and for Voigt, Angela Schwarz, Die Reise ins 
Dritte Reich. Britische 
Augenzeugen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (1933-39) 
(Göttingen-Zürich, 1993); AN erst. 
Guardian, pp. 501-503; Gannon, British Press, pp. 80-88; 
Richard Albrecht, T. A. Voigts 
Deutschlandberichte im `Manchester Guardian' (1930-1935)', Publizistik 
31 (1986), pp. 108-117. 
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Guardian. He was acutely aware of the difficulty of conveying to a British readership 
an adequate image of the Hitler phenomenon: 
the German situation ... 
is so abnormal - or at least must seem so to English 
people - that I fear the driest account of it must seem like a piece of sensationalism. ... I have described him as mildly y as possible in my article, 
simply because I want to avoid raising incredulity. 
Directly after Hitler's seizure of power Voigt had no doubt that a 'terrorist' system had 
taken control in Germany, and that the Nazi regime would now try to increase its 
power without any consideration for democratic means. In his coverage from Central 
Europe he stressed that the `Brown Terror' in Germany was far worse than the 
Communist terror: 
there is a Terror -a Terror is an organised thing, organised from top to bottom. 
It is systematic, and, while there are individual outrages too, it is war and a 
particularly ferocious one, a war against everything the Guardian has ever 
stood for, a war against people who are now unarmed and helpless. 20 
In contrast to many of his colleagues Voigt saw the terror not as a mere side-effect of a 
revolutionary change in Germany, but as a constitutive element of National Socialist 
rule. `Goering and Hitler are the chief Terrorists and all they object to (and even this is 
by no means sure) is to certain forms it takes', he explained to the editorial staff .2 
'He 
was convinced that Germany posed a threat to Britain, and even before the Rhineland 
crisis stressed the need for greater armament to protect Britain's interest and security: 
`If we were not rearming, Germany would certainly prepare to attack France, leaving 
her eastern plans until later. If war is averted at all, it will be British rearmament that 
19 Voigt to Crozier, 14 July 1932, MGA 206/207 (partially printed in Gannon, British Press, p. 81); and 
see Albrecht, `Voigts Deutschlandberichte', p. 111. 
20 Voigt to Crozier, 15 March 1933, MGA 207/145; see Guardian 25 March 1933, p. 10. 
21 Voigt to Crozier, no date, and 15 March 1933, MGA, 210/118,207/145; Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 
247-5 1. For Voigt's fuller analysis, see his, Unto Caesar (London, 1938), a very able and often neglected 
analysis of totalitarian systems in the 1930s. On the judgement of Hitler's responsibility for the Terror 
among British observers, see Schwarz, Reise ins Dritte Reich, pp. 333-5. 
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will have done it. '22 But he had no illusions about the state of British preparation: he 
considered that Britain began to rearm at least one year too late. His own attitude was 
much like an aspect of Chamberlain's later justification for appeasement. "We must gain 
time, whatever happens. '23 Although this could be seen as `support' for the principle of 
appeasement, it is only really belief in it as a means to an end, not an end in itself. It is 
more indicative that Voigt was one of the diplomatic correspondents who enjoyed a 
special relationship with Vansittart, the Foreign Office official most suspicious of 
German intentions. 24 
In contrast, the Nazi seizure of power did not change Crozier's conviction that 
revision of the European order created by the Treaty of Versailles remained necessary. 
The abhorrent practices of the new German rulers were, he maintained, no reason to 
reject justified demands: 
it simply won't do, in my opinion, to treat Germany as an outlaw, or a mad dog; 
she is entitled to have `equality', whether she is run by Nazis or Communists or 
anyone else, and she has to be given the opportunity of coming into the Pacts 
that are being made around her. It does not follow that this policy will succeed, 
but it seems to me to be the only course that is politically wise. 25 
The Guardian, indeed, faced greater dilemmas than other newspapers in its coverage of 
European affairs. Its dislike and fear of the Nazi regime, its commitment to peace and 
collective security, and its desire to integrate Germany into a European settlement 
pulled it in different directions. The rise of Nazism forced its staff to reconsider their 
preconceptions on foreign policy, and to decide whether `appeasement' of Germany - 
as they had advocated it since the 1920s - could have any validity while Hitler remained 
head of the German State. The newspaper's staff were often divided in their conclusions. 
`` Voigt to Crozier, 5 February 1936, MGA 215/68. 
2' Voigt to Crozier, 14 December 1936, MGA 216/376e. 
,' Cockett, Twilight, p. 18. 
25 Crozier to Dell, 12 March 1935, MGA 213/138 (partially printed in Gannon, British Press. pp. 
78-9); 
Huttner, Britische Presse, p. 243. 
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As the League of Nations grew weaker, it became increasingly difficult for 
Crozier to maintain the paper's unequivocal support for collective security. Yet if the 
Guardian came to accept the effective demise of the League, the policy alternatives 
were distinctly unattractive to it. From its perspective, it seemed clear that rearmament 
and alliances with other threatened states might increase the risk of war, yet making 
concessions to the dictators was morally abhorrent. In these respects, the Manchester 
Guardian expressed wider Liberal divisions on how to respond to fascist threats. 
*** 
Crozier and Voigt's divergent assessments were manifest in their differing 
reactions to the Abyssinian crisis. Crozier's main concern was that members of the 
League should fulfil their obligations towards Abyssinia under the Covenant, and 
ensure the success of collective security against Italian aggression. In contrast, Voigt's 
focus was set firmly on Hitler. As he had written earlier in the year: `Hitler's "peace 
offensive" has only one purpose - to gain time... Now, as before, Nazi Germany wants 
war and will go to war as soon (if ever) it can do so with any chance of success'. 
26 For 
him Abyssinia was a subordinate issue, and in his correspondence with Crozier, he 
strayed far from the line published in the Guardian. His concerns were most fully 
espoused in December 1935, when he described sanctions as `a false and dangerous 
doctrine' because if they failed, as he believed they would, this would set a dangerous 
precedent for dealing with Germany. 
27 
How could sanctions be successful against Germany when they already proved 
ineffective against a weaker Italy? Crozier's support for sanctions contrasted with the 
26 Voigt to Crozier, 2 January 1935, MGA 213/8. 
27 Voigt to Crozier, 16 December 1935, MGA 214/344. 
180 
pragmatism of Voigt. 28 The friction between the two surfaced again in June 1936 \\ hen 
Voigt wrote to Crozier criticising his editorship, under which the Guardian had `limped 
vaguely behind' since the start of the Abyssinian war. 29 As the League system became 
increasingly ineffective and European security increasingly unstable, for how long 
could the Manchester Guardian continue its idealistic, internationalist line, especially 
with the pragmatic Voigt increasingly at odds with the editor? 
Crozier was a traditional `appeaser' in the sense that he advocated the revision of 
Versailles, by modifications and readjustments, as a morally corrective measure to the 
unjust terms of 1919.30 In February 1936 he foresaw the problem of the Rhineland in 
the same context as German rearmament; France would consistently refuse all German 
requests until Germany was forced to take matters into its own hands. 31 Such anti- 
French sentiments were not uncommon among Liberal circles in the 1930s, 32 but in this 
instance they were another issue on which the editor was at odds with the diplomatic 
correspondent's point of view. Therefore, wider differences emerged over the Rhineland 
crisis. Although Crozier declared privately that he was not `deluded by Hitler and his 
aims and methods', 33 his perspective remained that of a critic of Versailles who looked 
for revision as the means of a general European settlement. In the Guardian his 
editorials argued that it was impractical to expect demilitarisation to last indefinitely, 
and that Hitler's peace proposals provided hope for a new understanding. 
34 
28 See Voigt to Crozier, 13 May 1936, MGA 215/283. 
29 Voigt to Crozier, 17 June 1936, MGA 215/350f. 
30 Gilbert, Roots, pp. 159-88, draws a distinction between the concept of appeasement conceived as early 
as 1919 as a measure to correct the injustices to Germany as a result of the 
Treaty of Versailles, and the 
`new' appeasement of the Chamberlain years that `became increasingly a nervous, 
jerky, guilt 
encumbered affair; not a confident philosophy, but a painful surrender to threats'. 
31 Crozier to Alexander Werth, the Berlin correspondent, 3 February 1936, MGA 215/56. 
32 In a letter to Voigt he put blame on France for the current state of 
Germany and its rearmament: Crozier 
to Voigt, 8 December 1937, MGA 218/304a. 
33 Crozier to Voigt, 18 March 1936, MGA 215168. 
34 See Manchester Guardian, 10 March 1936, p. 10; also Gannon, British Press, p. 
95. 
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Voigt regarded an alliance with France as vital for British survival. 3' His belief 
in such an alliance shows the influence of Vansittart, the pro-French Permanent Under- 
Secretary, on the diplomatic correspondent. Nevertheless not only Voigt but also Robert 
Dell, the paper's Geneva correspondent, and Alexander Werth, the Berlin correspondent, 
wrote to Crozier warning of the disastrous consequences of the German action. Werth 
went so far as to criticise the editor himself, and what he considered to be the reason for 
his stance: `the task of a newspaper is to guide public opinion and not follow it, even if 
sometimes it means going against the current'. 36 Voigt was particularly fierce against 
the German government: it was planning `a European war and ... the reoccupation was 
the first big strategic move in this war'. For him the conclusions were obvious - the end 
of the League of Nations and need for a British defence alliance with France. To 
pretend that there is a security for us in the League is not to be serious'. 37 
These disagreements began to be evident in the newspaper itself. As Crozier 
described the contents of one issue in April 1936, `we have at the present time about 
five correspondents and one long leader, and between them, like the famous meeting of 
six economists, they have at least seven policies'. 38 In these circumstances, Crozier 
exerted tighter control over the substance of his correspondents' articles, especially 
these of Voigt. On at least thirteen occasions during 1936 he intervened to tone down or 
exclude Voigt's contributions. 39 This, it should be emphasised, occurred before 
Chamberlain became prime minister and without advice or pressure from the 
government. Rather, this was a matter of preserving the newspaper's overall editorial 
policy, and asserting of editorial responsibility towards public opinion and the national 
35 See Voigt to Crozier, 14 December 1936,216/376f. 
36 Werth to Crozier, 26 March 1936, MGA 215/172. 
37 Voigt to Crozier, 27 March 1936, MGA 215/179d: emphasis in original. 
38 Crozier to Voigt, 24 April 1936, MGA 215/253. Crozier never seemed to have put pressure on those on 
his staff whose opinions differed from his own. 
39 See Gannon, British Press, p. 84. 
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interest. Privately he explained that some of the proposed articles were too bellicose, 
and might contribute to international tension. As he wrote shortly after the Rhineland 
crisis, I don't want to alarm people unduly by suggesting that the Germans are doing 
things which suggest an offensive intention'. 40 More often articles were altered or 
omitted for tactical reasons, rather than from any doubt about their accuracy. As Gordon 
Philips, who was occasionally acting editor, commented, it may in the present 
circumstances be more effective to assume that Hitler is not both so bad and so small- 
minded as I have not the faintest doubt that he really is'. 41 
The most common reason for such a step was a lack of space in the paper, and 
this was an issue long before Chamberlain might have tried influencing the press to 
foster a brighter outlook. 42 None of this meant, however, that Crozier was unaware of 
the mounting threat, nor that he did not contemplate alternatives to the Guardian's 
established adherence to the League and collective security. By November 1937 his 
private thoughts were as follows: 
It seems to me to be almost inevitable that whether we like it or not, we shall be 
drawn steadily closer to Russia, if only for the simple reason that Russia would 
give Japan something to think about in the East... and would take over part of 
the German burden in Europe. I am all against alliances, coalitions etc. but if we 
are going to cold shoulder Russia, doesn't it mean that we and France are left to 
face the other three? ... 
but what is the alternative? 43 
Crozier had recognised that the development of a fascist power bloc, now including 
Japan, required a diplomatic and strategic reassessment; yet his proposed solution 
remained uncertain. The old Guardian dislike of alliance systems, seen - on the parallel 
with 1914 - as destabilising, remained strong, and he was reluctant to argue that 
Britain 
should enter into formal obligations with other threatened nations. Nevertheless, this 
40 Crozier to Voigt, 27 March 1936, MGA 215/177. 
" Gordon Philips to Voigt, 17 November 1936, MGA 216/244. 
42 See Crozier to Voigt, 5 October 1936, MGA 216/257; Gordon Philips to Dell, 16 November 1936, 
MGA 216/328; Crozier to Fodor, 14 February 1938, MGA 219'61. 
43 Crozier to Voigt, 10 November 1937, MGA 218/251. 
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was not the Liberal vocabulary of the 1920s or early 1930s. The shift «was still more 
evident among his correspondents. Dell argued particularly that `whether ww e like it or 
not, we have to choose between Germany and Russia and in fact we are choosing 
Germany. 
. 
If England, France and Russia stood together now, late as it is, they could 
stop aggression without a war'. 44 Voigt's arguments for a French alliance were based 
more evidently on the once-repudiated conception of the balance of power. 
*** 
This, then, was the background to the Manchester Guardian's responses to the 
German aggressions during 1938, and to Chamberlain's form of appeasement. In early 
1938 Crozier was again assailed by criticism among his staff. His correspondents in 
other European capitals warned him of the dangers of appeasement. Dell declared that 
British foreign policy was `completely bankrupt', 45 and Werth (now in Paris) argued 
that Chamberlain's policy `merely acted as an encouragement to Hitler to go ahead'. 46 
During the height of the Austrian crisis, Crozier also happened to be in London and met 
Vansittart, who told him that `the methods and intentions of Hitler were now at last 
openly disclosed and he hoped that people ... would now at least pay some attention to 
what he had all along been telling them'. He also prophesised that `one of these 
ultimatums will be coming our way sometime'. 47 
In his leading articles, Crozier nevertheless gave Chamberlain the benefit of the 
doubt, accepting the views that the Anschluss was not a cause for British objection and 
that this further revision of Versailles might ease the prospect of an understanding with 
44 Dell to Crozier, 12 January 1938, MGA 219/23. 
as Dell to Crozier, 19 February 1938, MGA 219/67(b) 
46 Werth to Crozier, 15 March 1938, MGA 219,99. 
47 Crozier Interviews, pp. 71-2 (11 March 1938); and see Cockett, Twilight, p. 55. 
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Germany. Cockett argues that Crozier's line `shows how much an editor was prepared 
to use his paper to help the government pursue appeasement at the cost of ignoring his 
own staff . 48 Yet this ignores the force of the Guardian's existing commitments to 
peace and revision, and the extent to which Crozier had for two years preserved his 
editorial line against staff criticisms. Nor does the evidence suggest that he was subject 
to Chamberlainite influence. In his visits to London he met Chamberlain only once, in 
December 1937 - and then the discussion focused on Far Eastern, not European, 
affairs. 49 His most frequent contacts were with Vansittart. 
Moreover, there were significant changes in the Guardian's stance. During 
February, as the Austrian crisis mounted, it had urged conciliation. 50 But once the 
German armies marched into Austria, its position hardened: as Gannon argued, `Voigt's 
hand becomes very clear'. 51 The Nazi methods were condemned: no propaganda can 
disguise and ignorance fail to understand so concealed a threat of armed force. This is, 
as many have long realised, the only foreign policy known to the present German 
Government'. 52 But not even Voigt could offer a constructive alternative to British 
government policy, despite his long advocacy of a firm line against Germany. As early 
as March 1936 he had privately written that annexation of Austria and other German 
areas would not be a `general catastrophe': `indeed, it seems to me that there is a good 
deal to be said for the reunion of all German speaking peoples'. 
53 Later that year he had 
even written about Czechoslovakia in similar terms. 
54 Voigt's primary concern was the 
security of Britain itself; although he urged diplomatic resistance to German ambitions 
48 Cockett, Twilight, p. 55. 
49 See Crosier Interviews, pp. 67-8 (17 December 1937). 
50 See Guardian, 16 February 1938, p. 15. 
51 Gannon, British Press, p. 155. 
52 Guardian, 12 March 1938, p. 12. 
53 Voigt to Crozier, 29 March 1936, MGA 215! 181. 
54 See Voigt to Crozier, 19 December 1936, MGA 216/387. 
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in Central Europe, this fell far short of advocating war. The closest the Guardian came 
to any kind of policy recommendation was in the foreign leader on 14 March 1938: 
The British Government will have to reconsider its problems afresh. 
Rearmament is not itself enough. Everyone is rearming at top speed... Isolation 
will not help; does the attack on Austria encourage that idea? The Government 
must therefore search for the means of restraining the future aggressor. whoever 
he should be, and it must know that it can only be through some form or other of 
collective understanding that such a constraint can be construed. " 
The difficulty for the Guardian was proposing a means to restrain future aggression. Its 
preference for collective action through the League of Nations had failed during the 
Abyssinian crisis. So had economic sanctions. It now fully accepted the need for British 
rearmament, but still could not bring itself to recommend an alliance of states - only 
`some form or other of collective understanding'. Caught between its long-standing 
Liberal stance and the Nazi threat, it seemed wise for the editor to wait and see how 
events unfolded without lending the Guardian's moral weight to any specific course of 
action. 56 For Gannon, the effect was that: 
The Manchester Guardian's coverage of the Anschluss must be adjudged a 
disappointing one. Had it matched the spunk and spirit of the News Chronicle to 
its own ideological perception and integrity, it might have served as a standard 
to which advocates of opposition to Hitler could rally. In the event, it only sat 
back and complained. 57 
Gannon's disappointment arose from an expectation that, as a leading opposition 
newspaper, the Guardian should have provided a firm alternative to appeasement. 
While critical of the Nazi government's domestic oppression and its aggressive 
international policies, it did not seek to promote a crusade against Hitler. Yet in these 
respects it was little different from the positions of the political opposition - the Labour 
and Independent Liberal parties. In the House of Commons debate on the Anschluss on 
ss Guardian, 14 March 1938, p. 8. 
56 See ibid., 15 March 1938, p. 10. 
57 Gannon, British Press, p. 158. 
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14 March, Attlee and Sinclair were remarkably ambiguous, merely invoking `League 
principles' as the basis for British policy. 58 In other words, the Guardian's uncertainty 
reflected the wider dilemmas among the British Left, as two evils collided - Nazism and 
the prospect of war. Moreover, for all their other differences over Germany, Crozier and 
Voigt were agreed on one point about the Anschluss, as they would be on the 
Sudetenland issue: that this was a matter of German self-determination - and national 
self-determination was another fundamental Liberal principle. No Liberal newspaper 
was likely to risk the horrors of another European war over such an issue. 
*** 
The Guardian's first substantial comment on the Sudeten problem, in April 
1938, looked towards a peaceful settlement. Although it accepted that Hitler was likely 
to intervene at some stage, it regarded the dispute as primarily an internal issue for the 
Czechs and ethnic Germans. The Czechoslovakian government seemed prepared to 
make far-reaching concessions, and if these were firmly supported by the British and 
French, there was a good chance of avoiding international confrontation. 59 
So concerned was Crozier to assist this outcome that during the May crisis' he 
limited reports of German troop concentrations on the Czechoslovakian border and even 
- at the most critical moment - excluded an article by Voigt. For Cockett, this 
demonstrates that Crozier had `adopted the government's desired course of omitting any 
information likely to inflame the international situation'. 60 Crozier certainly did not 
want to contribute to international tension; but this in itself gives no ground for 
58 Parker, Churchill, pp. 142-3. 
s9 Guardian, 29 April 1938, p. 12. Immediately after the Anschluss Dell told his editor that 
Czechoslovakia was Hitler's next victim, `especially if Chamberlain lets them know tomorrow that the 
British Government will do nothing': see Dell to Crozier, 23 March 1938, MGA 219'127. 
60 Cockett, Twilight, p. 69. 
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implying that he was subordinating his paper to government wishes. He had his own 
reasons for taking this line, reasons reinforced by doubts about Voigt's specific claim of 
an imminent German invasion - doubts soon confirmed by Voigt himself. who reported 
that any German troop movements were merely a bluff. 61 As Crozier explained 
privately to Voigt, his original article was not published as 
a matter of tactics. What you write about the German plans for the conquest of 
Czechoslovakia is vivid, and, I have no doubt at all, accurate. On the other hand, 
I don't think that to-night, when we are hoping that we have just escaped, even if 
only for the time being, from the imminent outbreak of war, is the right time to 
describe the German plans for making war. 62 
As the Sudeten problem continued to grow, the Guardian's attitude remained uncertain 
- urging conciliation on the specific issue, but becoming increasingly firm on the wider 
threat from German aggression. As Voigt argued immediately after the May crisis, we 
ought in no circumstances to commit ourselves to the defence of Czechoslovakia. But 
we must continue to make it quite clear ... that 
if France goes to war, we hold the sea 
and Belgium and Holland, and co-operate in the defence of the French left flank'. 63 
The wording of this letter was evidence of the particular Liberal difficulties 
facing the paper and Voigt in particular. There was talk of `co-operation' but the 
anathema of `alliances' was kept out of the liberal vocabulary at this point. In private. 
Voigt even went so far as to suggest conscription, 64 feeling that a German attack on 
Czechoslovakia was a certainty. 65 Dell came to a similar conclusion but with fewer 
qualifications: `The only possible way to avert war is the way of May 21st, which has 
not been repeated. '66 
61 Voigt to Crozier, 23 May 1938, MGA 219/233. 
62 Crozier to Voigt, 22 May 1938, MGA 219/226; also Gannon, British Press, p. 168. 
63 Voigt to Crozier, 23 May 1938, MGA 219/233; see also Crozier to Voigt, 14 August 1938, 
MGA220/95a, and Voigt to Crozier, 11 July 1938, MGA 220/29. 
64 Voigt to Crozier, 22 May 1938, MGA 219/227b. 
65 See Voigt to Crozier, ? August 1938, MGA 220/108a. 
66 Dell to Crozier, 3 August 1938, MGA 220 77. 
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Even on the Sudeten issue, the editor envisaged limits. In late July he told Voigt 
that he did not object to the British government urging the Czechoslovakian `overnment 
to offer concessions towards the Sudetens - and Hitler. His reasons were twofold: to 
avoid the risk of European war, and `because in my opinion the Sudeten Germans have 
a moral claim to certain self-governing powers'. 67 Precisely what he meant is unclear, 
though he was aware (probably through Masaryk, the Czechoslovakian minister in 
London) of Halifax's proposal of cantonal autonomy. But it seems certain that he did 
not mean complete cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, because this would threaten 
the viability of the Czechoslovakian state. For the Guardian it was evident that `her 
continued existence as an independent sovereign state ... 
is essential to the balance of 
power in Europe'. 68 
The effect was that the Guardian was distinctly uneasy about Chamberlain's 
policies during the Czechoslovakian crisis itself. It was critical of pressure being placed 
on the Czechoslovakian government to make concessions, even though in early 
September Crozier privately commented that it was not yet time to speak `even 
hypothetically of "betrayal" and "demolish" in connection with Czecho-Slovakia. The 
time for these words may, of course, come. ' 69 Similarly, he was wary about 
Chamberlain's decision to fly to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden, yet felt that his editorial 
responsibility meant that the Guardian `ought not to do anything that would seem to 
"crab" his visit in advance'. 70 Accordingly, it praised the step as a `bold move'. 
71 Again, 
this might seem as if Crozier was offering up support for Chamberlain's version of 
appeasement. But a quite different perspective appears once one considers Crozier's 
contact with leading anti-appeasers, a contact which in itself suggests his independence 
67 Crozier to Voigt, 21 July 1938, MGA 220/47. 
68 Guardian, 21 July 1938, p. 6. 
69 Crozier to Werth, 6 September 1938, MGA 220/132. 
70 Crozier to Voigt, 14 September 1938, MGA 220/146. 
71 Guardian, 15 September 1938, p. 8. 
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from government influence. A note to Voigt reads: 'PRIVATE -I spoke to-night on the 
telephone to Winston Churchill, who is deeply perturbed but agreed that wie ought not to 
criticise until we had some results'. 72 In other words, the Guardian's position was 
perfectly compatible with that of the anti-appeasers. 
The Guardian leader columns became more critical after the Berchtesgaden 
meeting. 73 Not only was it becoming evident that German acquisition of the 
Sudetenland was now seriously contemplated; it also seemed that Hitler's policy was 
concerned less with the Sudeten Germans themselves than with the strategic importance 
of their territory. The editorial columns came close to offering a policy recommendation: 
When one thinks of the intolerable price of war in lives and misery it would be 
dirt cheap to pay the cost of transporting the Sudetens into Germany if there 
were enough common sense in the world to do so. It would be worthwhile, too, 
if there were time, to give Czecho-Slovakia [sic] an international guarantee of 
her future integrity should the Sudeten regions be torn from her. 74 
Once the Anglo-French proposals were announced on 20 September, the Guardian was 
indignant. 75 It condemned the plan not only because it left Czechoslovakia `open to 
attack in the future', but also because the Germans had succeeded with `a threat of 
superior force. ' Chamberlain's policy was described quite simply as 'surrender'. 76 
Plainly this was not a newspaper subject to government influence, let alone 
control. We have seen that Cockett's assertions about Crozier's subordination to 
government policies are misleading; but it should be added that they also all relate to his 
position before the height of the Czechoslovakian crisis: his book has no comments on 
the Guardian's criticisms between Berchtesgaden and the Munich settlement. As it 
happens, Crozier did withhold a Voigt article during this period, but he did so only on 
72 Crozier to Voigt, 14 September 1938, MGA 220/143. 
73 See Guardian, 15 September 1938, p. 8; see Crozier to Voigt, 14 September 1938, MGA 220/143. 
74 Ibid., 16 September 1938, p. 8. 
75 See Gannon, British Press, pp. 201-2. 
76 Guardian, 21 September 1938, p. 8. 
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his own initiative and for obvious prudential motives. The proposed article seemed to 
show that Voigt had access to secret information derived from Vanisttart and Leeper, 
and Crozier was warned about prosecution under the Official Secrets Act. " Fear of 
infringing the law was a quite different matter from yielding to any political pressure. 
Yet although the Guardian criticised Chamberlain's readiness to concede 
Hitler's demands, even now it would not advocate a stand which might result in the 
outbreak of war. Consequently, the leader columns after the publication of the 
Godesberg memorandum were `curiously tepid'. 78 Then, when Chamberlain seemed to 
be preventing war by accepting Hitler's invitation to Munich - welcomed, it should be 
emphasised by anti-appeasers, Liberal and Labour as well as Conservative - the 
Guardian too could see no choice but to support the initiative. 79 In effect, it again gave 
Chamberlain the benefit of the doubt, given the scale of what was at stake: `For the 
moment there is respite. Beyond that there is hope. '80 Even so, its attitude was plainly 
distinct from that of the government. This was most obvious in its criticism of the 
Russian government's exclusion from the Munich conference. Russia, as the strongest 
anti-fascist military force in Eastern Europe, was now part of the Guardian's 
calculations for resisting Hitler. Not for another six months did the Cabinet begin to 
think seriously along these same lines. 
The Guardian's response to the Munich settlement itself was similarly complex. 
Although it had come to deplore Chamberlain's concessions towards Hitler, believed 
that the agreement all but spelt the end for the Czechoslovakian state, and had earlier in 
the crisis stated that such terms would be dishonourable, it could not but welcome the 
longer end product - peace: 
" See Crozier to Voigt, 21 September 1938, MGA 220/154. 
78 Gannon, British Press, p. 203. 
79 Guardian, 28 September 1938, p. 8. 
80 Ibid., 29 September 1938, p. 8. 
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It is also something for which to be thankful... that peace is still the greatest hope 
in the hearts of men... And great as are the injustices that Czecho-Slovakia 
suffers under the Munich Agreement, and they are for her calamitous, they 
cannot be measured against that horror that might have extinguished not only 
8 Czecho-Slovakia but the whole of Western Civilisation. ' 
Agreement was finally reached at Munich on 30 September between Chamberlain. 
Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier. The arrangement looked suspiciously like the 'Four- 
Power' policy that both Masaryk and Crozier had feared. 82 Almost all the fears that had 
appeared in the leader columns of the Guardian over the course of September, and the 
private concerns of its staff, had been justified by the Munich agreement. These factors 
made the Guardian response to Munich even more surprising. While it recognised that 
the agreement all but spelt the end for Czechoslovakia, the primary concern of the paper 
was that war had been averted. Perhaps more remarkable still was the Guardian 's 
ability to revert to a critical line the following day. The Guardian mourned the loss of 
the `democratic front' which it had consistently hinted at in its leader columns, but 
never advocated explicitly when the international situation became fraught with tension. 
Instead this had been `replaced by the new conception of a European order governed by 
four states holding two opposite views of life'. 
83 
Assessing these abrupt shifts of position, Gannon concluded that `the truth 
would seem to be that once again, as in March 1936 and March 1938, despite 
its 
philosophically founded abhorrence for Nazism, the Manchester Guardian 
did not want 
war, especially a war over Czechoslovakia. ' 
84 This is accurate enough in itself, but his 
implied criticism is misplaced. Given its Liberal commitment to peace, 
it was hardly 
likely to advocate military action when no other mainstream newspaper and no 
leading 
politician - not even the anti-appeasers - were prepared to call 
for war. Nor did any of 
81 Ibid., 1 October 1938, p. 8. 
82 See Crozier Interviews, p. 86 (11 August 1938); Crozier to Werth, 21 September 1938, MGA 
220/152. 
83 Guardian, 2 October 1938, p. 8. 
84 Gannon, British Press, p. 203. 
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this compromise its independent stance. Immediately after the Munich settlement it 
diverged from Chamberlain by urging preparations for a more determined stand against 
fascist powers in the future: `Britain and France must keep and strengthen their 
association with Russia and the United States. '85 
*** 
Even now there were inconsistencies in the Guardian's position, as it continued 
to wrestle with the impact of fascist aggression on the Liberal conscience. It demanded 
that Britain must continue to rearm, as `no Government can discharge its duty or protect 
its interests unless its diplomacy has behind it material strength and confidence'. Yet at 
the same time an effect of Munich was the necessity for continuing in the arms race. 86 
Privately Crozier accepted that disarmament and `internationalist principles' were now 
`unrealistic'; yet he still deplored the increased militarisation. Rearmament, he felt, 
would `not produce peace but perhaps maintain it precariously until it produce[d] an 
explosion'. 87 
Nevertheless, the Guardian moved steadily towards a more resolute position. 
The Kristallnacht pogrom in November was taken as a further sign of the incorrigibility 
of the Nazi regime. When, during the following month, Chamberlain resumed 
appeasement, this time towards Italy, the Guardian was from the start critical. Crozier 
now encouraged his correspondents, writing to Voigt that he was `all in favour of 
articles in the "MG" that will make it difficult for Chamberlain to give way in Rome'. 
88 
It now presented Chamberlain in an unfavourable light: `his virtue is simplicity, and that 
85 Guardian, 2 October 1938, p. 8. 
86 Ibid., 29 October 1938, p. 12. 
87 Crozier to Voigt, 21 November 1938, MGA 220/271. 
88 Crozier to Voigt, 20 December 1938, MGA 220/331. 
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has the defect of exposing poverty and nakedness'. 89 In contrast, it praised Churchill 
who `since the Munich Agreement ... 
has delivered a fine series of speeches... [and 
recognised] the need for a moral basis for our [foreign] policy'. 90 
After the German occupation of Prague in March, Crozier finally caught up fully 
with Voigt's position since 1936 - that no country, not even Britain, was safe in the face 
of Nazi aggression: 
[t]hese terrible events should finally dissipate any illusions that remain about the 
character, aims and methods of Hitler. Whatever excuses might be made by 
apologists for his action over the Rhineland, over Austria, and over the Sudeten 
Germans, there can be none for this conquest of Bohemia. He will not stop there. 
In what direction will he "turn" no one can say... it might be Rumania or Poland, 
Holland or Switzerland, France or Britain. 91 
This did not mean that the Guardian immediately resigned itself to war. Hitler's actions 
were not tantamount to an attack on Britain or France, but provided a lesson to be learnt, 
and quickly. Prague gave an `opportunity to reflect with shame on the past and to 
prepare with energy for the future. ' 92 The newspaper still looked to `methods of 
discussion rather than force', but now dropping its earlier equivocations - definitely 
recommended a policy of alliances. 93 There was no alternative but quickly to `draw 
closer to all those who share our deepest interests and the growing danger'. 94 Voigt saw 
Britain `passing from the passive to the active in foreign affairs and... assuming the 
leadership of a coalition'. 95 And while Crozier had moved close to Voigt, for his part 
Voigt now accepted an aspect of Crozier's thinking - the need to include Russia in an 
anti-fascist front. 96 
89 Guardian, 14 December 1938, p. 10. 
90 Ibid., 12 December 1938, p. 8. 
91 Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 10. 
92 Ibid., 15 March 1939, p. 10. 
93 Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 10. 
94 Ibid., 20 March 1939, p. 10. 
95 Ibid., p. 11. 
96 Voigt to Crozier, 21 March 1939, MGA 221/69a. In general, Voigt remained highly sceptical about an 
Anglo-Russian alliance: see Voigt to Crozier, 10 April 1939, MGA 221/77 and Voigt to Crozier, 4 May 
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Slowly, the Guardian approved of the fact that despite the excesses and terror, in 
Russia's recent past it had shown a firmer stand `on behalf of honesty in international 
affairs' than most other nations. 97 The shift in the Guardian line was further highlighted 
in April when the government announced its guarantee to protect Poland from German 
aggression. Although Crozier, like Chamberlain, was motivated by the belief that the 
guarantee would help to maintain peace after the dishonour of Munich, the editor of the 
Guardian would not have supported such a gesture if he were not prepared to see its 
obligations fulfilled. As he told Lambert in July, the British government should be 
prepared to fight: `Then we may perhaps get peace'. 98 
*** 
Nevertheless, at this point Voigt had embarked upon an independent initiative. 
As has been shown, he and Crozier had long differed over their assessment of the fascist 
states, and Crozier had on various occasions toned down or even suppressed some of his 
articles and declined to accept his private advice. 
Voigt had been concerned that the British public were unaware of how 
potentially dangerous the Czechoslovakian problem was. In May 1938 he had written to 
Crozier stating the need for a `psychological transformation' to be initiated from the 
pages of the British press. 99 These views were shared by Voigt's chief Foreign Office 
contact, Vansittart. In June Vansittart posed the question to Crozier: `[w]hy did not the 
press point out more clearly what was the German game? The last thing Hitler wanted 
was a good, firm settlement in Czecho-Slovakia'. Again, in August, Vansittart `referred 
1939, MGA 221/113. He even suspected the possibility of a secret German-Russian pact, which was to be 
signed later in August 1939: see Voigt to Crozier, 10 March 1939, MGA 221/67. 
97 Guardian, 20 March 1939, p. 10. 
98 Crozier to Lambert, 24 July 1939, MGA 221/186. 
99 Voigt to Crozier, 22 May 1938, MGA 219/227. 
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to the press, which in general, he said, was by its "optimism" misleading the people. 
The people would "have a rough shock soon" he feared. ' 100 With Crozier evidently 
maintaining his tight control over editorial policy, Voigt in the winter of 1938-39 sought 
another outlet for his own opinions. 
In January 1939 Voigt with Peter Grieve, a former Guardian journalist, 
established a newsletter, The Arrow, in order to campaign for a still firmer stand against 
the dictators, and for greater British `preparedness for the next crisis'. 101 Cockett 
presents this - and similar newsletters established around this time - as further evidence 
of government influence; that is to say, they represented the frustration of some 
journalists at government pressure on the press. Yet this was not the main force of their 
complaints: they were reacting not against the government as such, but against the 
newspapers themselves - which, as has been shown, had in many cases either supported 
government policy for their own reasons, or else felt obliged to withhold their doubts or 
criticisms from a sense of national interest and editorial responsibility. 
Moreover, Voigt's initiative did not mark a breach with Crozier; on the contrary, 
Crozier had taken a benevolent attitude towards his independent activities. 102 In mid- 
1938 he had supported Voigt in becoming editor of a weighty review, the Nineteenth 
Century, so long as it did not interfere with his work on the Manchester Guardian. 
Indeed, he declared that he took pride in allowing more latitude than other editors of 
newspapers for his staff to write in other publications. '03 Voigt explained to Crozier that 
`the idea of a periodical that would give some little guidance amid the growing disarray 
of the reading public has been "in the air" a long time'. This was so because 'discontent 
with the daily press is intense amongst multitudes of people who are concerned ... over 
100 Quoted Crozier Interviews, p. 76 (22 June 1938) and p. 85 (11 August 1938). 
101 See Cockett, Twilight, pp. 101-2. 
102 See Crozier to Voigt, 10 January 1939, MGA 221/10. 
103 See Crozier to Voigt, 14 June 1938, MGA 219/161a. 
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the future of this country'. 104 But it is significant -a point not noted by Cockett - that 
he explicitly excluded the Manchester Guardian, the Yorkshire Post. and, with 
qualifications, the Daily Telegraph. ' 05 Clearly the discontent was not in fact directed 
against the whole daily press, but only against some newspapers. Voigt specified The 
Times (where dissatisfaction on this account `is intense' 106), but in all likelihood his 
main targets were the mass circulation Beaverbrook and Rothermere newspapers. 
Crozier seems at first to have not just tolerated but approved of The Arrow. This 
probably indicated his own sense that editorial responsibility meant that the Manchester 
Guardian could not always be as forthright as he would have wished. But The Arro}i, 
was exclusively a campaigning sheet, not a responsible newspaper - and soon its 
vociferousness led Crozier to cool towards it, and to seek to establish greater distance 
between it and the Manchester Guardian. 107 As Voigt privately noted `The M. G. ... 
is 
jibbing at The Arrow. ... To some extent I understand the M. G. - they don't want to 
row with, say, Sir Horace Wilson, on my behalf. 108 But this was Crozier's own 
decision, not the result of any complaint from Wilson or any other government official 
or minister: in any case, the Guardian itself was by now an open critic of Chamberlain's 
policies. 
* 
The Manchester Guardian abhorred Nazism, but at no point before 1939 did it 
call for resolute opposition to German government demands. Two factors influenced its 
104 Voigt to Crozier, 15 January 1939, MGA 221/22. 
105 See Voigt to Crozier, 15 January 1939, MGA 221/22; cf. Cockett, Twilight, p. 101-2. 
106 Voigt to Crozier, 15 January 1939, MGA 221/22. 
107 The Arrow wrote about the international situation that the Western Powers `may soon compel ... to 
consider a preventive war very seriously': Arrow, 14 April 1939, p. 56, quoted in Gannon, British Press, 
p. 85. 
108 Voigt to Lady Milner, 9 May 1939, Lady Milner papers C657/2. 
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commentaries on foreign policy: its Liberal ideological outlook, and self-imposed 
editorial restraint. Both contributed to the characteristic Guardian response to 
international crises: condemnation coupled with ultimate acquiescence towards Hitler's 
foreign policy. Ideological commitment - especially opposition to war - was the 
predominant force, but the notion of editorial responsibility was also a significant factor 
in Crozier's attitude. Editors of quality newspapers did not need Whitehall to tell them 
that newspapers could complicate diplomatic negotiations or exacerbate international 
tension. As Koss has written, 
editors knew far more than they saw fit to communicate, perhaps even more than 
they themselves wished to know... Resolved to avoid - or, at least, not hasten - 
the inevitable, they took it upon themselves to calm prevailing fears. In this way, 
they qualified as appeasers or the de facto accomplices of the statesmen who 
practised appeasement. 109 
Koss was writing about the Guardian, and how Crozier, interested in preserving a calm 
composure in the newspaper, resisted Voigt's more alarmist statements. Yet to conclude 
that Crozier was a `de facto accomplice' in appeasement is to go too far. Rather the 
Guardian was caught in the hands of several dilemmas: it feared Hitler, but also feared 
war; it wanted collective security through the League of Nations, but this became 
impossible: with major powers outside of the League and countries embarked upon 
individual rearmament plans, the original conception of all nations pooling their 
resources against the one aggressor was no longer applicable. The alternative - alliances 
- had long been regarded as a regression to the power-bloc diplomacy which, it believed, 
had dragged Europe into the horror of the Great War. The result was not that the 
Guardian supported Chamberlain's policies, but that it drifted and waited upon events. 
In several key respects, the Guardian lies outside Cockett's explanations for his 
claimed government influence over the press. It was a provincial newspaper, free from 
109 Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 542. 
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the London journalistic coterie which had close relations with the capital's political 
leaders and officials. Crozier's notes of his interviews show that he was not on intimate 
terms with the senior government figures most closely associated with appeasement. ' 10 
Crozier was far removed from Dawson in terms of social contacts with ministers. Nor 
did the Guardian have a proprietor with such contacts, who could impose his views on 
the editor. 
The only close contact between the newspaper and members of the government 
were through Voigt. Cockett is very likely right that Voigt was influenced by these 
contacts. Yet these were with Vansittart and with Leeper of the Foreign Office News 
Department, both critical of key aspects of appeasement - while Voigt himself remained 
a persistent critic of government policy. If, then, Dell was right to describe Voigt as one 
of Leeper's `tame pets', this is far from amounting to evidence of Chamberlainite 
pressures on the press. il Indeed, Cockett's argument on the link between government 
appeasement and the Guardian descends into implausible speculation. Voigt, it is 
claimed, was `merely panicked by Leeper into being overawed by the growing German 
military superiority and thus encouraged Crozier to take a more appeasing line than he 
otherwise might have done'. 112 In fact Voigt was not so overawed as either to become 
an appeaser himself, nor to recommend appeasement to Crozier. Nor was Crozier 
persuaded by Voigt to prefer conciliation and peace to war: he had his own reasons for 
doing so. 
The Guardian was not an active supporter of Chamberlain; it had both moral 
and practical reservations towards his conduct of foreign policy. The foreign leader 
columns did not wholly wither under the uncertainty of the times; the paper did not have 
110 Between 1935-39 Crozier met with Chamberlain and Halifax once each, and Simon twice. In contrast, 
he met with Vansittart on eleven occasions during the same period. For details of each interview see 
Crozier Interviews. 
111 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 18. 
112 Ibid., p. 24. 
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many answers but it maintained a questioning and critical line. It never hesitated to give 
the full truth about German domestic policies. Furthermore, after the Munich agreement, 
no other paper regained its critical line as quickly the Guardian. Far from being 
influenced by governmental pressure, it strove to maintain a Liberal line in its outlook, 
until the severity of the situation showed that such a policy was no longer tenable. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE NEWS CHRONICLE: 
"UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL" 
Cockett placed particular emphasis on the case of the News Chronicle to support 
his argument that the government exercised considerable influence, and sometimes 
control, over newspapers. He claimed that the paper's chairman, Walter Layton, had by 
summer 1938 `already shown his willingness to help the government', adding that he 
`increasingly sided with the more Conservative-minded Cadbury brothers [the 
newspaper's main owners] ... against the more zealously anti-fascist staff. Layton is 
said during the September crisis to have been `poised to silence' his staff's suspicions 
over events in order `to help the Chamberlain government'. 1 Caputi, who accepted 
Cockett's argument, went still further, claiming that the Nervs Chronicle provides 
`perhaps the most egregious example of "muzzling"' by the government. 2 
However, Cockett's earlier examples of Layton's supposed `pro-government' 
interventions date from summer 1937, before Chamberlain started to take a more active 
interest in newspaper comment on foreign affairs; and his argument is actually relevant 
to Layton's actions on just a couple of days in late September 1938. Moreover, in early 
1938 the Foreign Office received German complaints about the `vilification of 
Germany' in the News Chronicle (and Manchester Guardian), and in early 1939 
Ribbentrop spoke of the Chronicle as `a notorious mischief maker'. 3 Cockett's 
argument is further weakened by Chamberlain's remarks to a German official that he 
`deplored' these newspaper `attacks' and `admitted that the News Chronicle was in fact 
1 Cockett, Twilight, pp. 60,70. 
2 Caputi, Chamberlain, p. 167. 
3 Henderson to Foreign Office, 24 February 1938, FO 371/21709.1279; Ribbentrop, 20 February 1939, 
DBFP 3s, iv, app. 11 (2), p. 603. 
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the most dangerous British newspaper and that it had even attacked the King. the 
Queen, and the British Government in an irresponsible way'. 4 
The News Chronicle was the result of the amalgamation in 1930 of two Liberal 
newspapers, the Daily News and the Daily Chronicle. One of its founding principles 
was `that consistent support should be given to the promotion of unity in the Liberal 
Party'. 5 Yet at that very time (as the statement implies) the historic Liberal party was in 
the course of its final fragmentation into several splinter groups. What could support for 
`the Liberal party' mean when the party was split? Was the Chronicle able to follow one 
line, or was it subject to divergent influences? How could a single newspaper satisfy 
different Liberal sections, especially as one main group (the `Simonite' Liberal 
Nationals) remained in the National coalition government, yet the other (the `Samuelite' 
Liberals) left it after the 1932 introduction of tariffs? The Liberal party's divisions put 
the News Chronicle in a difficult position: both factions asked for its support, and the 
newspaper could not satisfy both (nor the other Lloyd George Liberal group), and was 
thereby liable to `satisfy none of them'. 6 After the split, Samuelite leaders doubted 
whether the News Chronicle would `remain loyal to "purified" Liberalism'. 
7 In contrast, 
Simonites asked `whether anything can be done to make the "News Chronicle" into a 
real Liberal newspaper instead of an organ which is merely anti-National Government'. 
8 
In practice, the newspaper became loyal to a more general Liberal body of thought. 
rather than trying to maintain the illusion of a united Liberal party. In other words, the 
party split gave the newspaper considerable freedom, as it was not obliged to follow any 
particular `party' line. Indeed, Laurence Cadbury, head of the main group of the 
4 Dirksen to German Foreign Office, 25 January 1939, DGFP 3s, iv, doc. 300, p. 390. 
5 Heads of Agreement, 2 June 1930, quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 519; see also Gannon, British 
Press, p. 3 8. 
6 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 520. 
Sinclair to Samuel, 14 October 1933, quoted in de Groot, Liberal Crusader, p. 102. 
8 W. R. Davies to Layton, 20 March 1936, Layton papers 75/83. 
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newspaper proprietors, later claimed that the `paper has always been, and still continues 
to be, independent and under no obligations to any political party'. 9 
All this meant that the News Chronicle accurately expressed mainstream Liberal 
beliefs - and difficulties - over European affairs. 
10 The Treaty of Versailles, with its 
intention of the Allied powers to place the blame and punishment on Germany alone, 
was incomprehensible to Liberal-minded thinkers. Instead they argued for a policy of 
reconciliation, and as time passed the Liberal press generally developed a guilt complex 
over the British government's treatment of Germany. To this was added a further 
element. As the `last citadel of Liberalism in the metropolitan morning press', " it was 
the News Chronicle's lot to reflect the painful dilemmas of late 1930s Liberal thought - 
an attachment to peace and collective security, yet also an anti-fascism which accepted 
that force might be required to resist military aggression. 
The Chronicle's difficulty in formulating a consistent editorial policy in these 
circumstances was made more difficult by internal tensions. The Cadbury family was 
suspected by many of the more `progressive' of the newspaper's staff as being `Tory 
wolves in Liberal sheep's clothing', 12 who prevented the newspaper from expressing a 
more definite Liberal perspective. 13 In reality, however, Laurence Cadbury delegated 
the editorial responsibility to the chairman of the paper's controlling board, Layton - 
who was also editor of The Economist, 1921-38.14 Both publications, as Layton's 
biographer stated, `reflected his views on international affairs and, in particular, his 
9 Laurence Cadbury to Layton, 16 December 1946, quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 385. 
10 For the Liberal attitude in the 1930s see Roy Douglas, The History of the Liberal Party 1895-1970 
(London, 1971), pp. 208-50; Chris Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party 1900-88 (London, 
1989), 
pp. 118-29, and Alan Sykes, The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism 1776-1988 
(London, 1997), pp. 233- 
64. 
Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 519. 
'2 Gannon, British Press, pp. 38-9. 
13 See Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 131; see also Thomas, `Bad Press', pp. 28,50. 
14 Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 128. 
203 
belief that security could only be assured if the League of Nations «was made 
effective'. 15 
The internal difficulty actually arose because the Chronicle's editor. Gerald 
Barry, was more radical and independent minded than either Layton or Cadbury. 'I am 
not', he told Layton, `attached to any party and I don't find that any one may today 
represent my political ideas in general'. 16 Barry's radical stance on foreign policy was 
supported by his staff, particularly Vernon Bartlett, the diplomatic correspondent and a 
leading supporter of the League of Nations, and A. J. Cummings, the political editor, 
described by Gannon as `probably the most influential, important, and well-informed 
radical journalist of the 1930s'. 17 In late 1938 they were joined by Reed, after his 
departure from The Times. 
More generally, the paper employed numerous left-wing journalists, even, 
Hubback claims, some Communists. '8 At one point it was rumoured that the News 
Chronicle was moving markedly towards the Labour party. 19 In mid 1937 Lloyd George 
claimed that `one had to turn to the News Chronicle to know what the Labour party was 
really up to'. 20 Cummings certainly showed sympathy towards Labour, and in mid-1939 
suggested a Liberal-Labour agreement to `avoid splitting the anti-appeasement vote'. 
21 
15 See ibid., p. 92. See also speech of Lady Layton `Public Opinion in England Today' (1939), Layton 
papers 1/24, which supported this view that British influence would increase `within such a wider 
organisation as the League of Nations'. This interesting speech could easily have been written by Layton 
himself. It attacked Conservative politics for being ignorant of the value of collective measurements and 
? raised the role the News Chronicle and the Daily Herald played in changing `public opinion'. 
6 Barry to Layton, 26 December 1933, Layton papers 1/38. 
17 Gannon, British Press, p. 40; see also Thomas, `Bad Press', p. 26. 
18 Gannon, British Press, p. 41, and Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 135. 
19 Douglas, History of the Liberal Party, pp. 235-6, who states that `[t]he idea of a Liberal-Labour 
alliance was pressed hard in the News Chronicle. ... and, although officially 
Liberal, exhibited throughout 
its life much tenderness for Labour'. 
20 Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 351 (12-14 June 1937). 
21 Quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 591. 
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Despite the left-wing tendency among the staff, Layton's direction of the 
Chronicle remained true to his own Liberal convictions. 22 As he defined the 
newspaper's position, `our attitude towards the Labour Party should be one of sympathy 
and support in matters where they are in agreement with Liberal ideas ... But this does 
not mean that we should give the impression of supporting the Labour Party as it at 
present exists'. 23 The News Chronicle, in other words, was certainly free from the 
constraints of any party-political affiliation; and its Liberal-Left ethos meant that it was 
particularly unlikely to succumb to influence or control from the Conservative- 
dominated government. 
In terms of circulation, the News Chronicle was the country's fourth strongest 
paper, with a readership of around 1,320,000 in 1937.24 For a newspaper no longer 
identified with a major political party and lacking financial support from an indulgent 
`press lord', maintaining this large circulation - and a consequent appeal to advertisers - 
was of highest commercial importance. Given this need to appeal to popular reading 
tastes, it is not surprising that questions were raised about the amount of space which 
the newspaper devoted to foreign news and international affairs. 25 Henry Cadbury, for 
instance, told Layton that he was `quite sure that ... the ordinary reader 
is not so 
politically minded as he was 30 years ago'. 26 The editor, however, had a different 
assessment of the requirements of a successful newspaper. In an undated speech he 
reflected on the main factors in selling advertising space, and concluded that they were 
not only circulation figures but also `reader appeal'. It was, he argued, the task of the 
editorial staff to create this reader appeal by a distinctive editorial approach and by 
22 See Charles Wintour, The Rise and Fall of Fleet Street (London, 1989), p. 72, and Hubback, No 
Ordinary, p. 135. 
23 Quoted in Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 136. 
24 See Gannon, British Press, p. 39. 
25 See ibid., p. 40. 
26 Henry Cadbury to Layton, 31 May 1938, quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 578. 
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`educating' its readers in this perspective: if it were not for a successful editorial policy, 
a paper would cease to exist'. 27 For Barry, part of this approach was to preserve good 
coverage of foreign news, with a focus on the League of Nations. This corresponded 
generally with Layton's conviction that international affairs should be controlled 
through `collective security and economic cooperation'. 28 In addition, well-balanced 
leader comment was supplemented by the inclusion of leading voices from across the 
whole political spectrum. In good Liberal style, the paper always gave room to a variety 
of news: even when appearing sympathetic towards the government during major 
political crises, it reported other, critical, views. 
*** 
The tension between the perspectives of the News Chronicle and the government 
first led to difficulties in July 1937, when the Foreign Office News Department 
informed Bartlett that it would be better, in the `public interest', if an article he had 
written about the British Ambassador in Berlin were not published. Bartlett was on 
good terms with the News Department, and it seems likely that he submitted the article 
to it more because he wished to keep it informed, than because he believed that he 
should seek its approval. Bartlett's article stated that: 
despite the fact that Great Britain and Germany find themselves on opposite 
sides in the Spanish crisis, British efforts to achieve an Anglo-German 
agreement are continuing. The zeal of the new British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir 
Nevile Henderson, calls imperatively for a word of warning ... 
from three 
separate sources I have received confirmation that the Ambassador's activities 
are causing uneasiness and on occasion, indignation. 29 
27 `An Editor Looks at Advertising', no date, Barry papers 3. 
28 Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 132. 
29 Quoted in Cockett, Twilight, pp. 30-1. 
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Peake at the Foreign Office objected because of the inappropriateness of an attack upon 
a public servant who would be unable to reply, but also because it could have 
unfortunate consequences for Henderson's standing in Berlin. He `sincerely hoped that 
the News Chronicle would refrain from publishing this article'. This appeal to 'public 
interest' persuaded Layton that the article should `not be published' . 
30 The incident has 
obvious significance in revealing how government officials were concerned about 
newspaper comment even before the full application of appeasement and even without 
German government involvement. Nevertheless, Peake had only expressed a `hope'; the 
decision not to publish had been Layton's - and his attitude was shaped by his own 
concern not to aggravate Anglo-German tensions. 
When Halifax's visit to Germany became publicly known, the Nelt's Chronicle's 
reaction was only lukewarm. The paper was prepared to give his mission the benefit of 
the doubt, but commented that `his visit may do great good' only if he adopted a strong 
position and made it clear that Britain would not be prepared to surrender its security. 31 
After Halifax returned from Germany, Layton was among the newspaper controllers he 
contacted. According to Layton's later memoirs, Halifax, 
after carefully explaining to me that he had no intention of trying to influence 
me in any way, he merely passed on a message at Goebbels' request addressed 
to myself and ... other 
journalists to the effect that Hitler was personally very 
sensitive to newspaper criticism and unfriendly cartoons and that this made it 
very difficult for an Englishman to deal with him. 32 
Cockett plainly wishes this to be read as evidence of government pressure. However, 
Layton also made a contemporary note of the conversation, which reinforces the 
conditional terms of Halifax's reported comments ('he had no intention of trying to 
influence me'). According to his note, Halifax said that he and Goebbels had discussed 
30 Minutes in FO 371/2042/5137,1495, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 31. 
31 News Chronicle, 13 November 1937, p. 8. 
32 Unpublished draft of `Layton Memoirs', quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 43. 
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what actions their respective governments could take towards the problem of newspaper 
criticism which threatened to poison Anglo-German relations. Halifax had, host ever. 
told Goebbels that `in the case of the British Press, the F. O. would inform the paper 
concerned, but of course, the latter would be under no compulsion but would be free to 
take whatever course it thought best'. 33 The extent of Halifax's efforts was therefore 
simply to report German government views to opposition newspaper controllers. He 
made it clear to both German ministers and to Layton (and so, presumably, to the other 
press controllers he saw) that the decisions on reports and editorial comment remained 
with the newspaper itself. Layton had been made aware of German complaints, but also 
been assured that there was no British government attempt to impose its own preference 
on editorial policy. 
*** 
Early in 1938 the Cadbury family established a new arrangement -a regular 
conference with Layton and Barry to review the newspaper's policy. The reasons for 
this are difficult to establish. From a declaration at the second conference, that the News 
Chronicle would continue its `Liberal tradition' of support for `liberty of conscience in 
the individual and for an anti-militaristic attitude towards international affairs', 
34 it 
would seem that the Cadburys were uneasy about its editorial stance. Cockett's further 
suggestion, that they were warned about the financial implications of the paper's anti- 
33 Note of Halifax-Layton conversation, November 1937, Layton papers 104/55: emphasis added. 
34 News Chronicle Policy Conference no. 2,18 February 1938, quoted in Cockett, Ttivilight. p. 60. 
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appeasement stance seems unconvincing, because contrary to his assertion that it was in 
a parlous financial state, other sources suggest that it remained profitable. 35 
In any event, the new arrangement was an internal one: there is no evidence that 
it reflected any concern about government criticism. Indeed, the News Chronicle reacted 
vigorously when it was rumoured in early March 1938 that the government ", as 
attempting to muzzle newspaper freedom under German pressure, and gave 
considerable coverage and comment to the House of Commons debate. The newspaper 
defended press freedom and rejected calls for censorship in the strongest terms. It did 
agree with Chamberlain that no `greater service could be rendered to the cause of peace 
than by the exercise of restraint and toleration by the press of all countries when dealing 
with foreign affairs, whether they are presenting or commenting on policies or 
personalities'. 36 This was, however, a characteristic identification with the principle of 
`responsible journalism', underpinned by the natural Liberal desire to avoid outright 
Anglo-German hostilities. The newspaper's commitment to free expression was 
demonstrated a week later, when the editor allowed Cummings to go still further in 
asserting journalistic independence. He not only defended the unique position of the 
British press, and expressed satisfaction that governments had no means of controlling it. 
He also warned against more sophisticated channels of censorship, just possibly 
prompted by concern about the caution of the Cadburys and Layton: 
I am not concerned at present about the possibility of any open and direct assault 
on the liberty of the British Press. What I am concerned about is ... approaches 
from abroad [which] either make cunning appeals for a `self-imposed' Press 
censorship or so control information as to produce something of the effect of a 
minor censorship on news. 37 
35 See Cockett, Twilight, pp. 60-1; cf. Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 131, who claims that the Chronicle 
became profitable the year after the amalgamation and stayed so for the next 25 years, and Wintour, Rise, 
p. 71. 
36 News Chronicle, 1 March 1938, p. 2. 
37 Ibid., 8 March 1938, pp. 10,13, with the reference to R. A. Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
which stressed the complete freedom of the British press on matters of concern to the country; see also 
News Chronicle, 22 March 1938, p. 10. 
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*** 
The News Chronicle was more than ready to challenge the isolationist creed of 
the Beaverbrook newspapers. It feared that if Britain did not get involved in Europe, 
`we shall run the terrible risk of being left alone'. In early 1938 it called a revitalised 
system of collective security, built around Czechoslovakia: 
we should maintain without qualification the principle of international right and 
thereby enlist the moral forces of the nation and the world, for if international 
right perishes, the British Empire, which cannot be defended by British force 
alone, will also perish. 38 
The newspaper was certain that Hitler would only negotiate if he knew that force would 
be met with cooperative resistance from other states: `this - and no nebulous idealism - 
is the hard practical reason why to throw over the collective principle is suicide for 
Britain'. 39 Even so, the proposals were not specific, and it can be argued that the News 
Chronicle did not offer a workable solution to the European crisis. Gannon remarks, 
dismissively, that `the words were strong, but their application vague and very probably 
impossible'. 40 Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the paper was not just 
opposing Beaverbrook's isolationism. This line was also critical of Chamberlain and the 
government, who remained reluctant to revive notions of armed collective security. 
Showing considerable political independence, the newspaper argued that Hitler would 
only understand `the threat of force', and consequently demanded that `we must rearm 
to the full and couple with rearmament the most energetic efforts possible to reconstruct 
the collective system while there is still time'. 41 
38 See ibid., 11 March 1938, p. 10; see Gannon, British Press, p. 158. 
39News Chronicle, 4 April 1938, p. 9. 
40 Gannon, British Press, p. 159. 
41 News Chronicle, 14 March 1938, p. 1. 
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The decision to advocate a stand on Czechoslovakia and to press for further 
rearmament represented a shift in the newspaper's editorial policy. Whereas before the 
Anschluss it supported collective action through the League, it now put its faith in a 
more robust support for guarantees and rearmament - ideas much in tune with the 
arguments of Churchill. This convergence between Churchill and the News Chronicle 
was significant in two senses. First, it indicated that Churchill was gaining support in 
Liberal quarters: this would earlier have been unlikely, but a contributing element was 
perhaps that the Chronicle shared Churchill's stance during the abdication. Second, and 
more important, this convergence meant that the News Chronicle broke ranks with 
existing Liberal efforts to preserve peace. 
The News Chronicle's problem remained that it could not formulate a consistent 
policy towards Germany. It clearly opposed German aggression; but it shifted between 
advocating a firmer action on rearmament, and a softer rhetoric about `the rule of 
international law and decency'. 42 This uncertain stance was manifested regularly in the 
paper, the more so because it opened its pages to a range of other opinions: after the 
Anschluss, Churchill, the trade union leaders and Labour politicians were all invited to 
publish their concerns about the threat to Czechoslovakia. The Chronicle especially 
promoted Churchill's call for collective security and accelerated rearmament as one 
which would give `a moral basis for British policy' 43 and gave much publicity to 
Churchill's parliamentary speeches. 44 
It is therefore not surprising that in late March 1938 the newspaper made its first 
attempt to promote an all-party coalition. Given the pro-Labour elements on its editorial 
staff, it looked especially towards the Labour party, expressing the hope that finally the 
42 Ibid., 15 March 1938, p. 10. This was in agreement with the Liberal party, which realised that 
rearmament was necessary, but insisted that arms could not substitute for diplomacy: it had to be part of a 
cohesive foreign policy based primarily on diplomacy: see De Groot, Liberal Crusader, pp. 125-26. 
'33 See News Chronicle, 16 March 1938, p. 10. 
44 See ibid., 17 March 1938, p. 1. 
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Liberal and Labour parties would find a practical and constructive basis for co-operation 
in pursuit of peace. `The old party divisions lose their meaning when the existence of 
civilisation is threatened. '45 When the Labour spokesman rejected the proposal, the 
newspaper declared that it found the move incomprehensible: 46 Cummings called it 
`diehardism at its narrowest and most stupid'. 47 Even so, the Newtws Chronicle did not 
give up hope of eventual co-operation, because it believed that 
an Alliance of the Progressive force is the only effective way of ensuring that 
peace and democracy will be preserved. Mr. Chamberlain's Government cannot 
be trusted to advance these causes; and it will not be defeated unless the 
Progressive forces concentrate on fighting it instead of fighting each other. '8 
*** 
So far we have seen that over a period of three months the paper's editorial 
comment underwent a definite process of evolution - advocating a stronger collective 
system, then security guarantees coupled with increased rearmament, then a Lib-Lab 
alliance to defeat the Chamberlain government. During the `May crisis', it welcomed 
what it believed to be a firm government stand. It claimed that an outbreak of hostilities 
had been averted by `the commendably prompt and vigorous representations of the 
British and French Governments to Berlin'. 49 The next day, Bartlett argued that `straight 
talk from Lord Halifax ... caused the greatest surprise 
in Berlin', 50 and that `if European 
peace is to be preserved', this would rest on the British position being clearly conveyed 
45 Ibid., 26 March 1938, p. 6. 
46 See Ibid., 14 April 1938, p. 8; see also ibid., 17 and 18 April 1938, p. 8. 
47 Ibid., 19 April 1938, p. 8. 
48 Ibid., 14 May 1938, p. 6. See also Layton's article on support for an alliance in ibid., 17 May 1938. 
p. 10: `For the Peace Alliance'. 
49 Ibid., 23 May 1938, p. 10. 
50 Ibid., 24 May 1938, p. 1. 
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to the German government. 51 The News Chronicle welcomed the Runciman mission. 
but nevertheless warned of a danger: `there is one possibility even worse than Britain's 
standing aloof and giving the Nazis a free hand against Prague and that is for Britain 
actually to help the Nazis'. 52 Rather, it should insist on Czechoslovakia's inclusion in a 
revised system of European security. 53 `For Great Britain to say plainly where it stands 
is to lessen the danger of conflict. It is not war-mongering to declare that in certain 
eventualities we should have to fight, but the very reverse. ' 54 It was also a line 
consistent with the principles of defending democracy and upholding obligations under 
the League of Nations covenant. British support was therefore seen as a necessity by the 
News Chronicle, and it urged the government `to stand firm on that positive policy, 
well-founded in their obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations'. 55 
In September 1938, the Chronicle was sure that a stand should be taken against 
Germany. It even asserted that if Britain had made its resistance towards Imperial 
Germany clear in 1914, there would have been no Great War. 56 In marked contrast to 
Chamberlain's attitude, it argued that `today Great Britain is solidly united ... 
in a firm 
resolve to resist aggression'. 57 It also argued that firmness towards Germany should be 
linked with the inclusion of Russia in any collective action, a line it pursued with 
greater conviction than any other newspaper. `Peace can still be preserved', a leading 
article stated, `but it calls for the most resolute action by the British Government 
working in the closest agreement with Czechoslovakia itself and with France and Russia; 
and there is not a moment to be lost'. 58 Right up until the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact 
it 
51 Ibid., 24 May 1938, p. 10. 
52 Ibid., 29 July 1938, p. 8. 
53 Ibid., 25 July 1938, p. 10; ibid., 29 July 1938, p. 8; see also ibid., 27 July 1938, p. 10. 
sa Ibid., 29 July 1938, p. 10. 
55 Ibid., 15 September 1938, p. 10; also 17 September 1938, p. 6; for Bartlett's point see ibid., 9 
September 1938, p. 2. 
56 See ibid., 20 September 1938, pp. 6,1. 
57 Ibid., 12 September 1938, p. 10. 
58 Ibid., 14 September 1938, p. 10. 
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maintained that any discussion about the future of Central Europe should include Russia. 
It was anxious about the government's apparent indifference towards Russia's 
significance. Cummings noted that `no British Minister has committed the indelicacy of 
even mentioning Russia in a public speech', 59 and warned that if Russia was excluded 
from any joint action, `the Western Powers could not stand for a day against German 
aggression'. 60 
When Chamberlain announced his decision to visit Hitler, the Chronicle 
supported his readiness to make such a bold move, without `standing on his dignity'. It 
hoped that he would take a firm stand - but was speedily disillusioned . 
61 The paper was 
strongly opposed to the Anglo-French proposals; so when Chamberlain visited Hitler 
for a second time, the News Chronicle was much less enthusiastic, and pointedly argued 
that public opinion was hardening against cession of Sudeten areas. 62 When it then saw 
Czechoslovakia `deserted by France and Britain', it criticised the democracies for `not 
only [having] failed to relieve the totalitarian pressure on Czechoslovakia but [having] 
dissolved before it' , 
63 
There was a further reason for the Chronicle urging a firm stand. Barry had been 
in contact with Carl Goerdeler, who was connected with the German political 
opposition and in touch with officers in the Wehrmacht. Goerdeler urged Barry to 
promote a strong British resistance towards Hitler, because he believed that in such 
circumstances the Wehrmacht would not march on Hitler's orders. 64 This, and also other 
sources of information on opinions critical of Hitler, proved to be of great importance 
59 Ibid., 6 September 1938, p. 8. 
60 Ibid., 13 September 1938, p. 10; also 14 September 1938, p. 10,19 September 1938, p. 10, and I 
October 1938, p. 6. 
61 Ibid., 16 September 1938, p. 10. 
62 Ibid., 21 September 1938, p. 10. 
63 Ibid., 22 September 1938, p. 10. 
64 See records of conversation with Goerdeler, 6 and 7 August, 11 September, and 15 October 1938, 
Barry papers 5. 
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later in September, when Barry and his colleagues came under pressure from Layton. 
who had been contacted by Hoare. 
For Cockett to write of these discussions as resulting in `spectacular success' for 
Hoare (and so for the Chamberlainite efforts to control press comment) is to overstate 
their effect, as other evidence indicates. 65 Hoare was not confident that Layton had been 
convinced by his arguments. Kennedy, the United States ambassador, who spoke with 
Hoare shortly after his meetings with newspaper controllers, reported that `he hoped 
that Layton would [play ball] but was not quite sure yet'. 66 According to Hubback, the 
exchange was far from one-sided. Layton tried to persuade Hoare that Britain and its 
potential allies were together stronger than Nazi Germany, and that to show weakness 
and concede Hitler's demands would be to hand over Central Europe to Hitler. 67 
Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Layton now intervened in the editorial 
process. On 28 September 1938 he stopped the publication of an article reporting on a 
leaflet obtained from Czechoslovakia, which claimed to reveal Hitler's timetable of 
territorial acquisitions. 68 Instead he sent the leaflet, reporting his own intervention, to 
Chamberlain, for which he received Hoare's thanks. 69 Publication would probably have 
complicated - perhaps jeopardised - Chamberlain's efforts for agreement with 
Hitler, 
by supplying further ammunition to the anti-appeasement critics. Cockett makes much 
of this incident. Yet Hubback records that Layton had discussed the matter with Barry, 
and while they were still discussing whether or not to publish, the Munich negotiations 
65 Cockett, Twilight, p. 79. 
66 Kennedy to the Secretary of State, 17 September 1938, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Diplomatic Papers 1938, vol. I (Washington, 1955), p. 611; on the episode see Cockett, Twilight, p. 75. 
67 See Hubback, No Ordinary , pp. 
156-7. 
68 For a more detailed discussion of the timetable, see Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 157. 
69 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 79. 
215 
made it seem redundant. As Layton later remembered, 'as so often happens when great 
issues are at stake some practical consideration settles the matter'. 70 
Several years later, Barry himself recalled that Layton had 'caused a much 
modified leader to be written', replacing, without prior consultation, a Barry text which 
was more critical of Chamberlain's policy. 7' On the day Chamberlain left for Munich an 
article by William Forrest, to which Barry had no objections, was suppressed on 
Layton's instructions. Layton's explanation for this second incident is important: at 
such a desperately dangerous moment'72 it would be unfortunate to publish criticism of 
Chamberlain, and he may well have thought the same of Barry's leader. 73 Layton's 
objection was one of timing, rather than the substance of Forrest's article. As Barry later 
wrote to Layton, the article was `stopped by you, your ruling being that we must go a bit 
slow, as the P. M. had received a great national welcome'. " 
Another difficulty arose over a report from Bartlett. Sent to Prague to comment 
on the Czechoslovakian dimensions of the Hitler-Chamberlain discussions, Bartlett 
wrote that the Munich settlement was `an almost complete capitulation to Hitler'. 
According to Barry's later recollection, Layton questioned the accuracy of this verdict, 
while he argued that `we ought to trust our man on the spot! '75 A fierce discussion 
apparently followed, after which, according to Cockett and Koss, Layton got his way 
and the article was withheld. `If that's the news', Barry was told, `it's too yellow to 
print'. 76 Yet other evidence indicates a different outcome. Margach recalled that Barry 
and his editorial staff `joined in unprecedented (and successful) strike action' against 
70 Layton memoirs, quoted in Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 158. 
7' Barry to Layton, 14 December 1944, Barry papers 11. 
72 Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 546-7. 
73 It is possible that Barry's 1944 recollection actually referred to the Forrest article - that he had 
misremembered the details. 
74 Barry to Layton, 14 December 1944, Barry papers 11. 
75 Ibid. 
76 See Cockett, Twilight, pp. 79-80; quoted also in Gannon, British Press, p. 39, and Koss, Rise and Fall, 
ii, p. 547. 
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Layton's decision. 77 Barry had `at once reacted vigorously to his boss's assault on his 
editorial freedom. He announced that he would not bring the paper out because he had 
total trust in Bartlett's judgement'. 78 Faced with this rebellion, Layton withdrew his 
veto on Bartlett's report. Bartlett's own recollection supports Margach's account: 
[t]he effect of this article was so depressing that Walter said it couldn't be used 
in the N. C., but Gerald Barry and other important members of the N. C. staff said 
the paper would not be printed without the article from its special correspondent. 
Walter gave way, and my article was printed in full. I. of course, knew nothing 
of all this. 79 
What should be made of all this evidence? Hoare undoubtedly tried to influence Layton, 
and Layton undoubtedly tried to influence editorial decisions. Yet Layton - as well as 
the News Chronicle's editorial staff - had been critical of government policies before 
the Munich visit, and (as we shall see) would be so again. These incidents refer only to 
the very specific period of the Munich negotiations, which seemed to be on the edge of 
peace or war - and which had the potential to create a new basis for Anglo-German 
relations. Rather than Layton cravenly submitting to ministerial pressure, he seems to 
have debated the issue with Hoare. It appears likely that in deciding to intervene, he 
acted on his own `highly [developed] sense of responsibility', concluding that the 
Chronicle should not at this point print controversial material which might cause 
difficulties not just for the government, but for the nation. 80 And it seems that the 
decision turned on the issue of appropriate timing, rather than on content. 
This interpretation is supported by the way that in the following weeks, the News 
Chronicle became a fierce critic of the Munich agreement: clearly, if its controllers had 
yielded to government persuasion, this had only been in exceptional circumstances. 
Although it acknowledged the agreement had brought universal relief, it declared that 
" Margach, Abuse of Power, p. 5. 
78 Ibid., p. 60. 
79 Bartlett, in April 1982, quoted in Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 163. 
80 Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 159, and Wintour, Rise and Fall, p. 73. 
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`we may already begin to ask what is the price we have had to pay. That price is the 
sacrifice of a small and noble people'. 8' The newspaper criticised Chamberlain for 
confusing the `enthusiasm resulting from relief at the sudden removal of the threat of 
war with endorsement of the policy by which that removal was brought about . 
82 It 
regarded Munich as a lost opportunity: `Hitler had faltered. This was the moment when 
we could have won an important diplomatic victory for democracy and have decisively 
checked dictatorship and what it stands for. It was the hour of destiny, but the 
opportunity was lost. ' It also identified the contradiction in government policies: If Mr. 
Chamberlain has truly made friends with Germany, against whom shall we be 
arming? '83 When reflecting on future British policy, it again seemed close to Churchill 
in its promotion of increased international cooperation. The News Chronicle, it declared, 
`has consistently held that the democracies could and should stand up to the 
dictatorships and that by doing so they could ensure without war the rule of order as 
against aggression'. 84 
Further, striking, evidence of the Chronicle's stance lies in the attitudes of its 
owners, the Cadbury family. Paul Cadbury was so disillusioned by the newspaper's 
criticism of Chamberlain that he told his brother Laurence that he proposed to exchange 
his shares in the Chronicle for an interest in another newspaper, the Birmingham Post, 
which had for over 50 years been under Chamberlain' family influence. Laurence, 
however, the chief force behind the editorial conference established earlier in the year, 
told Layton that he disagreed with his brother - and revealed that he himself was in 
touch with Eden. 85 The newspaper's chief owner was therefore in sympathy with Barry 
and his staff. And by the middle of October, they criticised the Munich agreement as 
81 News Chronicle, 1 October 1938, p. 6. 
82 Ibid., 3 October 1938, p. 10. 
83 Ibid.. 
84 Ibid., 3 October 1938, p. 10, and 7 October 1938, p. 10. 
85 See Laurence Cadbury to Layton, 8 October 1938, quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 582. 
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`nothing but a tragic farce', and deemed Cabinet ministers as `not up to the standard' 
required to deal with the international problems ahead. 86 A week later it declared that 
`the Cabinet must be made more representative of the nation', and argued for the 
inclusion of Churchill and opposition politicians in a re-modelled government. 87 Even if, 
through Layton, the newspaper had been subjected to some degree of government 
influence in late September, this had clearly only been momentary. It very soon reverted 
to its independent - and critical - line. 
88 
There was, however, a further instance of Layton's interference. In November 
the newspaper published an opinion poll on attitudes towards the government and its 
policies. 89 Layton withheld one result, and reported his action to Chamberlain: that 86% 
of those polled did not trust Hitler's promise that the Sudeten areas had been his last 
territorial demand. 
Cockett draws large and sweeping conclusions from the incident: it proved 
more than anything else that the press as a whole was no longer expressing public 
opinion, or even attempting to express it. The press had become an instrument of 
foreign policy'. 90 Yet this statement fails to stress that the News Chronicle was the very 
first newspaper to commission a Gallup poll, and that it did publish the rest of the poll's 
findings, which would not have been entirely to Chamberlain's liking: that 37% were 
dissatisfied with Chamberlain's leadership, and 72% wanted increased armaments. To 
this extent, the News Chronicle was most certainly expressing public opinion, and in an 
innovative way. Nor does Cockett's statement give adequate weight to Layton's own 
explanation of his action. He told Chamberlain that he had withheld the findings about 
Hitler's intentions not because he had `any doubt that they faithfully reflect British 
86 News Chronicle, 13 October 1938, p. 10. 
87 Ibid., 20 October 1938, p. 10. 
88 See ibid., 8 October 1938, p. 6; see also ibid., 4 October 1938, p. 10. 
89 For the result, see Cockett, Twilight, p. 101. 
90 Cockett, Twilight, p. 101. 
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opinion', but because he feared that `so blunt an advertisement of the state of British 
opinion on this matter would exacerbate feelings in Germany'. 91 In other xvords. Layton 
had made an independent judgment about the risks of contributing to increased German 
aggression. The fear and horror of war was so great that, as he would later recall, the 
newspapers tended `not to arouse antagonism with the Germans', and that the general 
`atmosphere of the thirties tended towards caution'. 92 This attitude was not equivalent to 
a newspaper subordinating its content and editorial comment to government wishes, as 
is clear from the Chronicle's criticism of Chamberlain's policies, indeed of the 
continuation of his present government. The criticisms were by this time so fundamental 
that it is difficult to understand how the Chronicle could be considered `an instrument' 
of Chamberlain's foreign policy. Moreover, one should consider why Layton sent the 
poll result to Chamberlain, emphasising that he believed it an accurate expression of 
public opinion. Plainly he was, in his own way, warning Chamberlain against a 
continuation of his existing policies. 
Moreover, Chamberlain can have had no doubt of where Layton and the 
Chronicle stood. Aside from the content of the newspaper, they had recently 
demonstrated their opposition to the government very clearly. Earlier in November 
1938, they had supported the candidature of Bartlett, the Chronicle journalist, in the 
Bridgwater by-election. Increasingly, 1930s by-elections had come to be regarded as 
referenda on foreign policy, and Bartlett stood on an anti-Munich platform against 
the 
government candidate. 93 His victory on 17 November was widely regarded as a 
`triumph for the opponents of Munich'. 94 
91 Layton to Chamberlain, 26 November 1938, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 101. 
92 Royal Commission on the Press, Evidence, qq. 8206,8208,4 March 1948. 
93 See John Ramsden, `Note: 1931-1939', in Chris Cook and John Ramsden (eds. ), By-Elections in 
British 
Politics (London, 1997), p. 91, and lain McLean, `Oxford and Bridgwater', in Chris Cook and 
John 
Ramsden (eds. ), By-Elections in British Politics, p. 113. 
94 McLean, `Oxford and Bridgwater', p. 121. 
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Whatever Layton's earlier concerns about Barry's editorial decisions. by early 
1939 he had discarded any doubts. As he wrote to Barry, your outline of news policy 
will, of course, have my fullest support'. 95 What this meant after Hitler's entry into 
Prague, was intensified criticism of the government. It was almost contemptuous of 
Chamberlain's House of Commons speech. His arguments that the German action gave 
no reason to act upon the guarantee to Czechoslovakia, `were those of a distant 
spectator of a tiresome conflict in a land of which he "knows nothing"'. 96 At Munich 
Chamberlain had `believed he was righting an injustice, but instead he has opened the 
floodgates of injustice'. 97 The Chronicle argued that a new policy was urgently needed, 
but feared that while he remained prime minister no one would believe that 
appeasement was dead. 98 
The News Chronicle argued that this new line of policy should be a `Peace 
Front', which should include Russia as `an equally essential element' in the coalition. 99 
But it was well aware that this approach remained unacceptable to the government. 
`Latent prejudice' against Russia remained strong, indeed it feared that the Cabinet 
`would still prefer to deal with Hitler's Germany than with Stalin's Russia'. '°° But its 
staff and controller were now sure that they expressed public opinion: `in view of the 
almost unanimous feeling of public opinion in favour of an alliance with Russia ... we 
should continue to press the Government to lose no time in concluding their 
negotiations with that country. ' 101 
95 Layton to Barry, 25 January 1939, Barry papers 21. 
96 HC Deb 345, col. 223,14 March 1939; News Chronicle, 15 March 1939, p. 10. 
97 Ibid.. 
98 See Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 12, and ibid., 18 March 1939, p. 6; see also ibid., 17 March 1939, p. 10. 
The paper was therefore in line with the leader of the Liberal Party, Sinclair; see De Groot, Liberal 
Crusader, p. 134. 
99 News Chronicle, 20 March 1939, p. 10; also 21 March 1939, p. 10. 
ioo Ibid., 22 March 1939, p. 1. 
101 Policy Conference, 19 May 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 116. 
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The News Chronicle welcomed the government's commitment to Polish security. 
but still thought that it did not go far enough: it continued to press for a Russian 
alliance. 102 When in August 1939 the German-Russian pact was concluded, this was a 
great blow for the Chronicle. Barry, probably the strongest supporter of an An`glo- 
Russian alliance, concluded that `Russia and Germany have now obtained complete 
mastery over Europe' and suggested that Britain should now advise 'Poland to negotiate 
its 
... 
independence with Germany. 103 Ironically, Layton opposed Barry's suggestion, 
taking the firmer line that Britain should stand by its guarantee. '°4 
*** 
In the early part of the war, Layton was not among the economic experts and 
technocrats recruited by Whitehall. Chamberlain's Downing Street remembered the 
criticisms of the News Chronicle. 105 In contrast, soon after Churchill became prime 
minister, Layton was brought into government service, as he had been in the First 
World War. His actions in late September 1938 left him open to criticism at the time, 
and have provided fuel for subsequent historical arguments about the role of 
newspapers in the 1930s. A wider criticism is that at times the newspaper appeared to 
be journalistically and ideologically inconsequential'. 106 In this, it embodied the 
dilemmas of Liberal journalism. Layton's own views were `very much in keeping with 
the progressive thinkers of his generation who were convinced that there must never be 
102 See News Chronicle, 31 March 1939, p. 12. 
103 Policy Conference No. 34,24 August 1939, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 117. 
104 Ibid.; see also Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 166. 
105 See Hoare, Nine Troubled Years, p. 396; also Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 167. ok 
106 Gannon, British Press, p. 38. Equally the very sympathetic study of George Glenton and William 
Pattinson, The Last Chronicle of Bouverie Street (London, 1963. ), p. 58. 
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another war'. 107 Like the owners, the Cadburys, and like Barry and his editorial staff, he 
found that the main Liberal prescription - collective security and economic co-operation 
under the League of Nations - could not withstand the force and ruthlessness of Italian 
and German fascism. The Chronicle was uncertain about specific means to check such 
aggression; and during the worst points of the Czechoslovakian crisis Layton was torn 
between doubts about government policy and the desire to assist any effort for peace. 
Nevertheless, the newspaper maintained a strong anti-fascist and anti-Nazi position, and 
was a persistent critic of Chamberlain's appeasement. Once the newspaper - and indeed 
Layton himself - is assessed on the record beyond a small number of (ambiguous) 
incidents in September and November 1938, it becomes plain that the case of the Net's 
Chronicle refutes more than it supports Cockett's argument. 
107 Hubback, No Ordinary, p. 147. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE DAILYHERALD: MOUTHPIECE OF LABOUR 
OR INDEPENDENT VOICE OF THE LEFT? 
Cockett treats the Daily Herald as another case of successful government 
influence; yet this was the newspaper which expressed the views of the chief opposition 
party. The Labour party and the Trade Union Congress were doubly opposed to Cabinet 
policies. As staunch supporters of the League of Nations, they continued - even after 
the Abyssinian and Rhineland crises - to advocate collective security. ' Although from 
1935 they abandoned their earlier commitment to disarmament, 2 they were so 
suspicious of the National government's foreign policy and unilateral rearmament that 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) at first continued to vote against the service 
estimates. 3 Only from 1937 did it concede implicit support for the government's 
rearmament by abstaining on the estimates, but at the same time it became increasingly 
critical towards Chamberlain's appeasement towards Germany and Italy. 4 
Cockett's argument depends upon the fact that the Herald was under dual 
ownership, with 51 % of its shares owned by its publishers, Odhams Press, itself chiefly 
owned by Lord Southwood. 5 Cockett's evidence is that Southwood was among the 
newspaper controllers seen by Halifax after his German visit, that there were evidently 
later meetings between the two, and that during the Czechoslovakian crisis the Herald 
1 See John F. Naylor, Labour's International Policy. The Labour Party in the 1930s (London, 1969), p. 3; 
also Jerry H. Brookshire, "'Speak for England", Act for England: Labour's leadership and British national 
security under the threat of war in the late 1930s', EHQ 29 (1999), pp. 255-6. 
2 See Brookshire, "'Speak for England"', here p. 251. 
3 See Andrew Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party (London, 1997), p. 90; also Naylor, Labour's 
International Policy, pp. 148,253. 
4 Best explored in ibid, 154-7,191-6; also Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge, 
1977), p. 149; Brookshire, "'Speak for England"', p. 256. 
5 Julius Salter Elias, born 1873, was made Lord Southwood in 1937 for his attitude during the abdication 
crisis, in which the Daily Herald criticised the King from a strictly constitutional point that the King had 
to follow Cabinet advice: Daily Herald, 3 December 1936, p. 8; see also R. J. Minney, Viscount 
Southwood (London, 1954), p. 293. A more critical picture is given in Francis Williams, Dangerous 
Estates (1957), pp. 188-9,192-3, and Nothing So Strange (1970), p. 141. 
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argued that Chamberlain's efforts for peace should be supported. Cockett concludes that 
Southwood was a `pliant visitor' to Halifax's rooms at the Foreign Office, and that the 
Herald's line in September 1938 was `prompted by the government's warnings'. 6 
Yet Cockett himself offers another explanation for the attitude of both 
Southwood and the Herald. `By favouring the prospects of Anglo-German 
rapprochement in his paper, he [Southwood] would be fostering the economic 
conditions which would attract advertising to his own paper. '? This was even more so 
because, along with the News Chronicle, the Daily Herald was `least able to resist the 
commercial implications arising out of the European situation in 1937-40'. 8 Cockett in 
effect offers two explanations for the Herald's stance just before Munich, and it is not 
obvious that the one he prefers is accurate. Were government efforts to influence the 
newspaper effective or relevant, if its stance was determined by commercial 
considerations? There is a further, crucial issue: who really controlled the Daily 
Herald's editorial policies? 
Although Odhams had become the majority shareholder, the Herald's traditions 
in the recent past had considerable bearings on its political character. From 1922 to 
1929 it had been wholly owned by the TUC and Labour party, and was ostensibly their 
official organ. 9 Yet the editorial staff had run it as an independent Labour newspaper, 
free to criticise the Labour leadership and Labour governments. 10 When the larger part 
of the Herald was sold to Odhams, the TUC retained 49% of the shares and overall 
control of editorial policy. " On the other hand, Southwood (or Elias as he then was) 
became chairman of the newspaper, with control of its publishing and commercial 
6 Cockett, Twilight, pp. 43-4,59-60. 
Ibid., 44. 
8 Ibid., pp. 61-2. 
9 Richards, Bloody, p. 2. 
10 See Henry Hamilton Fyfe, My Seven Selves (London, 1935), pp. 258-9; also Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 
440 and Richards, Bloody, p. 80. 
11 For details of purchase see Richards, Bloody, pp. 136-8 and Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 482-4. 
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activities. In practice this arrangement worked quite well. 12 Richards, the newspaper's 
main historian, argues that the Herald was different from other national newspapers in 
that `where other Fleet Street papers were essentially commercial in motivation, the 
Herald was overtly political. Fleet Street's ideology was capitalist, but the Herald 
espoused anti-capitalism'. 13 Yet for Southwood the newspaper's blend of political 
engagement and commercial outlook was clearly a `marriage of convenience'. 14 His 
initial interest was wholly commercial: as a publisher he wanted a newspaper to keep 
his printing machines busy during the week, and keep his company commercially sound. 
As Wintour remarked, `to safeguard business ... 
it was necessary to expand. ... The 
needs of the presses were indeed driving the whole strategy of the company'. '5 
This apolitical stance is emphasised by the fact that he had originally tried to 
gain control of the Conservative Morning Post and then the Liberal News Chronicle, 
before turning to the Herald. 16 He had an `ultra commercial approach': 17 Francis 
Williams, editor from 1937-40, described him as `a salesman of journalism, not a 
journalist', 18 while for Cudlipp, Williams's successor, he was `never a journalist, always 
a printer'. 19 Southwood was not, then, a `press baron' like Beaverbrook or Rothermere, 
because he did not use the Herald as an instrument for his own political agenda. 
20 Yet 
because the Daily Herald was not part of a larger newspaper empire, it did not have the 
same financial strength of the Beaverbrook and Rothermere newspapers, and so 
had to 
be more responsive to the market than the Daily Express or Daily 
Mail. Sales and 
12 See Minney, Southwood, p. 230. 
13 Richards, Bloody, p. 1. 
14 Adrian Smith, `The Fall and Fall of the Third Daily Herald, 1930-64', in Peter Catterall, 
Colin 
Seymour-Ure and Adrian Smith (eds. ), Northcliffe's Legacy. Aspects of the British Popular 
Press, 1896- 
1996 (London, 2000), p. 172. 
15 Charles Wintour, The Rise and Fall of Fleet Street (London, 1989), p. 51. 
16 See Minney, Southwood, pp. 220-2, and Wintour, Rise, p. 54. 
17 Wintour, Rise, p. 58. 
18 Williams, Nothing so Strange, p. 131. 
19 Hugh Cudlipp, At your peril (London, 1962), p. 268. 
20 Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, `1914-1976', in Boyce, Curran, and Wingate (eds. 
). 'ewspaper 
History, p. 142; see also Cockett, Twilight, p. 44. 
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advertisers became a large concern for Southwood. The Daily Herald's readership was 
working-class and lower middle-class in background, and it had been brought back on 
the newspaper market with an offensive design of free gifts (e. g. books) and insurance 
schemes, supported by door-to-door canvassing. In 1933 it became the first British 
newspaper to attain a circulation of two million. 21 Even so its financial position 
remained vulnerable, because it could not attract really large sums in advertising 
revenue. 
Formally, political control of the Daily Herald lay with the Labour movement. 
and more directly the TUC. Bevin, the dominant individual in the TUC General Council 
was in the habit of calling the Herald `my paper'. 22 Lloyd George claimed that `Bevin 
controlled the Herald', to such an extent that in order to find out what was happening in 
the rest of the Labour party `you had to read the News Chronicle'. 23 Certainly Williams 
was a friend of Bevin, and their views were in close accord. But in practice neither 
Bevin nor the rest of the TUC or Labour party exercised close supervision. Williams 
later recalled that although he attended meetings of the newspaper's board, he only 
`kept such contact as he felt was necessary with the political leaders and the trade 
unionists'. The initiative lay with him: he `would approach them, and not be approached 
by the Party or the Trade Unions'. 24 Moreover, many events developed so rapidly that 
the Herald's editorial staff had no time to seek guidance from party and TUC 
committees. These could consult with the editor over the general framework of editorial 
comment and journalistic commentary on foreign and defence policies, but could not 
determine reactions towards one of Hitler's `weekend surprises'. Smith has concluded 
that `other than at moments of national crisis, such as August 1931 or September 1938 
21 Gannon, British Press, p. 42. 
22 See Naylor, Labour's, p. 177 and Thomas, `Bad Press', p. 24. 
23 Quoted in Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 555-6, and Richards, Bloody, p. 183. 




[they] simply kept an eye on editorial content. Day-to-day management of the paper's 
affairs they left almost entirely to the presumed experts'. 25 Consequently the editor and 
his staff were sometimes more critical of government policy than the Labour leadership. 
As Koss stated, `the Daily Herald, however closely bound to the Labour hierarchy by 
its managerial structure, frequently diverged from the official Labour position, which, in 
any case, was seldom firmly established'. 26 Its support for greater rearmament during 
1938, in advance of the Labour leadership's position, was particularly indicative of a 
substantial independence from an official party line. 
Any differences with the Labour movement's leaders on political issues were 
marginal compared to those between the editor and Southwood over commercial 
matters. 27 Southwood was uneasy about Williams' Herald, while Williams later stated 
that he `came to hate him [Southwood] more than any man I have ever known'. 28 
Williams and his staff maintained a high quality of political reports and commentary, 
including considerable amounts on the dangers of the Nazi regime. But given the 
commercial pressures, especially once the Herald was overtaken by the Daily Express 
in circulation figures, Southwood pressed Williams to include more lighter news and 
entertainment: `Make them smile - cheer them up. The news is grim enough. We ought 
to have something on every page to lighten their hearts'. 
29 Williams later claimed that 
his resignation as editor in 1940 was a result of the `numerous occasions on which the 
commercial proprietors of the paper felt sure, that the political stance of the paper `was 
likely to drive away some public support for the newspaper, and some advertising 
25 Smith, `Fall', p. 172. 
26 Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 552-3. 
27 Gannon, British Press, p. 43. 
28 Williams, Nothing So Strange, p. 131. 
29 Francis Williams, Press, Parliament and People (London, 1964), pp. 155-6; Minney, Southwood, p. 
286. For similar pressure on the editor, see Cudlipp, At Your Peril, p. 272. 
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support'. He even accused Southwood of cutting and sub-editing articles on the 
grounds that the expression of policy was too vigorous'. 30 
Cudlipp also claimed that Southwood mourned that the only idea our editorial 
people have is to depress and horrify our readers'. 31 Many years later another member 
of the editorial staff, Douglas Jay, claimed that there were commercial pressures on the 
paper to support Chamberlain's policy. 32 Yet neither Williams nor Cudlipp went so far 
as to accuse Southwood of political motives. At the time of Williams' criticisms in 
1948, Odhams Press firmly denied that the paper's editorial policies and political views 
were affected by commercial purposes. If any article was cut, this was because of its 
length - and a member of its editorial board insisted that in such cases Williams was 
always informed, and had the last word. 33 Though members of staff confirmed that 
Southwood `very likely did ... talk generally about optimism', 
34 this happened in a 
friendly atmosphere, usually over lunch, and the word `pressure' certainly does not 
apply here. Cudlipp himself did not regard Southwood's desire for a more cheerful 
paper as a pressure that affected his political comment. 35 Quite what was the truth of the 
matter between Southwood and Williams is hard to define; but what seems clear is that 
Southwood was not regarded as acting as an agent of Chamberlain's government. 
*** 
When Halifax asked to speak with Southwood on his return from Germany in 
1937, it seems that his main concern was not so much with the Daily Herald's political 
30 Royal Commission on the Press, Evidence, 15 October 1947, q. 435: see also Koss, Rise and 
Fall, ii, p. 
546. 
31 Royal Commission on the Press, Evidence, 31 March 1948, q. 9064. 
32 See Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune (London, 1980), p. 71. 
33 Royal Commission on the Press, Evidence, 31 March 1948, q. 9059. 
34 See Ibid., qq. 9062 and 9063. 
35 Ibid., q. 9064. 
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reports and editorial commentary, as with the ridicule directed against German leaders 
by the newspaper's cartoonist, Will Dyson. On this matter Southwood was sympathetic. 
Halifax later commented that `I think you were disposed to take the view that the 
temper in which we all wished to see cartoonists portraying public characters was that 
of humour without cruelty'. 36 Southwood suggested that Halifax should contact him 
directly if he had any complaint, and a few days later Halifax did so. 37 He described a 
cartoon in that morning's Herald as `malevolently' and `unjustly cruel', and likely to 
make efforts to improve Anglo-German relations more difficult. 38 Southwood agreed 
that it might have been `less grotesque', and said that he had spoken with Dyson. He 
also assured Halifax that he largely agreed with him on `the big issues that matter'. Yet 
by this he can only have meant the maintenance of peace, because Halifax seems to 
have been satisfied with Southwood's comment that the newspaper's editorial line was 
based on Labour party policy. In other words, the Herald was essentially only making 
the same criticisms of the government as those of the chief opposition politicians - and 
on that, Halifax, as a parliamentary politician, could have no reasonable complaint. 
39 
In June 1938 Jay claimed that after Halifax became Foreign Secretary in 
February, he had `several times' sent for Southwood. Jay concluded that these visits had 
`some reflection ... 
in pressure' on the Herald `to prevent too critical a line on foreign 
policy'. It is this evidence which Cockett renders as meaning that Southwood was 
`pliant'. 40 However, for proper assessment of Jay's evidence - and of how far Halifax 
rather than commercial concerns effected any `pressure' on the Herald's editorial staff, 
and, indeed, whether there really was significant and effective `pressure' - what 
is 
36 Halifax to Southwood, 1 December 1937, Halifax Papers, A4.410.3.2 (xviii). 
37 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 43. 
38 Halifax to Southwood, 6 December 1937, Halifax Papers, A4.410.3.2 (xviii). 
39 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 43-4. 
40 The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918-1940, ed. by Ben Pimlott (London, 1986), p. 233 (5 
June 
1938); Cockett, Twilight, p. 44. 
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needed is close examination of the newspaper's reports and commentary, on German 
actions and British government policy. 41 
In the weeks before Halifax's appointment to the Foreign Office, the Herald had 
published a series of leading articles on the League of Nations and collective security, 
which clearly expressed its opposition not just to British conciliation towards Nazism, 
but also to the British government itself . 
42 On 21 February Williams supported the 
Labour party line that `this Government must go', because Chamberlain had no belief in 
collective security but instead followed powerful financial interests in seeking close 
collaboration with fascist powers. 43 
When Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary and was replaced by Halifax, the 
Herald expressed support for Eden as a champion of the League. " The newspaper's 
diplomatic correspondent, W. N. Ewer, discussed Chamberlain's concerns for 
`appeasement of Europe, general settlement, removal of misunderstandings' as 
praiseworthy - but `it isn't a policy. ' It also criticised Chamberlain's notion of a four 
Power Pact, excluding Russia and the League of Nations. 45 And it firmly reasserted its 
own independence, amidst the rumours that the government was seeking to silence or 
`guide' the British press. Ewer declared that any such efforts would be unsuccessful 
`except in a few cases' - meaning the Conservative newspapers - while a 
leading article 
insisted that the government had `no legal right to control the press.... That principle is 
vital to democracy'. 46 
41 It is not entirely clear from Cockett's paragraphs whether he thinks that Halifax or `commerce' was the 
larger influence with Southwood, though of course the whole book implies the former. What 
is clear is 
that Cockett uses no evidence from the Herald itself in this period. Rather (and oddly), 
his discussion 
shifts to a different Southwood publication, John Bull, at a different date (March 
1939): Cockett, Twilight, 
pp. 44-5. 
42 See Daily Herald, 4 February 1938, p. 10; ibid., 15 February 1938, p. 10, and 16 February 1938, p. 10. 
43 Ibid., 21 February 1938, p. 10. 
44 Ibid., 22 February 1938, p. 8. 
' Ibid, 24 February 1938, p. 10: `What Now, Prime Minister', by Ewer, and ibid., 28 February 1938, p. 
10. 
46 Ibid., 5 March 1938, p. 1: `Hitler's Terms: "Gag Your Press"', by Ewer; ibid., p. 10: Our Free Press'. 
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When the Austrian Anschluss took place, the Daily Herald argued that this ww as 
because of Chamberlain's weak foreign policy on the one hand, and Eden's resignation 
on the other. In contrast to Chamberlain's and Halifax's policy, it urged the restoration 
of collective security and a firm stand against further aggression, including an 
immediate assurance of British support for Czechoslovakia. 47 
In response to Chamberlain's announcement that rearmament would be 
accelerated, the Herald declared that `Arms Are Not Enough': rearmament without a 
firm and constructive foreign policy would be futile, but so long as Chamberlain was 
prime minister there could be no such policy. 48 Its conclusion was stark - that 
Chamberlain should resign: `his continuance is a danger to this country and to 
international peace'. 49 
The Herald's reactions to further events similarly reveal no evidence of a 
softened line towards the government and its policies. After the `May crisis', it 
published an article by Harold Laski50 which, on the first anniversary of Chamberlain 
becoming prime minister, condemned `the follies and ineptitudes of a year of 
premiership unequalled in British history'. He went on to reiterate the Herald's essential 
analysis of Chamberlain's policy, that he was `pretty clearly ... the obliging 
instrument 
of big business and little more. His interests are the safeguarding of the property-system 
and the maintenance of British imperialism'. 51 
Nor did the Daily Herald's critical comment and independent attitude abate in 
the period after Jay's June assertion about Halifax's influence. In July it leaked a story 
about what had been planned as a secret visit to London of Wiedemann, a close 
47 Ibid., and 14 March 1938, p. 10; ibid., 25 March 1938, p. 10. 
48 See ibid., 15 March 1938, p. 10. 
49 See for example Daily Herald, 17 March 1938, p. 10. 
50 Professor of Political Science at University of London; member of the Labour party's National 
Executive Committee and of Socialist League ('the guardian of the party's left wing conscience': Pimlott, 
Labour, pp. 41-2); editorial board of Tribune. 
51 See Daily Herald, 27 May 1938, p. 10: `Twelve Months of Mr. Chamberlain', by Harold Laski. 
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associate of Hitler -a leak which had the potential to weaken government efforts at 
rapprochement. 52 Chamberlain declared that the Herald had acted in a 'completer 
irresponsible manner'. 53 Shortly afterwards, it gave prominence to articles by the 
Labour party leader, Attlee, who accused the government of increasing the likelihood of 
war by its pursuit of a weak foreign policy. In contrast, he wrote, the Labour party 
represented collective security and a firm stand against aggression. 54 
During August the Herald argued for a strong stand against Hitler over 
Czechoslovakia, even to the point of risking war. Only by a firm expression of 
resistance could Hitler be checked and war prevented, avoiding similar wrong 
assessments to those which had precipitated the 1914 war. 55 In a further article, Attlee 
made much of Simon's Lanark speech, presenting it `as a warning that there is a limit to 
the tolerance which has been given hitherto to Fascist aggression. ' But he went well 
beyond the Cabinet in calling for a `positive peace policy' in the form of rallying the 
anti-fascist powers, on the basis of the League of Nations. 56 
More generally, a review of the Herald's reports during the first eight months of 
1938 supports its own reactions in August towards comments that different newspapers 
were offering news reports `painted' by their editorial policy. The Daily Herald's editor 
stated firmly that: `This paper does not paint the news. It gives the news. If the news is 
good, we give it. If the news is bad we report it, even though we know (and we know all 
right) that some people can't take bad news. '57 The terms of this statement are such that 
they seem to be a riposte not just to the debate about `biased' news reporting, 
but also to 
Southwood's commercial interest in `brightening' the newspaper's content. 
In any event. 
52 Ibid., 19 July 1938, p. 8. 
53 Quoted in Larry William Fuchser, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement. A Study in the Politics of 
History (New York, 1982), p. 134. 
sa E. g. Daily Herald, 26 July 1938, p. 8: `The Peace That People Seek', by 
Attlee. 
ss Ibid., 29 August 1938, p. 10. 
56 Ibid., 1 September 1938, p. 8: `Policy to rally the world', by Attlee. 
57 Ibid., 16 August 1938, p. 8: `News and Views'. 
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there is no evident sign of any curb on the editorial independence, not from Southwood 
and still less from the government. 
*** 
As the Czechoslovakian crisis developed, the Daily Herald added its voice to 
those of other `anti-appeasers' in calling for an early recall of Parliament. Its purpose 
was clear: to enable the various groups of MPs critical of the government to have better 
opportunities to press it to take a tough stance towards the German government. It 
rejected the assumption that this would emphasise `divisions in public opinion'. Instead, 
considering the circumstances, it would offer leadership when it was most needed. 
Parliament, in the newspaper's view, `does not habitually make a fool out of itself in a 
crisis. If it speaks, it will speak with restraint and, we believe, with unity'. 58 It should be 
clearly conveyed to the German leader that aggression towards Czechoslovakia would 
be met by united British, French and Russian resistance. 59 
Nevertheless, when Chamberlain's decision to visit Hitler was announced, its 
tone shifted: `Good luck, Mr Chamberlain! ' Chamberlain's mission `must win the 
sympathy of opinion everywhere, irrespective of Party'. 60 Cockett comments that 'how 
much of this attitude was due to the discussions Southwood had with Halifax is 
impossible to tell, but it was far removed from the usual tone of the paper's reporting up 
to that time'. 61 The revealing piece of evidence is the American Ambassador's report of 
Hoare saying that he had just spoken with Williams, and that he `felt that the Herald 
58 Ibid., 9 September 1938, p. 8. 
59 Ibid., 14 September 1938, p. 8. 
60Ibid., 15 September 1938, p. 8. 
61 Cockett, Twilight, p. 80. 
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would play ball'. 62 But this Hoare-Williams meeting occurred two days after the 
Herald's support for Chamberlain's first visit to Germany. The most plausible 
explanation for both the Herald's comments and Hoare's impression of Williams' 
attitude is the obvious one: that no British newspaper, however critical of the normal 
tendencies of government policy, would criticise a major effort to prevent a European 
war in advance of knowing the terms of such preservation of peace. Yet once the terms 
of Chamberlain's negotiations did become known, the Daily Herald (like the Labour 
party) recoiled with considerable force. In an editorial entitled `Hitler Wins', it declared 
that the `British government is involved in a shameful surrender to the threat of Herr 
Hitler', and feared that not only the interest of the Czechoslovakian people, but also 
Britain's vital interests were in danger; ultimately no border in Europe was safe. 63 
In contrast to Chamberlain's appeasement towards Nazi Germany, the Herald 
now firmly supported the Labour party's calls for an anti-fascist alliance with Soviet 
Russia. 64 Russia was now deemed to be an important part of any possible alliance. 65 It 
welcomed the Labour party's statement that `Britain, France and Russia should openly 
join hands together and let it be known that henceforward they would act in perfect 
concert', against further `unprovoked aggression'. 66 
The Herald did welcome the Munich settlement, but only to the very limited 
extent of sharing the widespread public relief that an immediate European war had been 
avoided. The sense of relief that entered the public's consciousness when the Munich 
conference was announced was perhaps natural, and was reflected in the newspaper. 
62 Kennedy to the Secretary of State, 17 September 1938, in Foreign Relations of the United States. 
Diplomatic Papers 1938, vol. 1, p. 611; Cockett, Twilight, p. 75. 
63 Daily Herald, 22 September 1938, p. 8, and see similar comments by Attlee to Chamberlain the 
previous day: Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 188. 
64 See Brookshire, `Speak for England', pp. 261-2, for Labour party's earlier doubts. 
65 Daily Herald, 23 September 1938, p. 10; see Naylor, Labour's, p. 293. 
66 Daily Herald, 27 September 1938, p. 8; see also ibid., 24 September 1938, p. 8. See Pimlott, Labour, p. 
4. 
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However, its reaction is described by one historian as `reserved in the extreme'. 67 This 
relief, it declared, `does not in any way absolve us from the necessity of continued clear 
analysis of the facts'. 68 These facts pointed to severe criticism of Chamberlain. The 
Munich settlement was in effect a bilateral Hitler-Chamberlain agreement, but peace 
could not be secured `bilaterally. It can be achieved only at a conference of all the 
Powers', by collective security. 69 More particularly, no agreement or policy which 
excluded the Russian government could really deter Hitler from another episode of 
aggression. So the Herald concluded that `war has been averted, but peace has not been 
secured'; indeed it went further and argued that it was Chamberlain's appeasement 
which had been `directly responsible for the war situation of last week', in encouraging 
Hitler to pursue his ambitions. 70 The Herald also went some way beyond official 
Labour policy in calling for an attempt to strengthen rearmament more drastically, so 
that Britain would not be threatened again by a more powerful neighbour. 71 
Through the winter, the Daily Herald continued to argue that the continuation of 
Chamberlain's policy would mean that further states in Europe would gradually be 
sacrificed, as a price for Britain's safety. Consequently, this would end in war. 72 The 
newspaper repeatedly called for Chamberlain's resignation. Williams wrote that the 
prime minister symbolised `a policy of slavish acquiescence in the aggression of the 
dictators, of readiness to sacrifice every democratic principle for a temporary reprieve'. 
The Daily Herald now called for a return to the original idea of collective security in the 
form of a widespread alliance system of the United States as well as France and 
Russia. 73 
67 Gannon, British Press, p. 218. 
68 Daily Herald, 29 September 1938, p. 8. 
69 Ibid, 1 October 1938, p. 8. 
70 Ibid., 3 October 1938, p. 10. 
" Ibid., 29 October 1938, p. 8. 
72 Ibid., 7 February 1939, p. 10; and ibid., 15 March 1939, p. 10; also ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 10. 
73 Ibid., 17 March 1939, p. 10; see ibid., 21 March 1939, p. 10, and ibid., 20 March 1939, p. 10. 
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The Daily Herald saw the German occupation of Prague as a consequence of the 
weak policy of Western Powers, which enabled Hitler to go ahead with his aggressive 
policy. `Let the British people not deceive themselves. This does concern us - and it is 
only inevitable because of our own failures and treacheries. ' 7' However, in no sense 
was Hitler's last act to be justified: `It is naked aggression, the planned and deliberate 
conquest of another country; an act of war. '75 Over the following days, however, the 
Herald was to be disappointed about the British government's inaction: Is the 
Government prepared to face up to the implications of German aggression and act 
accordingly, or is it not? It is time we had a definite answer'. 76 On the day the British 
government announced its guarantee to Poland, it painted a grim picture of the 
international situation: 
On the face of it the crisis of the minute may be Polish. But at bottom it is not a 
Polish crisis. It is a European crisis ... and unless swiftly and without more ado 
Europe faces its own peril and bands together to resist the common menace then 
nothing is plainer than that the free States of Europe will `hang separately'. " 
As war approached in August, the Herald had no doubt where, aside from the Nazi 
regime, the responsibility lay. Chamberlain's `criminal hesitation' towards the Russian 
government had made it distrustful of Britain and led to a pact with Hitler, a pact which 
enabled him to loose his armies against Poland. 
78 
*** 
It is, then, very difficult to conclude that the Daily Herald was subjected to 
successful government pressure or persuasion. There is some evidence of ministerial 
74 Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 10. 
75 Ibid., 16 March 1939, p. 10. 
76 Ibid., 29 March 1939, p. 8. 
7' Ibid., 31 March 1939, p. 8. 
78 Ibid., 22 August 1939, p. 8. 
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efforts to influence it, but it would be rash to conclude too much from this material. 
Certainly Halifax met and corresponded with Southwood in late 1937. but the exchange 
evidently focused on the `cruelty' of the Herald cartoonist's caricatures of German 
leaders, rather than on its editorial criticisms of government policy. The further 
evidence is tenuous: an unsubstantiated claim about further Halifax-Southwood 
meetings during the first half of 1938, and a second hand report about a Hoare-Williams 
meeting during the Czechoslovakian crisis. Aside from Jay's claim in June, there were 
no complaints about government pressure made by the editorial staff, not even in 
retrospect. Rather, the criticisms of Williams and other colleagues, and these include 
Jay's later complaints, were directed against Southwood, for arguing on commercial - 
not political - grounds that the newspaper contained too much grim reporting and 
comment on European news and foreign policy. This, it can be asserted, represented a 
form -a different form - of `capitalist' political pressure. Yet the effect of any such 
pressure cannot be found in the issues of the newspaper. This is where Cockett's large 
claims about the Herald really fall, in his failure to pursue his argument about `pressure' 
into an examination of the newspaper's reports, feature articles and editorial leaders. 
The Herald was the organ of the chief party opposed to the government; it extensively 
reported Labour politicians' assaults on the Cabinet: and its journalists and editors 
freely and persistently criticised Chamberlain and his policy. This was hardly a 
newspaper which was, in Cockett's phrase `surrendering its freedom' towards the 
government. Only for a few short days in September 1938 did it relent, and then for the 
same reason as those of the Labour party and all other anti-appeasers, including 
Churchill: because, in a desperately dangerous condition, it was prepared to give 
Chamberlain the benefit of the doubt and allow him the chance to demonstrate that he 
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could, after all, prevent a European war on acceptable terms. 79 But once the prospective 
terms became evident, like other anti-appeasers it reverted to its critical stance. 
Commercial and financial considerations were the foremost worries of the 
newspaper's proprietors; concern about political influence and pressure from the 
government were negligible or non-existent. A paper based purely on the financial 
success on the market would have to react to market forces and the thinking of its target 
readership, and it needed no hint from the government to avoid exaggerating the already 
volatile international situation. As an owner, Southwood was no exception: he was 
concerned about financial implications that would affect Odham's Press from running at 
full capacity, rather than by the quest of political influence. And clearly, the editor and 
the other journalists in the late 1930s were not interested in appeasing Hitler. It can be 
assumed that for the Daily Herald any attempts by Southwood to soothe the editorial 
line were likely to have caused the editor to be more critical in his stance towards 
appeasement. 8° 
Newspapers are always subject to varying degrees of influence from different 
directions. In the case of the Daily Herald it was from party leaders, trade union leaders, 
movement activists and journalists as well as commercial controllers, each anxious to 
articulate their point of view in the columns with their own specific ultimate goal. 
Although Labour leaders may have envisaged it as a loyal mouthpiece of their 
movement, the Daily Herald did not always adhere to the party line. But as McKibbin 
wrote: `The Herald had one indispensable quality; it was the only paper Labour had 
got', 8' making it therefore `a major price in intra-party battles'. 
82 
79 Richards, Bloody, p. 156. 
80 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 546. 
g' Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-24 (Oxford, 1974), p. 222. 
82 Richards, Bloody, p. 5. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is not possible or accurate to speak of there being such an entity as a 
`monolithic' press in the 1930s. The newspapers reflected the divisions and differences 
that existed between and within the political parties, and nowhere were these more 
pronounced than on the issues of German diplomacy and British rearmament. It was the 
political stance of each respective newspaper, rather than governmental pressure or 
`control', which determined whether its pages contained support for or criticism of 
Chamberlain's policies. 
It should not surprise us, however, that the government should have attempted to 
influence the newspapers, and through them the opinions of their readers, at such a 
critical time. It is clear that at various points in the increasingly fraught years of the late 
1930s Chamberlain and Halifax were greatly concerned at the possible effect of British 
newspaper comment on the opinion of the German government. In this context their 
desire to influence the newspapers and to moderate some of their reporting is 
understandable, especially if one argues on the basis of `national interest' that avoidance 
of war was desirable. This is even more so given a real fear that the Nazi leaders were 
so unstable that British press comment might trigger uncontrollable German reactions, 
and exacerbate the already tense situation. To appreciate this need, however, is not to 
say that the British press was directly controlled. In a pluralistic society, where each 
newspaper was subject to a range of pressures and influences, the attitudes of the 
various British newspapers were as various as the range of opinions in the country at 
large. The actual period where real, if somewhat oblique, governmental `influence' may 
be seen at work is limited to those few days in September 1938 when Beaverbrook 
asked for some `guidance'. If newspapers were prepared to listen at this 
juncture, 
however, it was out of a sense of responsibility towards the national interest, on the 
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grounds that everyone was united in the desire to avoid another war. Consequently. 
even normally critical newspapers from politically opposing ends of the spectrum, like 
the Liberal Manchester Guardian or News Chronicle, the Labour Daily Herald, and 
also the Conservative Yorkshire Post, toned down their criticism and gave Chamberlain 
the benefit of the doubt. 
The tacit approval of appeasement in certain newspapers around this time, at 
least until the terms of the Munich agreement became evident, owed little or nothing to 
government `interference' with the press. It was in part a reaction to practical 
considerations, but primarily it was determined by the ideological background and 
outlook of the respective newspapers. Born as it was out of the desire to avoid any 
repeat of the horrors of 1914-18, appeasement was, for many, a credible policy before 
the onset of Hitler. Some German grievances were seen as justified, not only by British 
newspapers, but also by politicians and the public. Even with the rise of Nazism the 
legitimacy of Hitler's demands for German equality remained as valid in principle as 
they had done under chancellors of the Weimar Republic, and Hitler skilfully tried to 
redress German grievances in such a way that he dealt with the least contentious issues 
first. Although a more daring move than those that had gone before it, the Anschluss in 
March 1938 was portrayed, with some success, as an extension of the doctrine of self- 
determination by German people. Up to that point, there seemed no strong argument for 
armed intervention, and the newspapers, on the whole, reflected this attitude. Only 
when confronted with the grievances of the Sudeten Germans did the issue became 
critical, due to the impact that self-determination would have upon another, non- 
German, nation state. 
Faced with the worsening international situation, newspaper editors and owners 
were aware of their role in shaping public opinion, but were also united in their belief 
that ultimately responsibility for their papers' content should remain where one would 
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expect it to be, with the owners and editors. They were prepared to exercise self- 
censorship out of their own sense of what was publicly desirable, when the `national 
interest' was at stake (the attitude known as `responsible editorship'). And given that in 
September 1938 everyone, including the anti-appeasers, wanted to avoid immediate war. 
it is not surprising that those with a part to play in shaping public opinion should, for a 
time, set criticism to one side and support Chamberlain's negotiations with Hitler. 
The editorials and news coverage of the newspapers in the late 1930s attracted 
the attention of a Royal Commission of the Press in 1947, on the grounds that they 
were regarded as having led the public astray. In particular the Commission focused 
upon perceived deficiencies in the papers' foreign policy coverage, which `invited 
subsequent accusations of collusion and censorship'. I Despite the fact that the 
Commission's main aim was concerned with the effects of concentration of ownership 
and influence of advertising on editorial policy, it found itself nonetheless addressing 
the possibility of censorship on the part of the government. 2 It concluded that 
advertising had no great effect on a paper's policy, and that the allegation of political 
manipulation in this area was also unfounded. 
3 It did concede that advertising played a 
greater role for newspapers with a weaker financial background (Daily Herald) than 
for the Beaverbrook newspapers, which could afford to compensate losses with profits 
from other newspapers. 
There might be some truth in the view that the Commission found nothing 
because the journalists did not want to draw attention to any collusion with the 
government on their part during the appeasement years, and that therefore advertising 
was an `easy scapegoat' for any perceived shortcomings. 
' This is some way short, 
however, of Cockett's sentiment that the Commission `could unfortunately 
detect no 
Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 542; also Cockett, Twilight, p. 1. 
2 Royal Commission on the Press, 1947-49, Report, para. 18, p. 4. 
3 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 640 and Seymour-Ure, The Press, Politics and the Public, p. 
120. 
4 Cockett, Twilight, p. 127. 
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such insidious influence', 5 which implies that the newspapers acted the way they did in 
response to pressure from the government. Cockett's choice of words, that it was 
`unfortunate' not to find the results he obviously expected to find, raises questions about 
the motivation of his thesis and his claim that the government did, in fact, exercise 
considerable control over the direction of the press at this time. 
Although the British government may, on occasion, have felt greater influence 
over the newspapers to be `desirable', it simply had no legal means of bringing any such 
pressure to bear. In fact, its ability to exert influence had been reduced by the gradual 
loosening of its ties with newspapers in the years that followed the First World War. 
The result of commercial developments in the 1920s and 1930s was a press which was 
more independent from both the government and the political parties. In itself, an 
independent press was not a cause for concern for the politicians, because in the past 
newspaper owners had shown that they were quite reliable supporters of particular 
parties. What was crucial in these interwar years was that at a time of great uncertainty 
and anxiety the newspaper owners, most notably the `press barons', were both aware of 
their potential influence and prepared to use their newspapers to voice their own 
political views, which were not always in accordance with the official party policy. 
The increased autonomy of newspaper owners greatly limited the British 
government's ability to directly influence a paper's policy. This explains Chamberlain's 
interest in the media: this interest is testimony to the vigorous independence and 
freedom of the press - not evidence of its subservience. The difficulties created 
by a 
vibrant press also explain his determination to muffle or silence alternative views from 
within government, particularly the Foreign Office News Department. 
6 The News 
Department, with Leeper at its head, and Vansittart as a strong supporter, had growing 
5 Cockett, `The Government, The Press and Politics in Britain 1937 to 1945' (PhD thesis, University of 
London, 1988), p. 6; see also idem, Twilight, p. 2. 
6 See Shepherd, Class Divided, p. 111. 
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reservations about Chamberlain's policy, and briefed its 'own' favoured journalists, the 
so-called `diplomatic correspondents', according to the Department's particular point of 
view. 
Chamberlain's approach to the media was, therefore, crucially informed both by 
an appreciation of its effectiveness, and an awareness that parts of the Foreign Office 
were critical of his policy of achieving a comprehensive agreement with Germany. It 
was, however, difficult to put his ideas for a combined policy of deterrence and 
appeasement, with the ultimate goal of achieving Anglo-German understanding, into a 
format that could be easily promoted. This was, on the one hand, due to the 
independence of the British press; on the other, because his policy was not without its 
opponents within Whitehall. 
Chamberlain had been used to briefing the press himself in areas where he had 
particular involvement, i. e. from 1931 the Treasury (and in the particular circumstances 
of late 1936, the abdication). In foreign affairs, however, there was already a well- 
established form of news `management', and from 1937 this Foreign Office line tended 
to give different emphasis in its briefings to those issues Chamberlain wished to 
promote. The disparity between those briefings offered by the Foreign Office and 
Number 10 increasingly bore witness to Chamberlain's attempts to counter what he 
perceived to be the alternative agenda proposed by Leeper and his colleagues. 
Chamberlain's increased concern with the content of certain newspapers was thus partly 
(and significantly) evidence of the government's awareness of the potential authority of 
the newspapers, and also a measure of the differing agendas operating within the 
government at this time. When assessing the late-1930s situation as part of the broader 
matrix of government-press relations, however, we should not be surprised that the 
government attempted to influence the newspapers, because that is what they always did. 
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Of great significance was the effect of newspaper criticism on Chamberlain 
himself. This study confirms Cockett's conclusion that he wrongly thought that what 
appeared in newspapers reflected `public opinion', ' and not the opinion of just a few 
individuals directing a paper's policy. It needs to be kept in mind that this thesis is not 
intended as a sociological study, and the question of how or if newspapers influenced 
the public is not its prime concern. It is, however, important to note that the British 
government and Hitler both thought that such influence existed. But Cockett's second 
conclusion about `public opinion', that `by controlling the press he [Chamberlain] was 
merely ensuring that the press was unable to reflect public opinion', has to be qualified. 
Obviously, the majority of Conservative newspapers tended to support Chamberlain in 
its editorials, but this was only one feature in a newspaper: features like news reports, 
letters or coverage of political speeches offered a broader and critical spectrum of 
opinion. Quite naturally, the Liberal and Labour press was less reserved in its criticism. 
Governments have tried to establish this control since the moment newspapers 
were first published in the early 18th century. Nor is it surprising that attempted control 
should be intensified at moments of great national danger; this had after all occurred 
during the First World War. The essentials had not changed in 1938. It remained the 
case that no government had an effective legislative or administrative means of 
controlling the press: it could not coerce, but only try to persuade. The success of 
persuasion depended ultimately on the decision of the owners and editors, not on what 
ministers said. This study has shown that throughout the 1930s the British government 
was not sure about how the press would react to certain domestic and international 
events - in other words, that the press was independent. 
What this independence amounts to is: (a) newspapers which did not sympathise 
with the government did not go to the government for opinions, and openly voiced their 
7 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 122. 
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opposition; and (b) those papers which were not opposed to the government did listen to 
the government. Is any of this surprising? And taking (b) especially, is this not crucial 
for understanding the situation? Chamberlain and his allies certainly wanted to 
influence the press, but they only had influence because the owners and editors were 
already inclined to agree or approve or sympathise - that is to say, the initiative in such 
an exchange lay with the newspapers. 
The question of why Halifax decided to see Layton, Southwood and 
Beaverbrook, but not other newspaper owners, after his 1937 visit to Germany is 
certainly important if seen within this context. It may have been the case that he did not 
need to make a point of seeing Dawson, who as a friend he saw often anyway, and he 
may have assumed that owners of other Conservative newspapers were broadly in 
sympathy with the government line, and that it was best to stick to seeing owners of the 
more independent-minded papers. If such was the case, it would explain his meeting 
with Layton and Southwood, representing as they did the main Liberal and Labour 
dailies. The fact that Halifax complained to Southwood about the cartoonist Dyson is 
probably indicative of why he also approached the independent-minded Beaverbrook - 
because of David Low. Halifax's concerns were specific: he was not attempting the 
impossible task of seeking to control opposition newspapers, but asking for greater 
sensitivity towards unusually touchy and dangerous foreign leaders, in the form of 
moderating the stronger criticisms. And his chief concern was not with reasoned 
political articles and editorials, but with the deliberately malicious caricature of 
cartoonists. 
In the wake of such meetings, however, the ultimate decision to shape a 
newspaper's content and tone still rested with its owner, and it follows that if some 
journalists were alienated to the point of producing their own newsletters it was in 
response to the decisions of their owners and editors, more than to pressure from 
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Chamberlain and the government. If this is so, the explanation for the support some, 
perhaps most (but never all) papers gave to Chamberlain lies chiefly with the press 
controllers, not the British government. Charles Warner, a Foreign Office official, 
confirmed that the growth of newsletters `is the reaction of the independent minded 
journalist to the control of the Press Lords and other interests'. 8 If support for the 
government was given, rather than successfully demanded, however, then we must 
regard it as proof that the press was fundamentally independent of government control. 
Such a press could, in certain circumstances, be susceptible to influence, but never to 
coercion. 
The extent to which Cockett's evidence consists of criticism of the attitude and 
conduct of newspapers as such, as opposed to proof of actual government influence on 
the content of the newspapers in question, is striking. Because he assumes that the 
newspapers were under government influence, he interprets complaints against 
newspapers as complaints against the government, and in doing so wholly overlooks the 
possibility (borne out by the evidence offered in this study) that papers adopted their 
own attitudes towards appeasement for their own reasons. Cockett is also prone to 
interpret criticisms of `the press' or `newspapers' as applying to all newspapers, when it 
is quite clear that the complaints are actually against just a few of them, mostly The 
Times and the Beaverbrook newspapers. 
In his desire to support his thesis Cockett offers certain words by Cranborne -a 
comment made retrospectively in August 1940 - as evidence of government control on 
the press, but his use of that quotation is characteristic of his style. What Cranborne said 
was not that the press was controlled by Chamberlain, but that the responsibility 
lay 
with the `personal interests and ambitions' of `certain owners', meaning the 
`press 
8 FO 395/362.2508, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 102. 
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lords'. 9 Cockett treats these words as a general condemnation of 'the press', and in 
doing so goes from particular cases to general assertions. 
The strongest alternative to the straw man of government pressure is the 
possibility that owners and editors had strong views of their own on Germany, British 
policy and the prospect of war - and that these created a prior reason for their support 
for Chamberlain, or at least their readiness to exercise restraint when urged to do so by 
ministers. If some press controllers did not sympathise with Chamberlain's policy, then 
they publicly disagreed even though they were financed by the Conservative party, as 
happened with the Yorkshire Post. 
The reaction of the so-called `anti-appeasers' or opposition, further illustrates the 
lack of government press `control'. Did Churchill, Eden, Amery and Liberal and Labour 
politicians believe that alternative views were being suppressed in the press? The anti- 
appeasers may have been worried about the arguments in the editorial pages, but were 
their own views suppressed? If they had been as worried as Cockett suggests, there 
would surely have been complaints from them. Memoirs, diaries and correspondence of 
the leading critical politicians contain no serious complaints. Aside from the free speech 
available in Parliament and transmitted by the still strong practice of newspaper 
reporting of parliamentary debates, the non-parliamentary speeches of leading 
politicians were printed in full, or substantially so, in the leading broadsheet national 
newspapers - whether The Times, Daily 
Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, Netit's 
Chronicle or Daily Herald - as well as in most local newspapers. 
Understandably each 
tended to be biased in their choice of reports towards members of the party to which 
they felt allegiance, but The Times, for instance, normally printed the speeches of 
Churchill, Eden, Sinclair and Attlee. 1° Anti-appeasement politicians were also invited to 
write articles in the major papers, some in series. From 1937 to 
1938 Churchill wrote 
9 Cranborne to Arthur Mann, 13 August 1940, quoted in Cockett, Twilight, p. 186: emphasis added. 
10 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 572,577. 
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fortnightly articles in Beaverbrook's Evening Standard, and although he was dropped 
because he contradicted Beaverbrook's views, he was immediately re-employed by the 
Daily Telegraph. Again, any `censorship' located in these examples owes more to the 
views of the respective newspaper owners than a co-ordinated policy of government 
`control'. 
The views of the left were also very actively propagated in the publications of 
the Left Book Club or in different newsletters. They were indeed so successful that 
other parties felt they had to counteract them, fearing the success of socialist and 
communist ideas - hence the creation in 1937 of a Right Book Club, National Book 
Association, and Liberal Book Club. This was a period of intense ideological debate, 
propaganda and publication. The creation of the British Association for International 
Understanding was a reaction to fears in late 1938 that the government was losing the 
propaganda war, not a further example of government control of the media. 
This study, informed as it has been by a wider range of primary documentation 
than Cockett chose to employ for his research, has shown that Cockett's claims that the 
Chamberlain government, through its close control of the press, certainly succeeded in 
subverting democracy during the years 1937 to 1940' and that `no alternative policy to 
appeasement as pursued by Chamberlain could ever be consistently articulated in the 
British press', are inaccurate. l l 
Aside from what has been suggested above - that anti-appeasement opinion and 
press criticism continued to be expressed - one might reflect on what happened from 
March 1939. Appeasement was undermined, and finally collapsed; Chamberlain's 
control of his own Cabinet was challenged from within, and newspaper criticism 
mounted; following political and newspaper pressure, he had to bring Churchill and 
Eden into the Cabinet in September 1939; and in May 1940 he was overthrown. What 
Cockett, Twilight, pp. 189 and 188. 
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Cockett chooses to see as increasingly critical newspaper comment surely contradicts 
his strong claims about government `control' - because here we see press owners and 
editors, even the previously most `loyal' ones, criticising the government. 12 What we 
see in this period from March 1939 is not the failure of Chamberlain's efforts at control, 
but a reduced readiness of some newspaper controllers to listen to and take heed of his 
appeals. There were, then, further efforts at influence, which were unsuccessful. These 
attempts were now being made from a more defensive, even beleaguered, standpoint: 
the government felt it was in danger of losing the propaganda battle, and so was 
counter-acting. None of this suggests that free speech, free press or `democracy' had 
been subverted. 
The outbreak of war in September 1939 changed the relationship between the 
government and the press completely. The government now acquired the legal means to 
interfere with newspaper policy on the grounds that national security might be 
endangered by excessive criticism. The Ministry of Information set up a Press and 
Censorship Bureau to control and centralise news dissemination. 13 The reactions of the 
newspapers to this development are significant: they give clear indications on how its 
relationship with the government had worked earlier. The Ministry's efforts to censor 
the newspapers were regarded as contrary to what had existed at any earlier time except 
during the 1914-18 war. Protest against these efforts immediately surfaced, and even 
Dawson, a steadfast supporter of Chamberlain, had to admit that `censorship were 
committing incredible follies'. 
14 Initially, the Lobby journalists themselves demanded a 
return to the pre-war relationship, which `had proved so mutually valuable in the past'. 
1' 
Then, only a few days later, the Ministry of Information's own press committee 
12 See especially ibid., pp. 112-6. 
13 For a detailed examination see Ian McLaine, The Ministn, of Morale (London, 1979). 
14 See Dawson diary, entries of 5,6, September 1939. 
15 Lobby Journalists Committee to the Prime Minister, 21 September 1939, PREM 1/391. 
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expressed concern. 16 These reactions show that all levels of the press were dissatisfied 
with the newly-introduced censorship powers. While they accepted the principle of a 
wartime need for some government `influence' on the content of the media, they 
disliked it in practice and contrasted it with the freedom of newspaper comment before 
the war - including that of the appeasement period. Furthermore, this study shows that 
the Lobby system, so heavily criticised by some historians, 17 was content with the way 
it worked before the war, because it worked both ways, with mutual advantages for the 
government and the press. 
It is fitting to conclude this study with a statement from Chamberlain, who was 
accused of having `manipulated' the British press, but who as late as February 1939 
complained about the lack of influence he could exert. His comment that `I wish the 
Press could be controlled a bit better' 18 shows not the success of a policy of control, but 
rather an awareness that the newspapers' fundamental independence kept them outside 
his influence. What makes this statement still more remarkable is the fact that it was 
not, as one might expect, a comment on the opposition newspapers, but was directed 
against the two most important Conservative papers, the Daily Telegraph and The Times. 
This comment also needs to be set in the context of Hitler's cancellation of the Anglo- 
German Naval Agreement, which he justified as a response to `the anti-German attitude 
of the British Press, prompted by the British Government'. ` The comment clearly refers 
to the sharp change in attitude of some papers, including the Daily Telegraph and The 
Times. This highlights a strong contrast between two arguments: firstly, Cockett's claim 
that Chamberlain `controlled' the press in favour of appeasing Germany; and, secondly, 
the German government accusations that the British press was mostly hostile, indeed 
16 See Press Committee of the MOI to the Prime Minister, 28 September 1939, PREM 1/391. 
17 See Cockett, Twilight, p. 4-8; also James Margach, The Anatomy of Power: an Enquire. into the 
Personality of Leadership (London, 1979), p. 129. 
18 Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 12 February 1939, NC 18/1/1085. 
19 See Times, 29 April 1939, p. 13; see also Gannon, British Press, p. 269. 
21 
provocative, towards Germany and, most importantly, its claim that this hostility was 
encouraged by the British Government. The distinction between the two claims could 
hardly be sharper, even if one bears in mind that the German government's accusations 
had a propaganda purpose. Even so, it is plain not just from the German complaints but 
also from the Chamberlain-Halifax efforts to restrain the press that there was not in fact 
British government `control'. If Chamberlain had no control over supposedly *friendly' 
Conservative newspapers, he certainly lacked influence on the opposition press. 
Without denying that Chamberlain and his closest allies attempted to influence 
newspapers and on occasion had success with some sympathetic newspapers, it remains 
doubtful that even in these cases this `pressure' was decisive because, as Koss 
commented, editors were resolved to commit their own mistakes'. 20 
Newspapers shared with the public the feeling that another war had to be 
averted. To achieve this ultimate goal they needed no external pressure to remind them 
of the power newspapers could wield over public and political attitudes towards the 
international situation: the outbreak of the First World War proved to be reason 
enough. 21 It was therefore the decision of the proprietor or editor whether to calm the 
fears of his readers and to support appeasement, as long as it was in accordance with the 
overall policy of the paper. In the final analysis, therefore, it was the press controllers, 
and not the government, who decided the political stance of a paper and who had direct 
influence on the control of news. 22 
'" Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, p. 576. 
21 See ibid., ii, p. 543, and Bernhard Rosenberger, Zeitungen als Kriegstreiber? Die Rolle der Presse im 
Polfeld des Ersten Weltkrieges (Cologne, 1998). 
22 See Koss, Rise and Fall, ii, pp. 544,579, and Seymour-Ure, Press, Politics and the Public, p. 16. 
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